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The two old, simple problems ever intertwined, 
Close home, elusive, present, baffled, grappled. 
By each successive age insoluble, pass'd on, 
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To ours today- and we pass on the same.' -Walt Whitman 
is there any meaning in my life which will not be annihilated by the 
inevitability of death which awaits me?' -Count Leo Tolstoy 
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'Can you tell me, boss ... why do people die? ... all those damned books you 
read - what good are they? Why do you read them? If they don't tell you 
that, what do they tell you?'- 'Zorba the Greek' (Nikos Kazantzakis) 
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Abstract of Nihilism in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas, a thesis submitted by 
Toby Smith for the degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Durham, 2006. 
6 
This thesis presents an account of nihilism in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, and a 
critical response to it using the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas. 
Chapter one gives an account of the three different types of nihilism in Nietzsche's 
writings, and of how the latest outbreak of nihilism, modern European, came about. Chapter 
two presents Nietzsche's own responses to modern European nihilism, focusing on the 
overman, the will to power, the eternal recurrence and his view of truth, and points out the 
disturbing ethical implications of Nietzsche's responses to nihilism. Chapter three places 
Nietzsche's philosophy within the context of Heidegger's account of nihilism as 
'forgetfulness of Being', and considers Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche and the notion of 
'values', Heidegger's account of the philosophical tradition since Plato, and his reflection on 
our 'technological' understanding of Being as an inevitable result of the 'forgetfulness of 
Being'. Chapter four discusses how Being and Time and its critique of Descartes and the 
subject-object distinction can be seen as a response to nihilism as the 'forgetfulness of 
Being', and as an implicit part of Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche. Chapter five considers 
Heidegger's response to nihilism in terms of his writings on authenticity, art, language, and 
thinking, and shows how all of these features of Heidegger's thought aim to attune us to 
Being as the mysterious 'source' of all particular understandings of being, a source to which 
we are beholden for the sense we are able to make in our lives. The potentially dangerous 
features of this picture of human life are then addressed, as is the lack of an explicitly ethical 
dimension to 1-leidegger's response to Nietzsche's explicitly ethical account of nihilism. 
Chapter six gives an account of Levinas's phenomenology of ethics and his critique of 
Heidegger and the philosophical tradition as 'philosophies of the Same'. It presents Levinas's 
theses concerning the importance of the other person in giving philosophical accounts of 
language, truth, and objectivity, and the heteronomous nature ofthe moral subject, as a way 
of making good the lack of an explicitly ethical response to Nietzschean nihilism in 
Heidegger's philosophy. 
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Introduction 
1. Why nihilism? Why Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas? 
Hermann Hesse, in The Glass Bead Game, describes a people who 
... assiduously learned to drive automobiles, to play difficult card 
games and lose themselves in crossword puzzles - for they faced 
death, fear, pain, and hunger almost without defences, could no longer 
accept the consolation of the churches, and could obtain no useful 
advice from Reason . 1 
These people are us. There was a time when being an 'atheist' or a 'nihilist' 
was a costly business - it might cost one one's friends, one's mental health, 
even one's life. People knew then how much was at stake. Not so now. There 
has been a forgetting or, to use Karen Carr's excellent phrase, a 
'banalization of nihilism', a collective ducking of the challenges that 
nihilism thrusts upon us, an evasion that results in taking a corrosive kind of 
relativism and commodification of life as 'the norm'. Martin Heidegger 
refers to this as the 'homelessness' of modern man. My concern in this thesis 
is to take nihilism seriously, to face the challenges it poses us in the form of 
Nietzsche's philosophy, with the help of the work of Heidegger and Levinas. 
If philosophers are the 'insomniacs of the age', those who remain awake 
whilst others are sleeping, then I would argue that nihilism is one of the 
issues that is most likely to cause us sleepless nights. 
George Steiner, at the start of Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky?(two men 
deeply concerned with the question of nihilism, of course), writes: 
Great works of art pass through us like storm-winds, flinging open the 
doors of perception, pressing upon the architecture of our beliefs with 
their transforming powers. We seek to record that impact, to put our 
shaken house back in order. 2 
~-- ----- - __ . ·_- ----~ -'------ -- ---=-=-
------------------- -'-- --------------
------------------------
1 Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game (London: Vintage, 2000), p.22. 
2 George Steiner, Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky? (London: Penguin, 1967), p.ll. 
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This was my experience of reading Nietzsche. I am still trying to register the 
shock of impact and put my house back in order, and this thesis is part of my 
attempt to do that. I have enlisted the help of Heidegger and Levinas in 
doing so. Heidegger, besides exerting a massive influence on contemporary 
philosophy, himself takes up the challenge of Nietzsche and nihilism. 
Levinas's approach to ethics offers a way of thinking about ethics that may 
escape Nietzsche's corrosive critique of morality. 
Nietzsche, Heidegger· and Levinas. A German philologist, son of a 
pastor, one time friend of Wagner, sickly loner, itinerant wanderer of 
Europe, jotting down notes during long hikes in the Swiss Alps, notes on the 
imminent collapse of a two thousand year old way of life and thought. A 
Swabian professor of philosophy, son of a sexton, one time member of the 
Nazi party, deeply rooted in provincial peasant life, writing away in his hut 
in the Black Forest, or preparing lectures for enraptured students - writings 
and lectures on the question of Being, the forgetfulness of this question 
going back to Plato, and the increasingly technological and objectifying 
modes of life and thought we are left with as a result. A Lithuanian Jew who 
settled in France, most of whose family were murdered in the Holocaust, 
deeply steeped in the Jewish tradition, writing essays and articles on the 
face of the other person, and the suppression of otherness through totalising 
modes of thought that lead to totalitarian regimes; writing always with the 
memory of the Holocaust and the voices of the Old Testament prophets in his 
mind. Writing a dialogue about what would happen if these three 
extraordinary men found themselves rn the same room would be very 
interesting and good fun to do. This thesis is a attempt to do something 
similar, in a more academic format: to bring these three thinkers into 
dialogue, around the issue of nihilism. 
2. Nihilism and the Impulse to Phi/osophise 
There is a sense in which nihilism can be seen as latent in the impulse 
to philosophise itself._ S()cra!(.l~_w_a~ e_xecuted for ~aring to, guest_ion, the---~--~" _____ _ 
city's gods, daring to ask for definitions of the virtues above and beyond the 
14 
cave of the particular culture within which he found himself. The powers 
that be in Athens were right to execute him insofar as they realised how 
important belief in the gods of the city is for the successful functioning of a 
society. Why is this? In the Phaedo Socrates describes philosophy as the 
practice of learning to die. More than anything else, we derive our 'courage 
to be' from our culture and its gods, from the roles which we play in it, the 
'hero systems' that generate our sense of self-esteem, and enable us to evade 
our fear of death (this is Ernest Becker's admirable thesis in The Birth and 
Death of meaning, The Denial of Death, and Escape from Evil, none of 
which can be recommended too highly). So, in questioning those gods, in 
questioning that Athenian hero system, Socrates is questioning what enables 
people to live, above and beyond basic 'necessities' like food and shelter. 
To practice such questioning and to attempt to think beyond the cave was a 
revolutionary activity (which is why we have still heard of Socrates two 
thousand five hundred years later), and is a form of dying. As Becker puts it: 
It [renouncing the security of the values that have made life liveable 
up to this point] is, as the Stoics and Shakespeare had already taught 
us, the going through hell of a lonely and racking rebirth where one 
throws off the !endings of culture, the costumes that fit us for life's 
roles, the masks and panoplies of our standardized heroisms, to stand 
alone and nude facing the howling elements as one's self- a trembling 
animal element. ... when, like Lear, a person has thrown off his 
cultural !endings, he is as weak and helpless as a new born babe. 3 
Such is the challenge of Socrates, the challenge of philosophy. It is also the 
challenge of Nietzsche and nihilism. Nietzsche too is questioning the city's 
gods, questioning the Judea-Christian tradition. This is why his thought is so 
frightening, and why we might so easily evade its challenge. With 
unparalleled audacity, Nietzsche tries to rip apart the Judea-Christian 'hero 
system'. This raises serious problems. What might take its place? Is it 
possible to effect such a breach with the past? Are we willing to adopt 
Nietzsche's immoralism and elitism? Does his critique of morality entail 
______ ~~cb immoral ism anE ~eJ iti_smJ Js ltJlc_~!i_~ibJ~" !_ojiy~_<i~_t!t~J_igb!_ _of_~Q_IJl~!h_i (1g 
3 Ernest Becker, The Birth and Death of Meaning (London: the Free press, 1962), p.147-8. 
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holy or sacred, something beyond human measure, without it being God? And 
how are we to think of ethics after Nietzsche? These are all questions I shall 
be addressing in the thesis. 
3. A Brief History of Nihilism -Jacobi, the Russians, Schopenhauer 
I want to give a brief history of the emergence of the word 'nihilism'. 
'Nihil' is the Latin word for 'nothing', so we can literally t1·anslate the word 
as 'nothingism'. As Critchley points out, the word 'nihilism' was first used, 
as far as we know, by Jacobi in 1799 in his 'Letter to Fichte' .4 In this letter 
Jacobi accuses Fichte of nihilism because, in the latter's philosophy, nothing 
is permitted to exist outside of the ego. The word 'nihilism' first began to 
emerge more broadly as a part of a people's vocabulary amongst the 
Russians, which is hardly a surprise: the deep, dark depths of the proverbial 
'Russian sou I' seem an appropriate womb for it to issue out of. Bazarov in 
Turgenev's Father and Sons ( 1862) is described as a nihilist. Tolstoy and 
Dostoyevsky, perhaps more than Turgenev, grappled with the issue of 
nihilism in their lives and writings. In 'My Religion' ( 1884) Tolstoy 
describes most of his adult life -the period in whic·h he raised a family, ran 
several estates, founded schools for peasants, and wrote two of the 
masterpieces of world I iterature, War and Peace and Anna Karen ina - as the 
life of a nihilist: 
I have lived in the world fifty-five years, and after the fourteen or 
fifteen years of my childhood, for thirty five years of my life I was, in 
the proper acceptation of the word, a nihilist,- not a socialist and 
revolutionist, as is generally understood by that word, but a nihilist 
in the sense of one who believed in nothing. 5 
We can also see the roots of nihilism in the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer, a philosopher much loved by Tolstoy and Nietzsche. Whi 1st 
4 Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy: a very short introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, '200 I). 
5 Leo Tolstoy, 'My Religion', in Religionfrom Tolstoy to Camus Walter Kaufmann ed., (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1961 ). 
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Schopenhauer does not himself use the word, a nihilistic mood pervades his 
thinking. Safranski, an astute biographer of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, is surely right when he claims, 'Schopenhauer is the philosopher 
of the pain of secularization, of metaphysical homelessness, of lost original 
confidence'. 6 Nietzsche himself wrote, 'As we thus reject the Christian 
interpretation and condemn its 'meaning' like counterfeit, Schopenhauer 's 
question immediately comes to us in a terrifying way: Has existence any 
meaning at all?' (GS: 357 I p.308). The question 'Has existence any meaning 
at all?' hovers like a palimpsest behind Schopenhauer's work. He argues that 
philosophy begins in a downbeat mood, a mood of disappointment, 
exasperation with, even despair of, life. In memorable lines he writes: 
... philosophy, like the overture to Don Juan, starts with a minor 
chord .... it is wickedness, evil, and death that qualify and intensify 
philosophical astonishment. Not merely that the world exists, but still 
more that it is such a miserable and melancholy world, is the punctum 
pruriens [tormenting problem] of metaphysics, the problem awakening 
in mankind an unrest that cannot be quieted either by scepticism or 
criticism. 7 
If this is where it begins, it ends, if practised rightly (or if you agree with 
Schopenhauer) in the recognition that the value of I ife is that it teaches you 
not to want it, and that, ' ... this very real world of ours with all its suns and 
galaxies, is - nothing.' 8 We can accommodate ourselves to these sobering 
facts by practising renunciation, and getting over the 'inborn error' of 
believing that man was made for happiness. However, for all its 'nihilism', 
Schopenhauer's philosophy evokes a much more sturdy, reassuring and 
comfortable world than the one we find in Nietzsche. The truths that 
Schopenhauer expresses rationally in his philosophy are, he argues, 
expressed mythically in the great world-denying religions - Buddhism, 
6 Rudiger Safranski, Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy (Cambridge, Masachussetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1990) . 
. -
7 Arthur.Schopenhauer,The World as Will andRepresentation,yo/.II(NewYork:_Dover,,I966),_p.J1b 
2. 
8 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol.I, (New York: Dover, 1960), p.412. 
17 
Hinduism and Christianity- in order for the masses to be able to understand 
them, traditions and ways of life that have been built up over millennia to 
accommodate us to the true nature of things, so boldly - unforgettably -
spe lied out by Schopenhauer. 
Thus, we can see the concept of nihilism emerging in response to 
Kant's critical philosophy, in Jacobi's worries about Fichte's idealism; in 
the Russian educated classes of the 1860s - in the lives and writings of 
Turgenev, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy amongst many others - and in the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer. However, it is Nietzsche that gave the concept 
the kind of centrality it enjoys to this day. Therefore, I begin the thesis with 
examining his treatment of nihilism. 
4. Works on Nihilism 
Nihilism is not a topic that has attracted a great deal of debate in 
Anglo-American philosophy, perhaps partly because it falls between the two 
stools of philosophy and religion in university departments, and perhaps also 
because it is too vague and 'sociological' a topic to attract the attention of 
more analytically minded philosophers. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
relatively recent books which do address themselves to this topic, and from 
which I have taken guidance and, in some cases, inspiration. Simon 
Critchley's Continental Philosophy: a very short introduction contains 
excellent introductory material on the Kantian background to nihilism, and a 
succinct summary of Russian and Nietzschean nihilism. His book Very Little 
... Almost Nothing also contains a very lucid framing of nihilism in the 
philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger. James Edwards' two books, The 
Authority of Language: Heidegger, Wittgenstein and the Threat of 
Philosophical Nihilism, and The Plain Sense of Things: the Fate of Religion 
in an age of Normal Nihilism, have informed this thesis, not least because 
Heidegger looms large in Edwards's suggestions as to how to respond to 
nihilism. The former book, with its argument for language as a source of 
authority for our lives which exceeds human control, has influenced the 
~e_c:_tjo_n~ on. l!!ng_!.l!!g~~- in _ _f!Hl.J>!~f f_iye. J(a_!~IL C~rr:~-""~·ex~eU~n~L_bo()JL_[h_~ 
Banlization of Nihilism I found salutary for its indictment of Rorty's 
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pragmatism as a 'banalization of nihilism', and for its emphasis on a 
religious dimension to nihilism missing from Rorty. In Allan Bloom's classic 
The Closing of the American mind recognized myself and my 
contemporaries in his portrait of students and the corrosive relativism, 
excessive freedom and lack of genuine 'eros' that can be found amongst us. I 
have also drawn inspiration from his account of the history of Western 
culture in terms of the gradual institutionalization of Socratic rationality, 
culminating in the Enlightenment project, and the need for a response to the 
failure of that project, a failure made so apparent by Nietzsche and 
1-Jeidegger. Lastly, Jonathan Glover's book, Humanity: a moral history of the 
twentieth century, whilst not primarily a work of philosophy, emphasises the 
link between Nietzsche's attack on Judea-Christian morality, and the 
atrocities of twentieth century history, a link that shall concern me 
especially when considering Levinas's contribution to the issue of nihilism. 
5. The Structure of the Thesis 
The specific way in which I have chosen to address the issue of 
nihilism is as follows. I have asked myself, 'What does Nietzsche mean by 
nihilism, and what is the nature of the challenge that it poses us?'. Then I 
consider the question: how successfully, and in what ways, does 1-Jeidegger 
answer it? Consideration of this question led me to a further one concerning 
the explicitly ethical dimension of Nietzsche's challenge, and the extent to 
which Heidegger's philosophy responds to this; which in turn led me to the 
work of Levinas, and to the question of whether Levinas achieves such a 
response. 
In chapter one, I begin by distinguishing the three principal kinds of 
nihilism in Nietzsche's writings: original, ascetic and modern European. The 
concept of original nihilism- the idea that, as beings who know we are going 
to die, and who are self-conscious about their suffering, we are intrinsically 
prey to nihilism - runs throughout the thesis. I then trace the shift from a 
non-nihilistic to a nihilistic response to suffering, with reference to The 
Birth of Traged)' ttnd Nietzsche's _d~~cussion ?( ~~cra_t~~_!__!Vh~~~~-_!_~.!'~d_s to,_~--­
clarification of ascetic nihilism. Then I discuss the origins of modern 
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European nihilism, with particular reference to the rise of the scientific 
world view, and the critical philosophy of Kant. I then discuss Nietzsche's 
Kantian-Darwinian reflections on the nature of knowledge, as forming the 
theoretical basis for modern European nihilism. 
Chapter two deals with Nietzsche's proposals for responding to 
modern European nihilism. Here I discuss the fear of an insipid relativism 
breeding an epidemic of soulless mediocrity which Nietzsche feared as one 
possible outcome of modern European nihilism. This is contrasted with the 
superman, who creates new values, and, crucially, has the strength to do so 
whilst recognising that value and truth are ultimately human creations that 
bear no direct relation to a reality that transcends human interests and 
concerns. I then discuss Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power, how 
'metaphysical' a doctrine it is, and how it sits alongside his claims about the 
perspectival nature of all knowledge. I then discuss what, in Nietzsche's 
view, a non-nihilistic response to suffering involves, with reference to 
Zarathustra's teaching on the eternal recurrence. I also point out what kind 
of political structures Nietzsche thought would most favour the overcoming 
of nihilism and the production of the superman, and demonstrate how this is 
implicit in his doctrine of the will to power. Finally, I raise a number of 
criticisms about Nietzsche's account of nihilism, particularly: is it possible 
to live in the world and to create values without believing that one's beliefs 
and values have some degree of objective validity, that they are more than 
simply choices or posits? Can we be happy with a vision of overcoming 
nihilism that compels most people to live for the sake of the few 'higher 
men' whose creativity may render human life meaningful? More generally, is 
the creativity of the few the right place in which to search for a solution to 
nihilism? 
In chapter three I turn to Heidegger, with the question of the 
feasability of Nietzsche's v1ew of truth and value as 'all too human' 
products of the drive for greater power in mind. Having briefly introduced 
'the question of Being', I give an account of Heidegger's interpretation of 
l'Jietzsche, fo~.?_using on Heidegger'~ ~argul'l1ent !_!l~at t~ thi_nk ___ q_f__nihp}_sm. in 
terms of values, as Nietzsche does, betrays a 'forgetfulness of Being', and a 
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subjectivization of truth, which he contrasts with an attentiveness to Being 
that he claims to find traces of in the pre-Socratic philosophers. I show how 
Heidegger locates the beginnings of this forgetfulness in Plato, and explain 
Heidegger's notion of a 'history of Being', the place that Nietzsche occupies 
in it, and his relationship to Heidegger's reflections on our age as the age of 
'technology'. 
Chapters four and five are devoted to Heidegget·'s account of how to 
respond to nihilism - nihilism as he has demarcated it, nihilism as 
'forgetfulness of Being', which includes Nietzsche's thought. I discuss 
Being and Time and its attack on the Cartesian subject-object distinction -
which, Heidegger claims, underlies Nietzsche's thought - with reference to 
its account of our 'being-in-the-world' and language. I then point out that 
the very intention to overcome nihilism is itself nihilistic, in Heidegger's 
view, because it is symptomatic of thinking that nihilism is a product of 
human thinking and doing, rather than something 'sent' us by Being itself. I 
then discuss Heidegger' s writings on authenticity and anxiety in terms of 
nihilism, arguing that within them we can see the roots of an attempt to 
become aware of ourselves as disclosers, and through so doing become more 
attuned to Being - not human agency or the will to power - as the source of 
this disclosing. I then examine Heidegger's meditations on art, language, 
thinking and the 'four fold' as ways of attuning us to Being, to a measure for 
our I ives beyond mere human fabrication for the enhancement of power, 
which nevertheless does not become some Platonic style 'true world'. 
Finally, I consider the success of Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche and his 
own account of nihilism. I suggest that it addresses the feasability of 
Nietzsche's 'all too human' account of the origins of truth and value, and 
demonstrates how this strand of Nietzsche's thought is closely related to the 
prevailing tendency of our day towards a 'technological' understanding of 
Being, towards increasing objectivization, standardization and 
commodification. However, the same strand in Heidegger's thought that 
makes it such a potent opponent of Nietzschean nihilism also renders it 
dangerous in some respects, and this leads me to criticize the passivity of 
_ J~!~L Hei9egger's~_p)£t,_yr~~<>L~nU~I] in r~l~tion to. B,t;:j}Jg, a pf!_s~ivityo tflat hj!s 
potentially dangerous social and political implications. Moreover, Heidegger 
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does not, 111 his response to Nietzsche and in his philosophy overall, give 
sufficient attention to the explicitly ethical dimension of Nietzsche's 
thought: to the abhorrent nature of the values that Nietzsche upheld as 
paramount as a consequence of viewing the essence of life as will to power, 
and the equally abhorrent nature of the kind of political structures Nietzsche 
thought were imp I ied by those values. I argue that the events of twentieth 
century history, events that occurred as it were in Heidegger's backyard, 
might have been more than enough to alert him to this failing, and that one 
of the most significant aspects of technology is the dramatic change it has 
led to both in our capacity for good and evil and our ability to take 
responsibility for our actions, neither of which he devotes much explicit 
thought to. 
These shortcoming in Heidegger's thought lead me, in chapter six, to 
discuss whether the work of Levinas addresses these failings. Here I discuss 
his critique of Western philosophy as a 'philosophy of the Same', with 
particular reference to Nietzsch_e and Heidegger, and argue that this critique 
sheds light on both of these thinkers. I explain the central features of 
Levinas's phenomenology of ethics, and argue that, by arguing that the 
ethical relation with the face of another person lies at the origins of 
language, self-consciousness and the very possibility of a shared world; that 
justice is ontologically prior to freedom, and that, prior to the autonomous 
act of choosing our values there is our heteronomous passivity in the face of 
responsibilities to others that originated prior to our birth and which we 
never freely took on, it offers a way of thinking about ethics that evades 
Nietzsche's scathing critique of Judeo-Christian morality, and points the 
way to a just politics. As such, it forms a much needed complement to 
Heidegger's response to Nietzsche's nihilism. 
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Chapter One: Nietzsche on what Nihilism is and! how it 
came about 
1. The Three Different Kinds of Nihilism: Original, Ascetic, and Modern 
European 
As I have mentioned, the term 'nihilism' was first used by Jacobi, in a 
letter to Fichte. In words the prophetic nature of which will become apparent 
as we consider Nietzschean nihilism, Jacobi laments: 
But the human being has such a choice, this single one: Nothingness 
or a God. Choosing Nothingness, he makes himself into a God; that is, 
he makes an apparition into God because if there is no God, it is 
impossible that man and everything which surrounds him is not merely 
an apparition. I repeat: God is, and is outside of me, a living being, 
existing in itself, or I am God. There is no third. 9 
It was Nietzsche who brought the concept of nihilism centre stage in 
philosophy, and characterized it in the kind of ways in which people use the 
word now. Surprisingly, the concept of nihilism appears hardly at all in his 
published writings. It is in the unpublished The Will to Power notebooks in 
which Nietzsche explicitly explores the concept at some length. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that much of the published work can be seen as 
leading towards the concept of nihilism as Nietzsche unfolds it in his 
unpublished notes. Much of what I have to say concerning Nietzsche on 
nihilism will be drawn from the published writings. What I am initially 
going to do is to explain the main ways in which Nietzsche uses the term 
nihilism. There are three. 
Actually, he sketches several more, but they need not detain us here: 
the following are the main three. Firstly, there is what we might call an 
'original nihilism'. There are two main ways of looking at this. One is to say 
that human life is essentially or constitutionally nihilistic, and that we can 
9 Quoted in Critchley (200 I), p.27. 
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only endure life on the basis of particular interpretations which we impose 
upon the world 111 order to render the suffering that is coeval with life 
meaningful and therefore bearable. These interpretations form the basis of 
culture. This point was made in the 'Introduction', section two. Secondly, 
this original nihilism can be said to refer to a particular historical outbreak 
of nihilism, an outbreak that Nietzsche discusses in On the Genealogy of 
Morality. We might date this outbreak to the seven hundred year period 
SOOBC. to 200AD., and call it the transition from a 'pre-moral' to 'moral' 
mankind. Nietzsche writes of a class of human beings, slaves, who were so 
oppressed, whose lives had becomes so miserable, so hard to bear, that is 
was absolutely imperative that they construct a new interpretation for their 
immense suffering. This sheds light on Nietzsche's enigmatic assertion that 
mankind would rather will nothingness than not will at all. According to the 
story that Nietzsche tells, this is exactly what a large portion of mankind 
did. Unable to exercise power 1n a material sense, such was the extent of 
their oppression by masters, the slaves had to take the drastic step of 
reconstituting their sense of what it means to be in the world, by affirming a 
'beyond', another world in which they will be rewarded for their meekness 
and obedience in this world. This is now a familiar story. This is what 
Nietzsche outlines as the first outbreak of nihilism in Western history: the 
desperate need felt by slaves to render their suffering meaningful, 
culminating in the drastic measure of inventing another world in which they 
will be compensated for their woes in this world. 
The second kind of nihilism is implicit in the first. Nietzsche 
characterises as nihilistic this new mode of valuation, on the grounds that it 
devalues this world in the name of another world. He terms this tendency the 
'ascetic ideal', and attaches great importance to it, as we shall see. So 
nihilism also means the way in which our earthly life can be robbed of value 
by the transference of value into another, fictitious, realm. It is, of course, 
mainly Christianity that Nietzsche has in mind when he speaks of this mode 
of evaluating, and which he regarded as 'Platonism for 'the people" (BG: 
Preface I p.32). 
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The third kind of nihilism is the one that is 'closest to home', as it 
were, for us citizens of twenty first century Europe. It is the form that 
Nietzsche is referring to when he writes, in The Will to Power: 'What does 
nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is 
lacking; 'why?' finds no answer' (WP: 2 I p.9). It refers to a sense of tension 
between our inherited ways of interpreting the world, and our actual 
experience of the world. Because we have learnt to think of value as residing 
in another world or realm distinct from this one, largely due to Christianity, 
when such an interpretation comes to seem to us more and more fallacious, 
we are inclined to regard the world as completely lacking in meaning. This ts 
because we have become so used to locating value in another world. 
1.2. The Transition from Original to Ascetic Nihilism: from Tragedy to 
Socrates 
Perhaps the central reason why the young Nietzsche was so taken with 
the philosophy of Schopenhauer was because of the latter's bold insistence 
on the centrality of suffering in human life. Nietzsche himself wrote that the 
lasting significance of Schopenhauer's philosophy consisted in a warning to 
us 'above all not to play down and obscure that indifferent, merciless, 
indeed evi I original constitution of being' . 10 Schopenhauer's writings are 
littered with passages of Shakespearean pathos which evoke how deeply 
entwined suffering is into the fabric of life. Nietzsche's concerns largely 
revolve around the question of how particular cultures deal with suffering, 
how they render it meaningful and bearable. Nietzsche's reverence for 
ancient Greek culture prior to Socrates was due to his discerning in that 
culture, in its tragedies, a way of responding to suffering that unflinchingly 
faces up to the suffering and terror endemic to human life whilst at the same 
time affirming it. He calls such a response a 'pessimism of strength', of 
which he writes: 
Is there such a thing as a strong pessimism? An 
preference for the hard, horrific, evi I, problematic 
intellectual 
aspects of 
10 Quoted in Peter Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p.200. 
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existence which stems from well-being, from overflowing health, from 
an abundance of existence? Might it even be possible to suffer from 
over-abundance? A tempting courage of the most intense gaze, which 
yearns for the fearful as for the enemy, the worthy enemy, on whom it 
can test its strength? from whom it wants to learn what 'fear' is? (BT: 
preface 1 I p.J-4). 
Herein lies the importance of tragedy for Nietzsche. Through it the Greeks 
experienced something on which they could test their strength, from which 
they could learn what fear is, and yet still affirm life: namely, the chaos of a 
thoroughly inhuman life force, which Nietzsche terms the 'Dionysian'. This 
inhuman life force is similar to what Nietzsche will later term 'the will to 
power', the recognition and affirmation of which by the 'higher men' will be 
central to his account of how to overcome nihilism. 
Nietzsche's analysis is based on the assumption that, 'that which truly 
exists and the original Unity, with its eternal suffering and contradiction, 
needs at the same time the delightful vision, the pleasurable appearance, for 
its continual redemption' (BT: 4 I p.30). The 'eternal suffering and 
contradiction' is the Dionysian element, which must be both acknowledged 
and redeemed. This requires the Apollonian, 'which must always ... triumph 
over a horrific depth of the contemplation of the world and the most 
sensitive capacity for suffering by resorting to powerful misleading 
delusions and pleasurable illusions' (BT: 4 I p.29). Thus the Greeks resorted 
to myth and tragedy, to the brilliant world of the dream-born Olympians, 111 
order to I ive with their knowledge of the Dionysian element of I ife. 
What is implicit in Nietzsche's account of tragedy is that human life 
is in need of redemption and that, central to human cultures are ways of 
dealing with suffering. As I have already mentioned, I am referring to this 
as 'original nihilism', by which I mean that nihilism - a sense of the 
meaninglessness of life - is endemic to the human condition, whether we 
realise it or not. We are placed in the uncanny position of both suffering and 
knowing that we suffer, dying and knowing that we are going to die. All of 
us, on one level or another, feel the pull of Tolstoy's question, 'Is there any 
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meaning in my life that will not be annihilated by the inevitability of the 
death which awaits me?' . 11 Thus we need ways of dealing with this 
predicament, and those social practices that enable us to do this constitute 
the most important part of a particular culture, in Nietzsche's view. His 
writing on tragedy is so important because it identifies a great parting in the 
ways in which Western culture has responded to suffering and to the 
inhuman life force, the Dionysian, we are thrust into at birth. We have, to 
put it in terms Nietzsche will use in his later writings, a shift from a non-
nihilistic response to suffering, to a nihilistic one. This parting of the ways 
is symbolized by Socrates, 'the single point around which so-called world 
history turns and twists' (BT: 15 I p.83). 
1. 2.1. Socrates and the Beginnings of a 'Nihilistic' Response to 'Original 
Nihilism' 
It is a remarkable testament to the unity of Nietzsche's writings that 
his two sustained reflections on Socrates occur eighteen years apart, in The 
Birth of Tragedy and Twilight of the Idols. In both books he narrates how, at 
a certain point, the Greeks could no longer bear the tension of their 
Dionysian wisdom, embodied in their tragedies: they were no longer able to 
affirm suffering without recourse to metaphysics, to life-denying fictions. In 
response to this crisis, reason and consciousness are given priority over I ife 
and instinct, creating a restricted notion of I ife as subservient to ideas that 
originate in life. This shift can be detected, in Nietzsche's eyes, in Socrates 
and the birth of philosophy: 'While in all productive people it is precisely 
instinct which is the creative-affirmative force and it is consciousness which 
criticizes and dissuades, in Socrates, however, instinct becomes the critic 
and consciousness the creator - a true monstrosity per defectum.' (BT: 13 I 
p.75). In Twilight of the Idols he gives a more detailed account of why 
Socratic dialectic became such a strong force at precisely the time that it did 
in Athens, thereby eclipsing Dionysian wisdom: 
Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were a 
Jew __ steps away ~fi'Oill excess:_ Jhe monstrum in anim()~:W!!S- t_h~ gen~ral __ ~ _ ~-- --------~-
11 Leo Tolstoy, A Col'!fession and Other religious writings (London: Penguin, 1987), p.35. 
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danger. 'The drives want to play the tyrant; we must invent a counter-
tyrant who is stronger' ... The fanaticism with which the whole of 
Greek thought throws itself on rationality betrays a crisis: they were 
in danger, they had just one choice: either perish or - be absurdly 
rational . ... Reason=virtue=happiness means simply: we must imitate 
Socrates and establish permanent daylight to combat the dark desires-
the daylight of reason. We must be clever, clear, bright at all costs: 
any yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards ... 
(T: II 9 I p.43). 
In Nietzsche's potted _history of ancient Greek culture, Socrates, far from 
representing a pinnacle, in fact marks the beginning of a decline brought 
about by an anarchy of the instincts. We can see how Plato's theory of the 
Forms can be characterised as part of this decline, as well as 'Platonism for 
the people': Christianity. In all three we see 'ascetic nihilism', as ideas 
about life are raised to a higher status than life itself, culminating in the 
idea of another, 'true' world behind this one that compensates for the 
miseries and imperfections of this one. Nietzsche detects the birth of all of 
this in Socrates: 
Socrates was a misunderstanding; the entire morality of improvement, 
Christianity included, was a misunderstanding ... The harshest 
daylight, rationality at all costs, life bright, cold, cautious, 
conscious, instinct-free, instinct-resistant: this was just an illness, a 
d~fferent illness - and definitely not a way back to 'virtue', 'health', 
happiness ... To have to fight against the instincts - this is the 
formula for decadence: so long as life is ascendant, happiness equals 
instinct. - (T: II 11 I p.44). 
With Socrates, the hegemony of reason and science begins. Socrates is the 
'theoretical man', the 'despotic logician' (BT: 15 I p.S0-1), and his creed is 
the following piece of 'sublime metaphysical madness': ' ... by following the 
guiding thread of causality, thought reaches into the deepest abysses of 
_ ~ -~~~~i_ng and i~ capab le"_noJ only of knpwing _but~ al~o ~ven g_(corrgcting_ b~ing. __ ~~-- _ 
... its purpose [is] to make existence appear intelligible and so justified (BT: 
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IS I p.82). So, Socrates is the grandfather of the ascetic nihilism propagated 
later on by Plato and Christianity. With Socrates ideas begin to lord it over 
life. Our original nihilism gets warded off by reason, we mask the abyss by 
means of concepts. Intelligibility becomes more important than creative 
energy, and the ability to explain, control and predict events becomes the 
new way of responding to suffering. The world now becomes an object of 
knowledge, rather than the dynamic, Dionysian process out of which we 
spring. It must now conform to predetermined frameworks rather than 
express truths which resist rational comprehension. As Ofelia Shutte puts it 
in Beyond Nihilism, 'The loss of the unified Dionysian ground of existence 
and the transfer of the centre for synthesizing experiences to the thought 
process constitutes a violation of ... all truly creative possibilities for human 
beings.' 12 
1.3. Ascetic Nihilism 
As I have said, Nietzsche regarded the task of warding off nihilism as 
something essential to our constitution, as something as deeply a part of us 
as our need to imbibe food and drink on a daily basis. Thus he writes at the 
start of The Gay Science: 
Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfil one 
more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to 
believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot 
flourish without a periodic trust in life - without faith in reason in 
life. And again and again the human race will decree from time to 
time: 'There is something at which it is absolutely forbidden 
henceforth to laugh (GS: I I p.75). 
Nietzsche thought that man, burdened as he is with the knowledge of his own 
existence and its inevitable end, as well as being self-conscious about his 
suffering, needs to find compensation for such terrible knowledge through 
meaning, an interpretation of the world that renders meaningful man's 
. -~oj o_ur11ln_ i!. despjte suffering~ and __ d~th-"-"-H~ J!.rg!I~~Jhat th~_ :re~s<;m_jn_j ife '--· _ 
12 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p.21. 
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which the human race has forbidden itself to laugh at for the last two 
thousand five hundred years is the 'ascetic ideal'. He writes, in On the 
Genealogy of Morality: 
Read from a distant planet, the majuscule script of our earthly 
existence would perhaps seduce the reader to the conclusion that the 
earth was the ascetic planet par excellence, an outpost of 
discontented, arrogant and nasty creatures who harboured a deep 
disgust for themselves, for the world, for all life and hurt themselves 
as much as possible out of pleasure in hurting (GM 3 I I I p.90). 
What does he mean by the ascetic ideal? Basically, a way of orienting 
oneself to the world, a mode of evaluation and interpretation, whereby man 
denigrates the things of this world- his body, his 'earthly life. - in the name 
of some other, 'higher', 'world' or principle. Such an ideal can, obviously, 
take various concrete forms. The two that Nietzsche focuses on the most are 
Platonism and Christianity, the latter of which he considers to be, as I have 
already mentioned, 'Platonism for the people.' 
Nietzsche locates the origins of the ascetic ideal in some unspecified 
time before the advent of Christianity. He writes of a time, prior to the 
invention of the ascetic ideal, in which: 
[Man's] existence on earth had no purpose; 'What 1s man for, 
actually?' -was a question without an answer; there was no will for 
man and earth; behind every great human destiny sounded the even 
louder refrain 'in vain!' ... something was missing, there was an 
immense lacuna around man, - he could think of no justification or 
explanation or affirmation, he suffered from the problem of what he 
meant. ... suffering itself was not the problem, but the fact that there 
was no answer to the question he screamed, 'Suffering for what? (GM 
328/p.l27). 
"(his js __ Qn_e_ Qf ~iet~~j;~h~~s __ mo_&l yj_yjd __ eyocatio_IJS_ oL 'o.rJginaLnihil.ism ',_a~-­
powerful feeling of the senselessness and futility of life. It was in order to 
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address this situation, he argues, that the ascetic ideal was created, and 
became so compelling. As we have seen, he locates the roots of this ideal in 
Socrates and the turn to the rationality of philosophy and away from the 
Dionysian wisdom of genuine tragedy. However, it is in the philosophy of 
Socrates' most famous student, Plato, that the ascetic ideal begins to take 
more definite shape. 
1.3.1. Ascetic Nihilism in Plato's Theory of Forms, and in Philosophy 
Generally 
Before considering Nietzsche's specific remarks on Plato, it is 
worthwhile briefly adumbrating the nature of Nietzsche's most common 
method of philosophical analysis. Typically, he does not argue for or against 
the truth of a particular proposition, but rather attempts to probe the 
psychological motives a philosopher might have for thinking in a particular 
way. As he puts it in Beyond Good and Evil: 
It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has 
hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of 
involuntary and unconscious memoir; moreover, that the moral (or 
immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted 
the real germ of life out of which the whole plant has grown. To 
explain how a philosopher's most remote metaphysical assertions have 
actually been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to ask oneself 
first: what morality does this (does he-) aim at? (BG 6 I p.38). 
What, then, is the confession that Nietzsche, self-styled master psychologist, 
detects in Plato's theory of the Forms? He detects an ascetic nihilism, a 
flight from the harsh actualities of the world of becoming into a 'truer 
world' of greater stability and justice. As he puts it in Twilight of the Idols: 
To talk about 'another' world than this is quite pointless, provided 
that an instinct for slandering, disparaging and accusing life is not 
strong within us: in the latter case we revenge_ourselv_es_oll_Jite~WitJl 
the phantasmagoria of 'another', a 'better' life (T Ill 6 I p.49). 
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Nietzsche felt that the whole of Western philosophy - that 'series of 
footnotes to Plato' - had been similarly 'ascetic' in its approach to life, 
similarly hostile to that which really is, in the name of a mendacious 
beyond: 
Why philosophers are slanderers. It is a miserable story: man seeks a 
principle through which he can despise men - he invents a world so as 
to be able to slander and bespatter this world: in reality, he reaches 
every time for nothingness and construes nothingness as 'God,' as 
'truth,' and in any case as judge and condemner of this state of being . 
... The history of philosophy is a secret raging against the 
preconditions of I ife, against the value feelings of I ife, against 
partisanship in favour of life. Philosophers have never hesitated to 
affirm a world provided it contradicted this world and furnished them 
with a pretext for speaking ill of this world. It has been hitherto the 
grand school of slander (WP: 461 I p.253). 
Elsewhere, he 
philosophers, 
speaks of the 'peculiarly 
denying the world, hating 
withdrawn attitude 
life, doubting the 
of the 
senses, 
desensualized, which has been maintained until quite recently to the point 
where it almost counted for the philosophical attitude as such' (G M 3 I 0 I 
p.89). In his brief history of philosophy, in Twilight of the Idols, 'How the 
'Real world' at last became a Myth', he suggests that this ideal has 
dominated all of Western philosophy, in three main guises - Platonism, 
Christianity ('Platonism for the plebs'), and Kantian transcendental 
idealism. He argues elsewhere that this ideal also dominates modern science, 
(see, for example, GS 344 I p.280-3). 
Nietzsche argues that the seeds of the ascetic ideal in philosophy are 
there in the way in which, according to him, we have to falsify reality in 
order to live at all, force, through metaphorical activity, disparate things 
into categories - a point I shall be considering in more detai I later. What 
-~~,_Ni-etzsche accuses,"PJato ."of doing;~.iand~_With_him __ much_ of~.:philosophy sin·ce __ 
then, is giving a moral colouring to this activity, thereby valuing the dome 
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of concepts that we have to construct on the rushing river of life over and 
above life itself, as more 'perfect', more 'real', because more reliable and 
secure. Thus something that originated in order to serve life- our conceptual 
scheme - becomes something in the name of which we accuse life of, as it 
were, not being up to the mark. As he puts it in The Will to Power: 
This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential 
fatality on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in 
the forms of reason- while in fact one possessed them in order to 
become master of reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a 
shrewd manner (WP: 584 I p.315). 
This is the meaning of his enigmatic remark, ' 'Reason' in language: oh what 
a deceitful old woman! I am afraid we are not getting rid of God because we 
still believe in grammar ... ' (T Ill 6 I p.48). By 'God' here he means more 
generally another, better world than the empirical world. We are inclined to 
believe in such a world because we are bewitched by grammar into seeing 
the world 111 a particular way, a way which chimes with deep seated 
yearnings for escape and respite from ceaseless becoming and suffering. 
Nietzsche elaborates on the way in which the nature of reason has been 
misunderstood in order to denigrate life and to take flight from its 
unpredictability and flux in Twilight of the Idols: 
You ask me what are all the idiosyncrasies of the philosophers? ... For 
one thing their lack of historical sense, their hatred of the very idea 
of becoming, their Egypticism. They think they are doing a thing an 
honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeterni- when they 
make a mummy out of it. A II that philosophers have been hand I ing for 
thousands of years is conceptual mummies; nothing real has ever left 
their hands alive. They ki II things and stuff them, these servants of 
conceptual idols, when they worship ... Death, change, age, as well as 
procreation and growth, are objections - even refutations - for them. 
Whatever is, does not become; whatever becomes, is not ... Now they 
all believe, eyen to the po,int of gesperation, in being (T: Ill 1 lJJ.45). 
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Later on in the same section Nietzsche points out how philosophers have 
concluded from the fact that we possess reason, a reason which is far more 
stable and perfect than the empirical world, that, ' 'we must once have been 
at home in a higher world ... , we must have been divine because we have 
reason!' ' (T: III 5 I p.48). So, ascetic nihilism has its roots in a mistake 
about the nature of conceptualisation, a mistake inaugurated by Socrates, 
and a mistake which has been so successful because it provided a way of 
overcoming our original nihilism. Now, however, its day is done, it has 
become unmasked. We are in the twilight of the idol of Reason. 
Another, more sociological reason why philosophy has been so bound 
up with the ascetic ideal, in Nietzsche's view, is because it had to adopt the 
socially permissible garb of the ascetic ideal in order to survive, in order not 
to suffer the fate of Socrates: 
... the philosophic spirit has always had to disguise and cocoon itself 
among previously established types of contemplative man, as a priest, 
magician, soothsayer, religious man tn general, in order for its 
existence to be possible at all: the ascetic ideal served the 
philosopher for a long time as outward appearance, and a pre-
condition for existence, - he had to play that part in order to be a 
philosopher,_ he had to believe in it in order to be able to play it .... 
philosophy would have been absolutely impossible for most of the 
time on earth without an ascetic mask and suit of clothes, without an 
ascetic misconception of itself (GM 3 I 0 I p.89). 
1.3.2. Ascetic Nihilism outside of Philosophy: Christianity 
Thus we can see why philosophy might well be bound up with the 
ascetic ideal, but Nietzsche is claiming that the whole of Western culture has 
been simultaneously nourished and poisoned by it, for the same reason it has 
so appealed to philosophers- because it offers a release from suffering: 
... the _ascetic_idea/ ojjer_ed oman ~a- meaning! Within it, suffedng was 
given an interpretation; the enormous emptiness seemed filled; 
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the door was shut on all suicidal nihilism .... man was saved, he 
had a meaning, from now on he was no longer like a leaf in the 
breeze, the plaything of the absurd, of 'non-sense'; from now on he 
could will something, - no matter what, why and how he did it at 
first, the will itse/fwas saved . ... And, to conclude by saying what 
I said at the beginning: man still prefers to will nothingness, than not 
to will ... (GM 3 28 I p.J27-8). 
The ascetic ideal, then, originally arose as an artifice for the preservation of 
life. This may initially seem a curious claim, given that it is a life-denying 
ideal. However, it provided a satisfactory answer to the problem of 
suffering. In the form of the Christian faith, for example, with its belief in 
an after- I ife, it gave suffering meaning, thereby rendering it bearable. It 
"creat[ed] more favourable conditions for being here and being human" at a 
time when human beings "existence on earth contained no goal" (GM: 3 13 I 
p.93). In bestowing value on this life as a means to another, 'truer' world, 
the ascetic ideal created meaning where there was none. The key to all of 
this is held in the enigmatic phrase with which Nietzsche begins and ends his 
essay on ascetic ideals: 'man would rather will nothingness than not will'. 
Man needs a purpose, and wi II invent a purpose that is actually opposed to 
life- 'nothingness', by which Nietzsche means the 'true worlds' of religion 
and philosophy - rather than live without a purpose. Above all else, human 
suffering must have a meaning. 
We have, here, then, Nietzsche's account of the ascetic nihilism at the 
heart of Western culture, a culture whose sole ideal has been vici_ously 
opposed to the world of the senses in favour of a fictitious other world, in 
Nietzsche's view. This ideal, as represented chiefly by Christianity, 
constitutes, for Nietzsche, the lies we have liked to tell ourselves in order to 
make our lives meaningful, but which, for various historical reasons to be 
considered shortly, we cannot believe in any longer. 
Christianity has been the chief vehicle of ascetic nihilism, which is 
_ why_N ietzsche de~_<?_tesso _much time to_~~ri!i~izi_!lg_ it, -~__!ld,~hy_h_e _refe~~-~o Jt _ 
as 'Platonism for the people' -because it takes over the two world scheme of 
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Platonism and popularises it by turning the world of Forms into an afterlife 
of heaven and hell, salvation and damnation. It is of the utmost importance 
to appreciate that Nietzsche, far from being the unalloyed God-basher he is 
sometimes portrayed as in the popular imagination, was deeply ambivalent 
about the 'death of God', an ambivalence conveyed in the doleful tone of the 
'death of God' passage itself, the sense of awe that the madman's words 
evoke as he bears witness to such a staggering event. Why did Nietzsche 
consider it to be so staggering? Because he was aware how much was - is - at 
stake when God dies - how deeply embedded in our very sense of the way 
things are Christianity has become, how deeply our sense of morality, of how 
to live, depends on a whole world view at the centre of which is belief in 
God. More pertinently for now, he was aware of the deep-seated needs that 
the Christian faith, elaborated over two thousand years, had come to minister 
to. Here is one of Nietzsche's accounts of those needs, and the ways in 
which Christianity met them: 
What were the advantages of the Christian moral hypothesis? 
I. It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and 
accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away. 
2. It served the advocates of God insofar as it conceded to the world, 
in spite of suffering and evil, the character of perfection - including 
'freedom': evil appeared full of meaning. 
3. It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus 
adequate knowledge precisely regarding what is most important. 
4. It prevented man from despising himself as man, from taking sides 
against I ife; from despairing of knowledge: it was a means of 
preservation. 
In sum: morality was the great antidote against practical and 
theoretical nihilism (WP: 4 I p.l 0). 
Christianity catered to a number of deep-seated needs in man. It gave him a 
feeling of his own power or value, a sense of his self-worth; a solution to the 
so-called 'problem of evil', a meaning for suffering; and a belief in the 
_.c-knowahil ity~of __ the~worJd,_in~the efficac)' of man',s,knowledge.c-We might add 
to this list the following, which were also facilitated by Christianity: belief 
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in a personal God, someone looking out for you; belief in the meaningfulness 
of history, in eschatology or providence; in nature's subservience to human 
beings and our special place in the world; and belief in an afterlife. Thus 
Christianity offers us solutions to profound human needs for secul'ity, and, 
above all, a sense of value and meaning in one's life. This, then, is what is 
at stake when this protective canopy begins to get punctured. Answers 
worked out over vast periods of time to the deepest of human needs become 
untenable, and so a new way of carrying on needs to be found. This raises 
the question of why, according to Nietzsche, the reign of ascetic nihilism 
propagated by Plato and Christianity, is coming to an end. How have we 
been so crazy as to undo the very basis of meaning in our lives? A good 
question! 
1.4. The Transition from Ascetic Nihilism to Modern European Nihilism: 
three reasons 
Nietzsche holds the view that, in both the lives of individuals and of 
cultures, we gradually grow out of certain interpretations of the world and 
into others, as our degree of power and life-affirmation grows or diminishes. 
Thus interpretations that at one point seemed true for a given individual or 
culture - true in the sense of life-enhancing - can, at a later stage in the 
development of that individual or culture, come to seem false or life-
denying. due to an increase or decrease in the degree of their life-
affirmation. As he puts it, ' ... that every elevation of man brings with it the 
overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and 
increase of power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new 
horizons - this idea permeates my writings' (WP: 616 I p.330). N, ietzsche is 
convinced that we, as a culture, are approaching a time in which, due to 
various factors shortly to be considered, it has become imperative to 
overcome the narrowness of the ascetic nihilist perspective of Christianity, 
in favour of new, as yet unclear, horizons, which will potentially- but only 
potentially- manifest an elevation in man's ability to affirm life. The factors 
that are, as it were, forcing us out of the Christian interpretation of the 
_worldoare our (ChristianL)ccommitment to truth, especially- as manifested in 
the natural sciences; the increased 'standard of living' that more and more 
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people enjoy; and the 'Copernican revolution' of Immanuel Kant. I shall 
consider these in turn. 
1.4.1. Truth Telling and Science 
At the start of The Will to Power, Nietzsche writes that the insights 
that have brought about the devaluation of our highest, Platonic-Christian, 
ascetic-nihilist, values, are the product of faith in morality, a morality 
inculcated by those values themselves. These values have instilled in us 'a 
two thousand-year discipline in truth-telling, which finally forbids itself the 
lie entailed in the belief in God' (GM: 3 27 I p.l26). In the last book of The 
Gay Science, he goes into some detail about how this has come about. There 
he argues that the Christian conscience has become sublimated, over the 
centuries, into a scientific conscience and an intellectual conscience (as 
defined in The Gay Science 2 I p. 76-7). This intellectual conscience has 
looked to nature as proof of God's goodness, history as testimony to His 
reason and to an ethical world order, and one's own experience as evidence 
of providence, and has found that this conscience, in the name of truth, 
forbids one from interpreting these phenomena in a 'Christian' way. The 
discipline of truth-telling has forbidden us from interpreting the wantonness 
of nature as evidence of God's goodness, the carnage of history as evidence 
of an ethical world order, and the disarray of one's own experience as 
evidence of providence (GS: 357 I p.307). Thus, 'Christianity as a dogma 
was destroyed by its own morality' (GM: 3 27 I p.127), undermining the very 
thing -God -that brought it into existence in the first place. 
Moreover, the findings of natural science have dealt a severe blow to 
the traditional Christian picture of the world, according to which man is 
made in God's image, and abides at the centre of creation. This blow has 
come in two main forms: the Copernican revolution, and Darwin's theory of 
evolution. Of the former, Nietzsche writes: 
Has the self-diminution of the human being, its will to self-
___ ditninution, ~ n_o_t __ pr~ogressed _jnexorably_~since~_Coper_n icus?-'A las, the 
faith in human worth, its uniqueness and indispensability in the rank 
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order of creation has gone - the human has become an animal, without 
reservation or qualification; the human, who formerly believed itself 
to be almost divine ('child of god,' 'God-man'). Since Copernicus, 
humanity seems to have got itself on to a sloping plane- already 
sliding faster and faster away from the centre - into what? into 
nothingness? into the 'piercing feeling of its own nothingness'? (GM: 
3 25 I p.l22). 
The findings of Copernicus have caused us to imbibe the view that we are 
creatures perched on a rock in the middle of nowhere, on which relatively 
soon the lights will go out. As for Darwin's contribution to the undoing of 
Christianity: 'Formerly one sought the feeling of the grandeur of man by 
pointing to his divine origin: this has now become a forbidden way, for at its 
portal stands the ape, together with other gruesome beasts, grinning 
knowingly as if to say: no further in this direction!' (D: 49 I p.32). 
1.4.2. Improved 'Quality of Life' 
Another reason why the ascetic nihilism of Christianity is on the 
wane, in Nietzsche's view, is because we no longer need to have recourse to 
such an extreme way of lending suffering meaning as the Christian 
interpretation of the world provides: 
Actually, we have no longer such need of an antidote to the first 
[what I am calling 'original'] nihilism: life in our Europe is no longer 
that uncertain, capricious, absurd. Such a tremendous increase in the 
value of man, the value of trouble, etc., is not needful now ... the 
power man has attained now permits a demotion of the means of 
breeding of which the moral interpretation was the strongest. 'God' is 
far too extreme a hypothesis (WP: 114 I p. 70). 
For one thing, most of us, at least in the developed world, are no longer 
slaves. We do not need such extreme cures as God because our suffering is 
__ Jess_intense_than the~slaves~who,in Nietzsche's view, first fond solace in.the 
ascetic ideal on a mass scale. There are, finally, another set of reasons for 
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the 'death of God', of a more intellectual and ultimately more important 
kind, which centre on Kant's critical philosophy, and Nietzsche's 
elaborations on that philosophy in his reflections on 'truth'. 
1. 4. 3. Kant: the 'All-Pulverizing' Godfather of Nihilism 
Kant is rightly cited as the source of all noteworthy Continental 
philosophy since him, and Nietzsche is no exception to this pattern. Kant is 
also characterised, quite rightly in my view, as the fountainhead of modern 
nihilism. 13 As Beiser writes with reference to Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, 'A nightmare looms: that the self-criticism of reason ends in 
nihilism, doubt about the existence of everything' . 14 It is worth recalling that 
the word 'nihilism' first came into circulation in response to Kant's critical 
philosophy, in the letter by Jacobi quoted at the start of the thesis. His 
critical philosophy plays a central, if largely inexplicit, role in Nietzsche's 
analysis of nihilism. Kant was aptly dubbed by Moses Mendelson 'the all 
pulverizer', and it is the pulverizing aspect of his philosophy that Nietzsche 
emphasizes. Those of us living happily ever after in the postmodern world, 
sprawled out lazily on the easy chair of cultural relativity, might find it hard 
to appreciate the impact that Kant's work had on a much more 'innocent' 
world, that was horrified by the approach of the spectre of what they saw as 
epistemological nihilism. Nowhere is this better brought out than in von 
Kleist's letter to his fiance, which Nietzsche quotes in 'Schopenhauer as 
Educator': 
'Not long ago', he writes in his moving way, 'I became acquainted 
with the Kantian philosophy -and I now have to tell you of a thought 
I derived from it, which I feel free to do because I have no reason to 
fear it will shatter you so profoundly and painfully as it has me.- We 
are unable to decide whether that which we call truth really is truth, 
or whether it only appears to us to be. If the latter, then the truth we 
assemble here is nothing after our death, and all endeavour to acquire 
a possession which will follow us to the grave is in vain.- If the point 
13 See Critchley (200 I), chapter two. 
14 Quoted in Critchley (2001), p.22. 
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of this thought does not penetrate your heart, do not smile at one who 
feels wounded by it in the deepest part of his being. My one great aim 
has failed me and I have no other' (UM 3 3 I p.I40-1 ). 
As is well known, von Kleist killed himself shortly after writing this. It is 
this inability 'to decide whether that which we call truth really is truth, or 
whether it only appears to us to be so', which Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason so rigorously argues, which forms the kernel of Nietzsche's 
reflections on the rise and nature of modern European nihilism. 
1. 4. 3.1. Reflections on Kant in Nietzsche's Early Philosophy 
Nietzsche probably encountered Kant largely through the writings of 
Schopenhauer, who was both a strong admirer and stern critic of 'the 
astounding Kant', as he called him. Schopenhauer admitted that his work 
would simply not have been possible without Kant, and admonishes all 
readers of his own work to have, 'an acquaintance with the most important 
phenomenon which has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years ... the 
principal works of Kant'. 15 Nietzsche's notes, 'The Philosopher: Reflections 
on the struggle between art and knowledge', of 1873, are deeply informed by 
Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of things-in-themselves (see TP, e.g., 
p.l 0-11, 28), the significance of which for Nietzsche, in these notes, was 
not, as for Kant, that it created a space for faith by fencing off the activities 
of reason and therewith the natural sciences, but rather that it enhanced the 
importance for culture of art. As he writes, in a very important quotation 
which anticipates much of his later work: 'It is unlikely that this [belief in a 
mythical construction, creating a religion] will ever happen again after the 
Critique of Pure Reason. On the other hand, I can imagine a totally new type 
of philosopher-artist who fills the empty space with a work of art' (TP: 
p.15). In a similar vein, in The Birth of Tragedy he praises the 'great 
audacity and wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer' for winning out a most 
difficult victory over the optimism hidden in logic, an optimism on which 
our Socratic culture has been based, by arguing that 'all the enigmas of the 
world~ cannoL"~be _known~ .and ~~fathomed', __ thaL_'r_eat~knowledge __ of the_ 
15 Schopenhauer ( 1969), vol.l, p.xv. 
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[innermost and true essence of things]' is impossible (BT 18 I p.98-9). Most 
dramatically of all is his invocation of Kant at the start of the unpublished 
(in Nietzsche's lifetime) but now famous essay 'On Truth and Lies in an 
Extra-Moral Sense': 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe 
which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was 
a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most 
arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, 
it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star 
cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die (TP: p.79). 
This awesome image is designed to illustrate how 'miserable, how shadowy 
and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within 
nature' (TP: p.79). It is Nietzsche's version of Schopenhauer's remark, 
'Whatever torch we kindle, and whatever space it may illuminate, our 
horizon will always remain encircled by the depth of night', 16 and is 
essentially a radicalization of Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of 
things-in-themselves. 
1.4.3.2. Kant's Undoing of the 'Real World' Hypothesis 
Sixteen years later the central idea of the Critique of Pure Reason 
still deeply informs Nietzsche's philosophical outlook, as is evidenced by 
the pivotal role given to Kant in Nietzsche's, 'How the 'real world' at last 
became a myth'. In this passage Kant plays the transitional role, being the 
means whereby the 'real world' of Plato and Christianity, the ascetic 
nihilism concocted to counteract original nihilism, is finally exposed for the 
sham that it always was, in Nietzsche's view. Because Kant rigorously 
argues that the real world is 'unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable' (T 4 I 
p.SO), the way is paved for Nietzsche to 'do away' with the real world 
(something that Kant was not able to do because he was, at heart, a 'crafty 
Christian' (T: 3 6 I p.49)). 
16 Schopenhauer (1969), vol.ll, p.l85. 
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It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Kant leads Nietzsche to 'the 
death of God' and to modern European nihilism, that his Critique of Pure 
Reason is the fulcrum upon which these themes of Nietzsche's turn. This 
becomes more apparent when we consider the notes on nihilism in The Will 
to Power. For example, in the second aphorism of that work Nietzsche 
defines 'radical nihilism' as the devaluation of the highest values plus, 'the 
realization that we lack the least right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of 
things that might be 'divine' or morality incarnate' (WP: 3 I p.9). It was, of 
course, Kant who afforded us this painful realization. Nietzsche writes, 'We 
see that we cannot reach the sphere in which we have placed our values' 
(WP: 8 I p.l I), and lists as one of four advantages of the Christian-moral 
hypothesis, quoted above, the belief that 'man had a knowledge of absolute 
values and thus adequate knowledge precisely regarding what is most 
important' (WP 4 I p.l 0). It was Kant who rendered this belief untenable, 
who shortened our reach so that we can no longer get to the place where we 
placed our values, amongst the 'things-in-themselves'. 
1.4.3.3. Nietzsche's Elaborations on Kant 
However, Nietzsche does more than simply take over Kant's 
philosophy uncritically and put it to a very different use to its creator. He 
elaborates on Kant's 'Copernican revolution' in a number of striking and 
original ways, advancing further arguments as to why our capacity for 
knowledge must be radically limited, and arguments against the very 
intelligibility of the notion of 'things-in-themselves.' 
1. 4. 3. 3.1. Criticisms of our Capacity to Know: 
a. Truth as metaphor 
In the early fragment 'On truth and I ies in a non-moral sense', 
Nietzsche begins by impressing upon us to how great a degree deception is 
part of ordinary social life: both self-deception, and deception of others, a 
feature of life brought out brilliantly by some novelists and filmmakers 
(George-Eliot, Jane-Austen, Tolstoy-and Woody Allen- spring immediately to 
mind). Given this, he asks where a desire for truth can have come from, and 
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suggests that truth arose with· society, as part of man's desire to live with 
other human beings, which necessitated agreeing to call certain things by 
certain names, and thus in this limited sense being truthful. However, 
Nietzsche then raises the more fundamental, Kantian style question, 'Are 
designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of 
all realities?'. The answer that he gives is a resounding 'no'. His argument 
is that man, as the creator of language, has no interest in the 'thing-in-
itself', and is entirely concerned with the relations between things and men. 
To express these relations, he engages in essentially metaphorical activity. 
He argues that the metaphorical process is twofold: firstly, a nerve 
stimulus is transferred into an image, and secondly, this image is transferred 
into a sound. What does Nietzsche mean by metaphor, here? Well, when I 
say, 'My love is a rose', I am not suggesting that my love literally is a rose, 
but rather, that there is an aspect of her - her charm, say, or her rosy cheeks 
- that can be likened to the blooming of a rose. His point is that the 
transference that we make from nerve stimulus to image, and from image to 
word, is similarly metaphorical. Both transferences involve identifying 
things which are only alike in a certain, very specific, respect. So, just as my 
love is not literally a rose, so the nerve stimulus is only like the image in a 
certain respect, and the word is only like the image in a certain respect: 
... the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve 
stimulus, then as an image, and finally as a sound. Thus the genesis of 
language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material 
within and with which the man of truth, the scientist and the 
philosopher later build, if not derived from never-never land, is at 
least not derived from the essence of things (PT: p.89). 
This leads him to conclude: 
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are 
metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of 
-sensuous.force,-coins -which ha¥e- lost theirembossi,ng,.and are.now-. 
considered as metal and no longer as coins (TP: p.90). 
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We have here Nietzsche's early version of Kant's doctrine of the 
unknowability of 'things-in-themselves.' However, he argues for this claim 
in a different way to Kant. As we shall see in greater detail shortly, 
Nietzsche first questions why man would be equipped to know anything 
about the 'thing-in-itself' in the first place, given that it is of no practical 
concern to him, and that his life relies on dissimulation on a large scale 
anyway. Secondly, he argues that both our percepts and our concepts do not 
bear a direct relationship to reality, but are, rather, metaphors, creative 
transferences from dissimilar realms. So, to summarise what has been said so 
far, in Nietzsche's own words: 
... it seems to me that 'the correct perception'- which would mean 'the 
adequate expression of an object in the subject' - is a contradictory 
impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres, as 
between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and 
no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation: mean, a 
suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a completely 
foreign tongue- for which there is required, in any case, a freely 
inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force (PT: p.91 ). 
This, then, is Nietzsche's first string of arguments in a Kantian vein, against 
the possibility of knowledge of 'things-in-themselves.' It does leave various 
questions unanswered, not least the question concerning to what extent the 
fact that we can build rockets that fly, houses that stay standing, and atomic 
bombs that blow up suggests that the relationship between our knowledge 
and the world might be considerably more than entirely aesthetic and 
metaphorical. However, rather than pursue this, let us now turn to his further 
arguments against the possibility of knowledge of 'things-in-themselves.' 
b. 'Evolutionary Epistemology' 
The following passage from Beyond Good and Evil gives us a good 
idea of where Nietzsche most decisively parts company with Kant:_ _ _ 
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But Jet us stop and reflect: it is time we did so. Kant asked himself: 
how are synthetic judgements a priori possible?- and what, really, did 
he answer? By means of a faculty ... But answers I ike that belong in a 
comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question 'how are 
synthetic judgements a priori possible?' with another question: 'why 
is belief in such judgements necessary?'- that is to say, it is time to 
grasp that, for the sake of preserving beings such as ourselves, such 
judgements must be believed to be true; although they might of course 
still be false judgements! (BG: II I p.42). 
In Nietzsche's hands Kant's 'synthetic a priori truths' lose their 
metaphysical necessity and simply become tools that a particular species 
happens to operate with in order to survive and flourish. This claim is part 
of what is more generally known as 'evolutionary epistemology', which is 
the view that we are only equipped to know that which we need to know for 
the sake of our survival and enhancement, and therefore it is highly unlikely 
that we would try to or be able to obtain knowledge which did not serve 
these ends. Nietzsche accounts for our conception of truth in terms of that 
which interests, concerns, or resists us: " ... we have only drawn the concept 
'real, truly existing' from the 'concerning us'; the more we are affected in 
our interest, the more we believe in the 'reality' of a thing or an entity". 17 
He tells us, "The uti I ity of preservation - not some abstract-theoretical need 
not to be deceived - stands as the motive behind the development of the 
organs of knowledge" (WP: 480 I p.266-7); and, "It is improbable that our 
'knowledge' should extend further than is strictly necessary for the 
preservation of life" (WP: 494 I p.272, see also GS: 354 I p.300). 
This evolutionary epistemology leads Nietzsche to argue that 
deception, a will to untruth, might be just as advantageous for our survival 
and enhancement as a will to truth. He asks, in The Gay Science: 
But why not allow oneself to be deceived? ... 
... What do you know in advance of the character of existence 
to~becablec to -decide- whether the greater- advantage cis on the 
17 Quoted in Poellner {1995), p.89. 
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side of the unconditionally mistrustful or of the unconditionally 
trusting? (GS: 344 I p.281 ). 
His point is that we cannot assume a priori that the wi II to truth is more 
useful for us than a will to its opposite- falsehood, deception, lies. He goes 
on to say that," ... truth and untruth [have] constantly proved useful to life" 
(italics mine). Moreover, he argues that life seems to encourage us towards 
falsehood rather than truth: 
... it does seem ... as if life aimed at semblance, meaning error, 
deception, simulation, delusion, self-delusion, and ... the great sweep 
of life has actually always shown itself to be on the side of the 
most unscrupulous polytropoi 1x (GS 344: p.282). 
He gives as an example of this assertion that those who did not know how to 
find what is 'equal' as regards nourishment and hostile animals - those, in 
othu words, who were less willing to draw hasty and ultimately false 
conclusions about reality, for 'nothing is really equal' - would have been 
less likely to survive than those with a greater capacity to erroneously 
equalise things, and hence procure food and flee from enemies more easily 
(GS: llllp.l71). 
It must be pointed out, however, that this ingenious argument faces 
two serious problems. Firstly, it presupposes a theory of truth which 
Nietzsche denies, namely the correspondence theory of truth. Moreover, it 
presupposes a realm of 'things-in-themselves', of which our 'knowledge' is a 
falsification, a t·ealm which, as we shall see in the next section, Nietzsche 
argues against. Secondly, even when we grant the existence of this realm, for 
the sake of the argument, Nietzsche makes claims which he elsewhere 
forbids himself (and others, of course) from making. As he acknowledges in 
The Gay Science, 'We cannot look around our own corner: it is a hopeless 
curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives 
there might be' (GS 374 I p.336); and in The Will to Power, 'One would have 
18 The Greek word used to describe Odysseus in the first line of the Odyssey. Its connotations include 
wiliness, versatility, craftiness, and virtuosity in deception. 
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to know what being is, in order to decide whether this or that is real ... but 
since we do not know this, a critique of the faculty of knowledge is 
senseless' (WP 486 I p.269); and in 'The Philosopher' he writes, 'Against 
Kant, it must always be further objected that ... it still remains entirely 
possible that the world is as it appears to us to be' (TP: p.32). Thus his 
claim that our be I iefs must be false imp I ies knowledge he elsewhere states 
that we cannot have. 
The above argument emphasises the potential dangers of not 
apprehending reality falsely, and with it the apparent wrong-headedness of 
an unbridled 'will to truth', a search for truth for truth's sake. In the 
example above, those beings who apprehend reality in a truer way are the 
ones who perish. As Nietzsche puts it, 'Innumerable beings who made 
inferences in a way different from ours perished; for all that, their ways 
might have been truer' (GS: Ill I p.l71). He is emphasising that not only 
are our beliefs about 'things-in-themselves' highly likely to be false given 
that they are developed for biological reasons; if they were true, or at least 
truer, our survival might be endangered: 
No living beings would have survived if the ... tendency ... to err 
and make up things rather than to wait ... to pass judgement rather 
than to be just - had not been bred to the point where it became 
extraordinarily strong (GS: Ill I p.172). 
Thus the will to truth begins to seem positively dangerous, unnatural, as 
something to be eschewed, even. So we have here a further argument against 
knowing 'things-in-themselves.' 
However, Nietzsche's marriage of Darwin and transcendental idealism 
faces a severe difficulty. By explaining our ability to know the world in 
terms of evolution, Nietzsche invokes an item of knowledge - evolutionary 
theory - in order to explain how knowledge is possible in the first place, 
which is surely a problematic endeavour. David Cooper highlights this kind 
Qf difficulty in The M~a~yrtt of_Things: 
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it is surely problematic to understand how the world or nature can 
be a 'product' of human beings, something constituted through human 
agency, if men and women are simply 'parts of nature' .... the more 
familiar, the more 'worldly', 'we' [who constitute the world] become, 
the harder it is to understand how, in any philosophically exciting 
sense, 'we' could be responsible for the world .... Kant could avoid 
the problem of how 'we' could at once belong in nature yet be 
constitutive of it by viewing 'us' in a 'twofold way' - as phenomenal 
creatures and as denizens of the noumenal realm. Any such dual 
vision, however, is one of the targets of a Prometheanism [like 
Nietzsche's] which 'translates' 'us' back into ordinary, active, flesh-
and-blood creatures. 19 
How Nietzsche might overcome this difficulty, whilst retaining 
simultaneously his naturalism and his commitment to a form of anti-realism, 
is not clear to me. 
1. 4.3. 3.2. Abandoning the Very Idea of 'Things-in-Themselves' 
However, there is another side to Nietzsche's attack on Kant's notion 
of 'things-in-themselves' than the 'Darwin ian', pragmatic style arguments 
discussed above. He gives at least two more traditionally philosophical 
J'easons for rejecting this idea. In order to understand the first one, it helps 
to consider a passage Nietzsche wrote in the early 1870s, at which time he 
readily embraced the Kantian-Schopenhauel'ian distinction between 
phenomena and 'things-in-themselves'. Here he argues that knowledge of 
'things-in-themselves' is unattainable because a thing can only become 
known by a subject, at which point it ceases to be a 'thing-in-itself': 
We can say nothing about the thing-in-itself, for we have 
eliminated the standpoint of knowing, i.e. of measuring. A quality 
exists for us, i.e. it is measured by us .... What things are is something 
19 David Cooper, The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility, Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University 
press, 2002) p.86-8. 
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that can only be established by a measuring subject placed alongside 
them (TP: p.3 7). 
Knowledge and 'things-in-themselves' are incommensurate: by definition 
things-in-themselves cannot be known. A known 'thing-in-itself' is a 
contradiction in terms, like a triangular circle. So much was established by 
Kant. However, in the mid-1880s Nietzsche radicalises this point into the 
notion that because 'things-in-themselves' cannot be known, the very idea of 
such things is unintelligible, and therefore should be abandoned as a 
hypothesis. 20 
This claim first finds expression 1n his published writings in 1886 in 
Beyond Good and Evil, where he writes, ' ... I shall reiterate a hundred times 
that 'immediate certainty', like ... 'thing in itself', contains a contradictio in 
adjecto: we really ought to get free ourselves from the seduction of words' 
(BG: 16 I p.46). Postulating a realm of 'things-in-themselves' is a case of 
being 'bewitched by language', to put it 111 Wittgensteinian terms. 
Nietzsche's point is that terms like 'thing', 'exist' and 'reality' have their 
places in particular 'forms of life', and when they are abstracted from such 
concrete contexts -for example, when doing Kantian philosophy and talking 
about 'things-in-themselves' 'really existing' - we have a case of language 
'going on holiday', and we are now talking, quite literally, nonsense. 
Nietzsche's reasons for thinking this can be further gleaned from The 
Will to Power and The Gay Science. 21 In The Gay Science, in a passage 
called 'The consciousness of appearance', he writes: 
20 Throughout this part of my discussion I am indebted to Maudemarie Clark's perspicacious analysis of 
Nietzsche's gradual abandonment of the idea of thing-in-itself. See Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1990), p. 95-103. 
21 Of course, The Gay Science was written in 1882, i.e. prior to Nietzsche's abandonment ofthe idea of 
the thing-in-itself, according to my (and Clark's) reckoning. However, as Clark convincingly argues, 
Nietzsche gradually came to recognise the unintelligibility ofthe notion of a thing-in-itself, and dates 
this,recognition as'beginning in The Gay Science.~Sheargues-that-it -wasnot-until Beyond'Goodand 
Evil and afterwards that this insight 'crystallises'. Again, for a detailed analysis of this, see the Clark 
reference cited above. 
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What is "appearance" for me now? Certainly not the opposite of 
some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the 
attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one 
could place on an unknown x or remove from it! (GS: 54 I p.l16). 
His point is that we have no way of conceiving of a thing's 'essence' except 
in terms of its 'appearance', and hence the dichotomy between phenomena 
and 'things-in-themselves', existence and essence, is fallacious. To put it 
another way, the idea of subject-independent entities having properties or 
'structures' in themselves is incoherent because it is inconceivable22• He 
writes in The Will to Power, 'As if a world would still remain over after one 
deducted the perspective' (WP: 567: p.305); and, '[the hypothesis that things 
possess a constitution in themselves] presupposes that interpretation and 
subjectivity are not essential' (WP: 560 I p.303). Thus, because we cannot 
conceive of what a non-perspectival reality would be like, it is 'an idea with 
no further use ... an idea become useless, superfluous, therefore a refuted 
idea: let us do away with it!' (T: IV I p.50). 
His second and closely related argument against the concept of 
'things-in-themselves' is that for something to be a 'thing', it has to fulfil 
requirements which 'things-in-themselves' by necessity cannot fulfil. 
Primarily, it needs to affect us in certain ways: 'The properties of a thing 
are affects on other 'things': if one removes other 'things', then a thing has 
no pr~perties, i.e., there is no thing without other things, i.e., there is no 
'thing-in-itself' ' (WP: 557 I p.302). In a similar vein he writes: 'But the 
psychological derivation of the belief in things forbids us to speak of 
'things-in-themselves' ' (WP: 473 I p.263), and ' ... thingness has only been 
invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of 
defining, communication' (WP: 558 I p.302). 
22 This point is, of course, very similar to Berkeley's 'esse est percipi' argument against Locke's 
'matter'. 
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I. 4. 3. 3. 3. Nietzsche's Account of Truth, and a Problem with it 
Thus Nietzsche disposes of the hypothesis of 'things-in-themselves' 
on the grounds that no sense can be made of such 'things' partly because the 
essence of 'thingness' is its discernible affects on other things and subjects. 
What then are we left with? Exactly what Jacobi and von Kleist most feared, 
when the spectre of epistemological nihilism first raised its head in the wake 
of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Recall that Jacobi wrote: 
But the human being has such a choice, this single one: Nothingness 
or a God. Choosing Nothingness, he makes himself into a God; that is, 
he makes an apparition into God because if there is no God, it is 
impossible that man and everything which surrounds him is not merely 
an apparition. 23 
In Jacobi's view, without a God there is no way of guaranteeing that our 
perspective on the world is no more than that: just our perspective 
(Descartes introduces God into his Meditations for a similar reason). 
Similarly, without a realm of 'things-in-themselves' there is nothing against 
which to compare our human perspectiv.es. This opens up the possibility of 
man, in Jacobi's terms, making 'himself into a God', in the sense of 
becoming that which determines what is true and what is not, what is and 
what is not. This possibility horrified Jacobi. Nietzsche, by contrast, 
embraces it with all his might. As a result of the Kantian critique of 
knowledge, and Nietzsche's own sharpenings of this critique, we are left 
with the following account of knowledge and truth: 
Not 'to know' but to schematize - to impose upon chaos as much 
regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the formulation 
of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the 
need, not to 'know,' but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of 
intelligibility and calculation (WP: 515 I p.278). 
23 Quoted in Critchley (2001), p.27. 
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Jacobi also wrote, 'If the highest upon which I can reflect, what I can 
contemplate, is my empty and pure, naked and mere ego, with its autonomy 
and freedom: then rational self-contemplation, then rationality is for me a 
curse - I deplore my existence'. 24 This is, more or less, the position that 
Nietzsche has arrived at - although he draws an opposed conclusion from it. 
For Nietzsche, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, the highest 
upon which we can reflect is our ability to shape the world in a particular 
way, to forge our own perspective on that which possesses no qualities 'in 
itself'. However, it is not even the ego which does this. Rather, the ego is 
part of the order which we impose, is a construction of the various disparate 
drives which comprise it: 'The 'subject' is not something given, it is 
something added and invented and projected behind what there is' (WP: 481 
I p.267). 
Before leaving Nietzsche's engagement with Kant's transcendental 
idealism it is worth trying to pin down quite where Nietzsche stands -
something that is not very easy to do given Nietzsche's aphoristic, elusive 
style. More specifically: can sense be made of the notion of a 'perspective' 
and of truth being 'perspectival' if there is not some independently existing 
'thing' for there to be perspectives of? When Nietzsche uses such terms as a 
'chaos of sensations' to describe such a reality, how can he insist that this is 
not some form of 'thing-in-itself'? Poellner addresses this tension in 
Nietzsche's writings. 25 Without any such entity, we are left with what 
Poellner calls 'a conception of subjects as uncaused quasi-monadic entities 
unaffected by anything genuinely external to- ontologically independent of-
them'. 26 Such a peculiar and abstract view cannot be Nietzsche's view, which 
means that his talk of human beings 'constructing' or 'creating' the world 
that we inhabit is ultimately hyperbolic, and potentially obscures the extent 
to which he thinks that whatever exists independently of our perspectives 
does make definite demands on us. As Poellner puts it, 'Reality can only 
'select' well-fitted individuals for survival and condemn others to extinction 
if it has determinate properties which the respective individuals either are or 
24~ib7a:: 1'~27~ 
25 Poe liner ( 1995), p. 195-8. 
26 Ibid, p.l98. 
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are not capable of mastering' .27 Again, if it possesses such determinate 
properties it may seem hard to see on what grounds Nietzsche denies so 
vociferously a realm of 'things-in-themselves'. 
However, Nietzsche does have a defence. Claiming that reality 
possesses 'determinate properties' is something quite different to claiming 
the existence of 'things-in-themselves' in Kant's sense. While it may be 
hyperbolic to deny, as Nietzsche does, that there are 'things' or 'objects', 
and to assert that there are only really sensations, he can claim that the 
things which there are are not Kantian 'things-in-themselves'. Rather, they 
are empirical objects, part of an empirical world whose character and 
structure is not, in the final analysis, independent of human practices, 
valuations and 'sensations'. 
1.5. Nietzsche's Epistemology and Modern European Nihilism 
lam calling this aspect of modern European nihilism 'epistemological 
nihilism', the claim that there is no objective order for our knowledge to 
correspond to. What are the implications of such a position, and why might 
they seem nihilistic? It is worth remembering that one of the central 
motivations behind Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was to make room for 
faith in God by preserving a realm beyond knowledge. Nietzsche uses an 
essentially Kantian point to argue in the opposite direction, against God. We 
cannot know 'things-in-themselves'. Why, therefore, should we assume that 
there is a God? So, the 'death of God', announced so powerfully and 
movingly in The Gay Science 125, is, as it were, intellectually rooted, for 
Nietzsche, in Kant's critical philosophy. In this mournful passage (the tone 
is sombre rather than celebratory) Nietzsche's primary concern is the loss of 
measure or orientation for human life which this staggering event must bring 
about. As he puts it in the following marvellous metaphors: 'How could we 
drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? 
What were we doing when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it 
moving now? ... Away from all suns?' (GS: 125 I p.181 ). For the 
. - -accumulated reasons l have explained-- the moral demand to tell the- tt·uth; 
27 Ibid., p.J96. 
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expressed in modern science, reduction in the intensity of suffering that the 
majority of people experience, and the philosophy of Kant - the ascetic 
nihilism of Christianity has begun to toppie, an interpretation that has 
provided meaning and strength to the sensitive creatures that we are for two 
thousand years. We have 'drunk up the sea ... wiped away the entire horizon 
... unchained the earth from its sun.' We have caused fatal damage to the 
dam that protects us against the constitutional nihilism that would otherwise 
flood in. 
What is so fatal about Kant's philosophy is the self-consciousness it 
gives us as to the projected nature of what we take to be knowledge. We are 
no longer able to have faith in the correspondence between our categories of 
reason, and the world: 
The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realization that the 
overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the 
concept of 'aim,' the concept of 'unity,' or the concept of 'truth.' 
Existence has no end or goal~ any comprehensive unity in the plurality 
of events is lacking: the character of existence is not 'true,' is false. 
One simply lacks any reason for convincing oneself there is a true 
world. Briefly: the categories 'aim,' 'unity,' 'being' which we used to 
project some value into the world - we pull out again; so the world 
looks valueless . ... 
Conclusion: The faith in the categories of reason is the cause 
of nihilism (WP: 12 I p.JJ). 
It is Kant's philosophy that provides the means to pull out these categories 
of reason from the world -those of aim, unity and a true world - by alerting 
us to the projective character of our knowledge, a recognition that has 
nihilistic consequences as we are forced to adjust to the realisation that the 
world is not inherently purposeful, unified, and true. 
We have seen how Jacobi and von Kleist reacted to the inklings which 
_they o_b_viously _ had_Qf _this,_re_c_ognition. Nietzs_che was weJL aware_ of .the 
power of this despairing response, no doubt through personal acquaintance 
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with it. He thought that the challenge that modern European nihilism poses 
us is to live with the epistemological insights furnished by Kant and 
intensified by Nietzsche without collapsing into despair. The tension 
between these two alternatives - of capitulating in the face of the 
recognition of the absence of meanings which transcend our own 
construction of them, and of affirming such a recognition as a liberation 
into infinite possibilities of creation - constitutes the core of European 
nihilism. lt was a tension that Nietzsche became aware of early on in his 
writings, as early as Human, all too Human ( 1878), where he writes: 
But the tragic thing is that we can no longer believe those dogmas of 
rei igion and metaphysics, once we have the rigorous method of truth 
in our hearts and heads, and yet on the other hand, the development of 
mankind has made us so delicate, sensitive, and ailing that we need 
the most potent kind of cures and comforts - hence arises the danger 
that man might bleed to death from the truth he has recognized. Byron 
expressed this in his immortal lines: 
Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most 
must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth, 
the tree of knowledge is not that of I ife (HA: I 09 I p. 78). 
And, in The Gay Science, four years later: 
Have we not exposed ourselves to the suspicion of an opposition - an 
opposition between the world in which we were at home up until now 
with our reverences that made it possible for us to endure life, and 
another world that consists of us - an inexorable, fundamental, and 
deepest suspicion about ourselves that is more and more gaining 
worse control of us Europeans and that could easily confront coming 
generations with the terrifying Either/Or: 'Either abo I ish your 
reverences or- yourselves!'. The latter would be nihilism; but would 
not the former also be- nihilism?- This is our question mark (GS: 346 
I p.287). ____ ------- __ -' 
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As he puts it in The Will to Power, man is now torn apart by the following 
tension: 'not to esteem what we know, and not to be allowed any longer to 
esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves' (WP: 5 I p.lO). Facing up to 
European nih i I ism is, therefore, a great risk, and Nietzsche was all too 
keenly aware of this. European nihilism is a 'pharmakon', both poison and 
cure. However, there is no guarantee that it will be a cure, a liberation from 
ascetic nihilism, rather than a lapse into something even worse than this (a 
possibility which will be addressed in the next chapter). Nietzsche was well 
aware that man might bleed to death from the truths he has recognized, but 
nevertheless proceeds to ruthlessly proclaim such truths - 'plain, bitter, 
ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral truth' (GM: l 2 I p.l2). 
As a result of the proclamation of such truths, we modern Europeans 
are left with the following challenge: 'It is a measure of the degree of 
strength of will to what extent one can do without meaning in things, to what 
extent one can endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes 
a small portion of it oneself' (WP: 585 I p.318). This is the crucial issue of 
Nietzsche's nihilism. Kant has drawn our attention to the role that we play 
in constituting reality, and Nietzsche elaborates on this idea to emphasise 
the constructed nature of what we take to be 'truth'. Such knowledge has the 
potential to crush us, insofar as, if one is not able to 'organize a small 
portion of [the world] oneself', one may despair of all meaning, or else fall 
back into the belief that our knowledge is not constructed, that 'there is a 
will in [things] already' (WP: 585 I p.318). Nietzsche's challenge is to face 
up fully to the constructed, 'all too human' nature of the meanings that we 
live by, thereby overcoming modern European nihilism by not succumbing to 
the despair that Kant's philosophy, radicalized, can lead to (and did lead to 
for people like von Kleist). As one Nietzsche commentator, Gregory Bruce 
Smith, puts it, 'Nietzsche saw his task,_ the task of present philosophy, as 
one of trying to develop a means by which mankind could again esteem and 
revere with a good conscience' .28 That is to say, Nietzsche tries to articulate 
how man can feel his life to be meaningful and valuable without thinking 
that such meaning comes from reality as it is 'in-itself', thus whilst 
28 Gregory Bruce Smith, Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Transition to Postmodernity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago press, 1996), p. 72. 
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acknowledging that the meaning it possesses is 'man-made'. This is the 
burning question in Nietzsche's response to nihilism: having become self-
conscious about the human origins of truth (and, therefore, of morality) can 
man sti II feel his I ife to be meaningfu I? Edward Craig, in The Mind of God 
and the Works of Man, suggests that, 'Nietzsche ... feels very keenly ... that 
the realization that a belief is held for pragmatic purposes is halfway 
towards its abandonment'. 29 Does it? This, to be blunt, is the central question 
of chapter two. 
29 Edward Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
p.281 
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Chapter two: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism 
Introduction 
I have sketched out, then, the three kinds of nihilism that Nietzsche 
adumbrates in his works: original, ascetic, and modern European. I have 
indicated how nihilism centres around the issue of rendering suffering 
meaningful, and, in my discussion of The Birth of Tragedy, sketched out a 
provisional contrast between nihilistic and non-nihilistic, 'Dionysian', 
responses to suffering. I have also traced the reasons that Nietzsche gives 
for the emergence of modern European nihilism, and the challenges that it 
poses us, challenges that originate in Kant's critical philosophy. In this 
chapter I shall be considering Nietzsche's account of how we might 
overcome this latest outbreak of nihilism, how we might overcome modern 
European nihilism without reverting back to a form of ascetic nihilism. 
Ernest Becker, the psychologist, anthropologist and philosopher 
quoted earlier, writes, in The Birth and Death of Meaning: 
The most astonishing thing of all, about man's fictions, is not that 
they have from prehistoric times hung like a flimsy canopy over his 
social world, but that he should have come to discover them at all. It 
is one of the most remarkable achievements of thought, of self-
scrutiny, that the most anxiety-prone animal of all could come to see 
through himself and discover the fictional nature of his action world. 
Future historians will probably record it as one of the great, liberating 
breakthroughs of all time, and it happened in ours. 30 
This quotation summarises very well much of what Nietzsche has to say 
about overcoming nihilism, about using our newly won self-consciousness 
concerning the nature of value and truth to freely choose new values and new 
'truths'. Nietzsche responds to nihilism by painting a picture of a man who 
embodies the overcoming of nihilism. This is the central feature of the 
0 
-overman,-or 'higher man' (I am not-going t<Hnsist on a significant-difference-~-
30 Ernest Becker ( 1962), p.l41-2. 
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between these terms, and shall generally use the former term). He is the 
person who can accept the human origins of meaning, truth and morality, 
without this insight plunging him into despair, or a crippling kind of 
relativism. In Becker's terms, he is able to acknowledge 'the fictional nature 
of his action world', and to use this insight to create new values for himself. 
It is Nietzsche's theory of the will to power which, in its author's eyes, 
provides the means to do this. So, the overman is somebody who is 
simultaneously able to affirm the human origins of truth, the perspectival 
nature of knowledge, and yet live in accord with the will to power rather 
than the life-denying fictions of the various forms of ascetic nihilism. 
2.1. Nietzsche on Truth and the Opportunities that Nihilism Affords Us 
Firstly, let us recap on Nietzsche's understanding of truth: 
Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition 
of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. 
'Truth' is therefore not something there, that might be found or 
discovered - but something that must be created and that gives a name 
to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end -
i ntrpJ1n c. in a,.tr.v:t..~ .~~ ,:;t,.._nmcr.·~·t I ~'?II inlft?~<u .. m.,..~ ""II c.,t,i xe lltJ.~tr rm j,Q,\ 1:1.~ i 1111" 
not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and 
determined. It is a word for the 'will to power' (WP: 552 I p.298). 
This recognition, in Nietzsche's view, splits people into those who see in 
this a reason for despair over the meaninglessness of life, von Kleist 
fashion, and those who see in it an unprecedented opportunity to create new 
forms of truth, new values. This is the point of his 'open sea' metaphor in 
The Gay Science, about which Nietzsche rhapsodises thus: 
At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not 
be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to 
face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted 
_,agai1l; the__sea,_op_r_,sea, lies ope_!lagain_; p_e_r_hap_sJ~~r_e_]1a,s~ neve~ y~t 
been such an 'open sea' (GS: 343 I p.280). 
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This beautiful passage registers the sense of liberation which Nietzsche felt 
his perspectival account of truth leads to. However, he was well aware that 
not everyone would see it this way, that not everyone would greet the open 
sea with such a welcoming embrace. This is the chief feature which 
separates the man who is able to overcome nihi I ism from the man who is not, 
the extent to which, 'we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, the 
merely apparent character, the necessity of I ies' (WP: 15 I p.15). Nietzsche 
predicted that the 'death of God' and the 'twilight of the idols' would 
initially not be greeted as a great liberation, but with profound despair: 
Our pessimism: the world does not have the value we thought it 
had. Initial result: it seems worth less; that is how it is 
experienced initially. It is only in this sense that we are pessimists; 
i.e., in our determination to admit this revaluation to ourselves 
without any reservation, and to stop telling ourselves tales- lies- the 
old way. 
That is precisely how we find the pathos that impels us to seek 
new values. In sum: the world might be far more valuable than we used 
to believe; we must see through the naivete of our ideals, and while 
we thought that we accorded it the highest interpretation, we may not 
even have given our human existence a moderately fair value (WP: 32 
I p.22). 
Nietzsche's turns of phrase in the second paragraph are misleading, because 
they imply that the world has a constitution 'in-itself' which may be more 
valuable than we previously thought, which is exactly what, as we have seen, 
he is denying, and the recognition of which constitutes the heart of modern 
nihilism. His central point is that, released from ascetic nihilism and its 
concomitant claims to non-perspectival knowledge, we are now in a position 
to value the world more highly than it was valued by ascetic nihilism- which 
is why he writes that, as such, nihilism might be 'a divine way of thinking' 
(WP: 15 I p.15). However, this freedom can only come about once we 
l,egis!t;:rc-· and __ }~'Yc~EB_Oill~e J~~~_!_ n)ti!l_ 1--'l'~<>_ck_c of ~European _ n ihiJ_Lsrrt_ a1_1_~"-tl!e_. -~c. _ --~ 
devaluation of our highest values, go through a 'dark night of the soul' and 
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'stop telling ourselves tales ... the old way.' And there is no guarantee that 
we will do this, that we will undergo this dark night of the soul, out of 
which a new kind of humanity would emerge. As I mentioned earlier, 
nihilism is a 'pharmakon', both poison and cure. Before considering the 
ways in which it is a cure for the life-denying fictions of ascetic nihilism, I 
want to discuss the dangers that it leaves us open to if we fail to embrace its 
challenge, its poisonous aspect. The central danger that Nietzsche feared is a 
kind of vacuous relativism in which little more is at stake than one's 
personal comfort. As such, Nietzsche's portrait of 'the last man' (I have 
chosen to use this term rather than Kaufmann's translation 'the ultimate 
man', because the latter sounds too positive!) is a damning indictment of the 
philosophy underlying much of mainstream, capitalist culture (see TZ: 
Prologue 5 I p.45-7). 
2.2. The Danger of European Nihilism: the Rise of the Last Man 
As mentioned above, Edward Craig suggests that, 'Nietzsche ... feels 
very keenly ... that the realization that a belief is held for pragmatic 
purposes is halfway towards its abandonment'. Craig is rightly indicating 
how acutely aware Nietzsche was of the potentially crippling effects a 
perspectival view of knowledge may have. He writes, in The Will to Power: 
Extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by 
extreme positions of the opposite kind. Thus the belief in the absolute 
immorality of nature, in aim- and meaninglessness, is the 
psychologically necessary affect once the belief in God and an 
essentially moral order becomes untenable. Nihilism appears at that 
point, not that the displeasure at existence has become greater than 
before but because one has come to mistrust any 'meaning' in 
suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has collapsed, but 
because it was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there 
were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain .... 
The mistrust of our previous valuations grows unti I it becomes 
the question: _'Are not all 'values' lures thaLdraw ouLthe comedy 
without bringing it closer to a solution?' (WP: 55 I p.35). 
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The most pervasive way 1n which Nietzsche thoi.lght this attitude might 
manifest itself is depicted in the character of the 'last man' (a phrase that 
has since become famous due to Fukayama's illuminating use of this notion 
with reference to Hegel's view of 'the end of history'). Anderson, in The 
Truth about Truth, suggests that, ' ... the inner voice of the postmodern 
ironist is becoming a part of everybody's psychological makeup' .31 This is 
what Nietzsche prophesied, and it can fairly seem to have come to pass. 
Allan Bloom, in The Closing of the American Mind, gives a portrait of 
students which characterises them in similar terms to Nietzsche's last men. 
He begins his book by saying, 'There is one thing a professor can be 
absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, 
or says he believes, that truth us relative'. 32 He suggests that this 'new 
language of value relativism constitutes a change in our view of things 
moral and political as great as the one that took place when Christianity 
replaced Greek and Roman paganism . .JJ However, this seismic shift, 
registered so fully in Nietzsche's philosophy, presents grave dangers, 
dangers which Bloom saw in many of the students that he taught over his 
long career: 
Our openness [value relativism] means we do not need others. Thus 
what is advertised as a great opening is a great closing. No longer is 
there a hope that there are great wise men in other places and times 
who can reveal the truth about life ... Gone is the real historical sense 
of a Machiavelli who wrested a few hours from each busy day in 
which 'to don regal and courtly garments, enter the courts of the 
ancients and speak with them' .34 
And consequently: 
... a young person today, to exaggerate only a little, actually begins de 
novo, without the givens or imperatives that he would have had only 
31 Walter Truett Anderson (ed.), The Truth about Truth (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1995), p.II6. 
·- ~3£Allan'Bioom, The Closing oft he American Mind(London: Penguin,I987~,'P;25. 
33 Ibid., p.141. 
34 Ibid., p.34-5. 
yesterday. His country demands little of him and provides well for 
him, his religion is a matter of absolutely free choice and -this is 
what is really fresh - so are his sexual involvements. He can now 
choose, but he finds he no longer has a sufficient motive for choice 
that is more than whim, that is binding (ita I ics mine). 35 
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We have here almost a grotesque parody of the overman seizing the freedom 
to c1·eate his own values. Bloom's fear is the same as Nietzsche's: namely, 
that the recognition that knowledge is perspectival can lead to a crippling 
relativism, in which any life is regarded as as good as any other life because 
it is all a question of the individual's own 'values'. (It is the same fear that 
Macintyre evokes and addresses in After Virtue, under the term 
'emotivism'). James Edwards, in The Plain Sense of Things, sees in the 
shopping centre the perfect symbol of this insidious relativism. Having 
described the stark juxtaposition of various shops selling different things 
and purveying different values and 'lifestyles', he laments, 
Laid out before one are whole I ives one can, if one has the necessary 
credit line, choose to inhabit ... the way in which the tools, garments 
and attitudes specific to particular times and places become 
commodities to be marketed to anonymous and rootless consumers: 
these are the natural (if also banal) expressions of our normal 
nihilism .... In the culture of the mall, our highest values ... have 
become the playthings of an impersonal and endless economic 
ordering. 36 
We can recognise Nietzsche's 'last man' wandering the shopping malls. The 
'last man' is the antithesis of the overman. Zarathustra paints a memorable 
po.rtrait of the last men. Having come down from the hillside after ten years 
of solitude, and finding his audience unreceptive to his teaching on the 
overman and self-overcoming, he tries to inspire their contempt 
(unsuccessfully) by painting a portrait of the 'last man' (this quotation, from 
- -
35 /bid:, p;109. 
36 James Edwards, The Plain Sense of Things (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997), p.S0-1. 
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Kaufmann's translation, translates the relevant phrase as 'ultimate man' 
rather than 'last man'): 
Alas! The time is coming when man will no more shoot the 
arrow of his longing out over mankind, and the string of his bow will 
have forgotten how to twang! ... 
Alas! The time is coming when man will give birth to no more 
stars. Alas! The time of the most contemptible man is coming, the man 
who can no longer despise himself . 
.. . 'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a 
star?' thus asks the Ultimate Man and blinks. 
The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Ultimate 
Man, who makes everything small. ... 'We have discovered happiness,' 
say the Ultimate Men and blink. 
They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs 
warmth .... 
No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing: 
whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse .... 
They have their I ittle pleasure for the day and their I ittle 
pleasure for the night (TZ: Prologue S I p.46~ 7). 
This dazzling passage contains some ideas that lie right at the heart of 
Nietzsche's philosophical project. Firstly, the contention that what is of the 
utmost importance is human excellence, and not the peaceful coexistence of 
individuals pursuing 'life, liberty and happiness'. Indeed, as we shall see, 
for Nietzsche these two aims are radically opposed. Secondly, the contention 
that greatness comes through conflict, strife, 'chaos', which gives birth to 
'dancing stars.' Nietzsche's deepest fear was that, in the wake of the death 
of God, man would lose his longing for excellence, and settle down into a 
mediocre and petty existence, pampered by material comforts, but a life in 
which nothing essential is at stake. 
He expresses this fear most emphatically in On the Genealogy of 
"Morality:~ -
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For this is how things are: the diminution and levelling of European 
man constitutes our greatest danger, for the sight of him makes us 
weary. - We can see nothing today that wants to grow greater, we 
suspect that things will continue to go down, down, to become thinner, 
more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, 
more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian- there is no doubt that 
man is getting 'better' all the time. 
Here precisely is what. has become a fatality for Europe -
together with the fear of man we have also lost our love for him, our 
reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The sight 
of man now makes us weary- what is nihilism today if it is not that?-
We are weary of man (GM: 1 12 I p.27). 
So, Nietzsche's conception of the overman needs to be understood in 
opposition to this 'last man', as 'a man who justifies man ... for the sake of 
which one may sti II believe in man.' (ibid.). The last man is the man who 
succumbs to a dehabilitating relativism in the wake of the collapse of ascetic 
nihilism, who wanders the shopping malls aimlessly looking for the next 
purchase, and who, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde's definition of a cynic, 
'knows the price of everything, the value of nothing.' 
2.3. The Overman: Owning up to our Creativity and Creating New Values 
The overman embodies the opposite attitude to the last man to 
perspectivism. He sees in it an opportunity for creativity and imposition of 
his own will, rather than a reason for lapsing into a stultifying relativism. It 
is in The Gay Science that Nietzsche begins his celebration of the 'all too 
human' nature of our knowledge as a means to the overcoming of nihilism. 
There he focuses on the liberation which recognition of the human nature of 
our knowledge potentially leads to, because it brings man into an 
unprecedented self-consciousness concerning his creative capacities, and 
therewith the potential to take charge of his own destiny, to will the kind of 
creature that he wants to become, and the kind of world he wants to live in. 
H_e writes: 
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Only we have created the world that concerns man! - But precisely 
this knowledge we lack, and when we occasionally catch it for a 
fleeting moment we always forget it again immediately; we fail to 
recognize our best power and underestimate ourselves ... We are 
neither as proud nor as happy as we might be' (GS: 301 I p.242). 
The advent of nihilism provides us with an opportunity to recognise that we 
have created the world that concerns man, a recognition that could make us 
much prouder and happier that we have been for so long. Earlier in the book 
Nietzsche tells a I ittle parable: 'There is a lake that one day ceased to permit 
itself to flow off; it formed a dam where it had hitherto flown off; and ever 
since this lake is rising higher and higher .... perhaps man will rise ever 
higher as soon as he ceases tojlow out into a god.' (GS: 285 I p.230). Man is 
now able to enter into his true estate, to recognise the power of his own 
creativity rather than believing it to be the work of a world 'in itself'. As 
Martha Nussbaum eloquently puts it: 
Nietzsche's human being, noticing [that his positing of an order of 
things is negated by his experience of life] is filled with Dionysian 
joy and pride in his own artistry. For if there is no intrinsic order in 
things, how much more wonderful -that one should have managed to 
invent so many beautiful stories, to forge so many daring conceptual 
schemes, to dance so many daring and improbable dances. The absence 
of a designing god leads to a heightened joy in the artistic 
possibilities of humanity. 37 
The way beyond nihilism, then, involves us becoming God-like in the way in 
which Jacobi had in mind, becoming aware of ourselves as world-makers 
rather than world-takers, as creators, as, in the broadest possible sense, 
artists. In both The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche 
celebrates the creative potential that his 'all too human' insights bestow 
upon man, a celebration that reaches its fruition in the figure of the overman 
in Zarathustra. 
37 Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus' in Christopher Janaway (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.364-5. 
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Early indications of what later becomes the overman can be found in 
The Gay Science. Thus Nietzsche writes, 'What do you believe in?- [n this: 
that the weight of all things must be determined anew' (GS: 269 I p.219), 
and, 'Let us therefore limit ourselves to the ... creation of our own new table 
of values . ... We ... want to be ... those who give themselves their own law, 
those who create themselves!' (GS: 335 I p.266). The self-consciousness 
brought about by the advent of nihilism puts man in the position of being 
responsible for his values, an incredible burden the weight of which 
Nietzsche thought man could only bear by overcoming himself, by becoming 
a new, higher kind of being: an overman. 
In Zarathustra Nietzsche gives supremely poetic expression to some 
of the ideas concerning nihilism expressed in The Gay Science. Thus in 
Zarathustra's crucial first discourse, 'Of the three metamorphoses', he 
speaks of the transition from camel to lion to child. The camel, the 'weight-
bearing spirit', represents man before the advent of modern European 
nihilism, man straining under the weight of Platonic-Christian values, which 
have given his existence, characterised as a desert, ballast, meaning, 
'gravitas'. Importantly, this meaning is assumed to inhere in Kant's 'things-
in-themselves', or some Platonic I Christian equivalent: reality as it anyway 
is, independent of the human contribution: 'foreign heavy words and values' 
(TZ: 3 11 I p.211 ). The lion represents the onset of nihilism, who 'wants to 
capture freedom and be lord in its own desert'. Zarathustra tells us that the 
might of the lion creates 'freedom for new creation', seizes 'the right to new 
values - that is the most terrible proceeding for a weight-bearing and 
reverential spirit' (TZ: 1 1 I p.55). The lion represents the destructive aspect 
of Nietzsche's work, his corrosive genealogies, designed to uncover the 'all 
too human' nature of previously presumed 'ideals'. From the perspective of 
the camel, the activity of the I ion is terrib I e. But the deconstructive activity 
of the lion is not enough in itself. Nihilism must be overcome, man must 
negotiate the abysmal open sea on his frail, human bark, and this is 
symbolised by the third metamorphosis of the spirit, the child, who is 
'innQc_eJt~t: ~Jl<l fQJgetfyln~ss, a new b~ginning ... a ~acred_ Y~~.' This is wha_t ___ _ 
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is needed for 'the sport of creation', in which 'the spirit wills its own will, 
the spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world' (ibid.). 
In another crucial discourse, later on in the book, 'Of the spirit of 
Gravity', Nietzsche develops these images further. In this section the spirit 
of gravity is analogous to the camel, and overcoming this spirit is analogous 
to the child. Zarathustra speaks of baptizing the earth as the weightless, and 
of teaching men to fly by removing boundary stones. He accuses the spirit of 
gravity of being the cause of man being 'difficult to discover'. He explains 
that what he means by this is that the spirit of gravity has prevented man 
from recognising that he has created all of the things that he has reverenced: 
' ... he has discovered himself who says: This is my good and evi 1: he has 
silenced thereby the mole and the dwarf who says: 'Good for all, evil for all' 
(TZ: 3 II I p.212). 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche had begun to baptize the earth as 
weightless by removing all boundary stones, and by exposing man as the 
creator of his reverences, the creator of value. In Zarathustra this theme is 
developed more and more. Thus Zarathustra says, 'Man first implanted 
values into things to maintain himself- he created the meaning of things, a 
human meaning! Therefore he calls himself: 'Man', that is: the evaluator' 
(TZ: 15 I p.85). Elsewhere he says: 'But may the will to truth mean this to 
you: that everything should be transformed into the humanly-conceivable, 
the humanly-evident, the humanly-palpable .... the world should be formed in 
your image by your reason, your will, your love!' (TZ: 2 2 I p.IIO). 
Zarathustra warns of the 'terror' inherent in this recognition, comparing it, 
in an echo of metaphors found in The Gay Science (e.g. 125), to being, 'a 
star thrown into empty space and into the icy breath of solitude' (TZ: 3 I 0 I 
p.207). The overman is able to acknowledge this terror, to look into the 
abyss without it rendering him incapable of creating meaning in his life. 
2. 4. The Will to Power: Nietzsche's Guide to the Creation of New Values 
In Qr_der to co_unteract the 'icy bre~!b' of~lllRJX_sfl@.ce' that ~urrounds 
the thinker who is no longer able to believe in absolute truths, the vertigo 
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and potentially crippling relativism that such an insight can induce, 
Nietzsche formulates his theory of the will to power, which is, as it were, a 
guide to the creation of new values for those who have travelled with him so 
far. The question to which the will to power provides an answer was one 
which had been central to Nietzsche since the beginning of his 
philosophizing: namely, how to furnish a new, naturalistic account of values 
in the face of the collapse of traditional, metaphysical, ascetic nihilist forms 
of grounding- such as Platonic forms, God, 'thing-in-themselves.' Thus, in 
the first of his Untimely Meditations, 'David Strauss, the confessor and 
writer', we find him criticising Strauss for failing to see the implications of 
Darwin's erosion of any essential difference between man and animal in his 
On the Origin of the Species: 
With a certain tough satisfaction he clothes himself in the hairy 
garments of our ape genealogists and praises Darwin as one of the 
great benefactors of mankind - but abashed we see that his ethics is 
quite untouched ... Strauss has not even learned that ... preaching 
morals is as easy as giving reasons for morals is difficult; it should 
rather have been his task seriously to explain and to derive the 
phenomena of human goodness, mercy, love and self-abnegation, 
which after all exist as a matter of fact, from his Darwinistic 
presuppositions (UM: 2 I p.7). 
This, in fact, becomes the task Nietzsche takes on for himself: to explain 
human goodness. from naturalistic presuppositions, and is what, ultimately, 
his theory of the will to power is an attempt to do. 
The most important feature of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to 
power is that it directly opposes the ascetic nihilism of Plato and 
Christianity by painting a picture of man and the world the living out of 
which will restore man to the healthiness of his instincts (which are 'the 
creative-affirmative force in all productive people', as we saw Nietzsche 
claim eadier), 'transform him back into nature' (BG: 230 I p.l62), reground 
him in this world, which Nietzsche thinks is best characterised as a world of 
:__::_:_J-~-'------ _ _::_..:.___ :_. _____ . _ ___,_: ____ ._ ~-- __ ::. > :_: ~ ~ _ o.;~__:_::::';,_ ·.......:..:._.=__-' _,_;:.__:____;.;__. _:__::._· .• __ -_: ____ .= .. ~-"-~i~---
will to power, that is to say, a world of 'appropriation, injury, overpowering 
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of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of one's own 
forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation' (BG: 259 I 
p.l94). It is Nietzsche's attempt to reintroduce the Dionysian spirit of the 
early Greek tragedies, as the best way of responding to suffering, rather than 
the ascetic nihilism engendered by Socrates and propagated by Plato and 
Christianity. 
What kind of doctrine is the will to power? Attempting to answer this 
question swiftly takes us into a hornet's nest. In Daybreak Nietzsche mocks 
the pretensions of previous philosophers to 'solve everything at a stroke, 
with a single word ... to compress the problem of the world into the simplest 
riddle-form' and become its 'unriddler' (D: 547 I p.219-20). In Human, All 
Too Human he writes, 'It is the sign of a higher culture to esteem more 
highly the little, humble truths, those discovered by strict method, rather 
than the gladdening and dazzling errors that originate in metaphysical and 
artistic ages and men' (HA: 3 I p.\5). In that book Nietzsche styles himself 
as a modest pursuer of such humble truths. And yet, with his doctrine of the 
wi II to power, he does indeed seem to be attempting to 'solve everything at a 
stroke, with a single word'. Well, that is the question: is he? Commentators 
are - of course - divided on this question. Following a distinction Brian 
Leiter makes, we can divide them roughly into two kinds 38• The more 
'postmodern' commentators, inspired by Foucault's reading of Nietzsche, 
argue that the will to power is not such an attempt; they spend much of their 
time focusing on Nietzsche's perspectivism rather than the will to power. On 
the other hand, there is the more 'essentialist' school of commentators, who 
read Nietzsche as a more traditional philosopher, and, like Freud, take him 
to be making non-perspectival claims about the essence of things in his 
theory of the will to power. An example of such an approach is that taken by 
Richardson, who, in his provocatively titled book, Nietzsche's System, 
writes: 'Like Plato, [Nietzsche] claims a systematic truth about essence, an 
essence or being that is ... differentially realized, generating values that 
ground an ethics, in which the metaphysical project is rated as our highest 
38 Brian Leiter, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge, 2002), 
p.l-2. 
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activity.' 39 Nietzsche's writings being as fecund as they are, either 
interpretation can be convincingly argued for. 
What is clear is that what later becomes, in Zarathustra and Beyond 
Good and Evil, the doctrine of the will to power starts life as a 
psychological doctrine. Thus we find Nietzsche, in the books of his so-called 
'middle period' (Human, All Too Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science), 
giving compelling accounts of various diverse human phenomena in te1·ms of 
a drive for power. (This is chronicled excellently, as ever, in Kaufmann, 
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, chapter six.) Daybreak 
contains a very good account of Nietzsche's psychological analyses of 
power: 
The striving for distinction . ... The striving for distinction keeps a 
constant eye on the next man and wants to know what his feelings are 
... We want ... to perceive or divine how the next man outwardly or 
inwardly suffers from us, how he loses control over himself and 
surrenders to the impression our hand or even merely the sight of us 
makes upon him; and even when he who strives after distinction makes 
and wants to make a joyful, elevating or cheering impression, he 
nonetheless enjoys this success not inasmuch as he has given joy to 
the next man or elevated or cheered him, but inasmuch as he has 
impressed himself on the soul of the other, changed its shape and 
ruled over it as his own sweet will. The striving for distinction is the 
striving for domination over the next man, though it be a very indirect 
domination and only felt or even dreamed. There is a long scale of 
degrees of this secretly desired domination, and a complete catalogue 
of them would be almost the same thing as a history of culture, from 
the earliest, still grotesque barbarism up to the grotesqueries of over-
refinement and morbid idealism. The striving for distinction brings 
with it for the next man - to name only a few steps on the ladder: 
torment, then blows, then terror, then fearful astonishment, then 
elevation, then joy, then cheerfulness, then laughter, then derision, 
thep mocker)', then ri_!tLc!Jle_, then _giving bl2ws, then ill)posi~g 
39 John Richardson, Nietzsche's System (Oxford: Oxford university press, 1996), p.76 
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torment: - here at the end of the ladder stands the ascetic and martyr 
(D: 113 I p.68). 
This passage indicates well the extent to which what Nietzsche has in mind 
by our striving for distinction is deeply akin to Hegel's notion of 
recognition, so powerfully used by Fukayama in The End of History and the 
Last Man, where he links it to the Platonic notion of 'thymos', the 
'appetitive' part of our souls. Whilst Nietzsche does not use the word 
'power' here, he does in several other passages that make similar points, in 
his middle period writings. What is so significant about the striving for 
distinction, ot· power, is its all encompassing nature, as Nietzsche sees it. In 
his view the 'striving for distinction hypothesis' has great explanatory 
range, it can be applied to actions which, on the surface, look like the 
opposite of striving for distinction, such as acts of generosity or patience. 
Thus it is a key which can be used to write 'a history of cultut·e', because it 
explains human interactions as diverse as beating another human being, 
making him laugh, or weep with gratitude. Because of its diversity, 
Nietzsche is now, it seems, on the way to 'solving everything at a stroke'. 
Another way of putting this is to say that Nietzsche's psychological 
analyses provide him with a monistic theory with which to combat the 
dualisms of ascetic nihilism, especially the dualisms of matter and spirit, of 
this world and another, 'truer' world. So, what does he actually mean by the 
phrase 'will to power'? He means a striving that all forms of life possess to 
move beyond what they now do or possess. Kaufmann, being a Hegelian 
scholar, compares it to Hegel's Geist insofar as it is of the essence of the 
will to power to manifest itself in one way, and then to sublimate this 
manifestation, thereby making Nietzsche a 'dialectical monist'. 40 He also 
compares it to the Platonic 'eros', and writes, ' ... his [Nietzsche's] account 
of man's ontological interest has no equal in the history of Western thought 
since Plato offered his soul-stirring picture of man's ontological 
predicament in his Symposium. ' 41 Whilst this point is exaggerated, Kaufmann 
40 W'alter_Kaufmann, Nietzsche:_Rhilosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Chichester: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), p.235. 
41 Ibid, p.255. 
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is quite right to point out that, 'Nietzsche's conception of morality has a 
cosmic setting' ,42 provided by his theory of the will to power. It is quite 
clear from the passage in which Nietzsche first advances this theory that it is 
no longer just human life that is motivated by a thirst for power, but all life: 
Where I found a I iving creature, there I found wi II to power ... 
And life itself told me this secret: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am that 
which must overcome itself again and again. 
The living creature values many things higher than life itself; 
yet out of this evaluation itself speaks -the wi II to power!' (TZ: 2 12 I 
p.l38). 
The parallel here with Schopenhauer is striking. Nietzsche has, for a number 
of years, been burrowing into the roots of human behaviour and discovering 
there a desire for power. He now takes a giant leap from the human to all of 
life in order to proclaim his theory of the will to power, just as his early 
'educator' leaps from the claim that the inner knowledge we have of our 
bodies is will to the claim that the inner nature of all things is will. 43 
However, Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the implications of 
this theory for us. We are pre-eminent amongst manifestations of the will to 
power because of our capacity to consciously break out of habitual patterns 
of behaviour and adopt new forms. This is what Nietzsche means by 'self-
overcoming', a notion of great importance to him. The overman is somebody 
who recognizes that the essence of life is will to power, and lives his life in 
accordance with this recognition, in accordance with the will to power, 
constantly striving to overcome his particular patterns of thought and action: 
'Whatever I create and however much I love it- soon I have to oppose it and 
my love: thus will my will have it.' (TZ: 2 12 I p.I38). Here we can see the 
plausibility behind Richardson's view that, '[Nietzsche] claims a systematic 
truth about essence, an essence or being that is ... differentially realized, 
generating values that ground an ethics' .44 
4
_
2 1/Jj__d., p_,~~2. 
43 Schopenhauer ( 1969), vo/.1, p.l 04-5. 
44 Richardson ( 1996), p. 76. 
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However, interpretations of Nietzsche's along Richardson's lines, 
which treat him as making traditional metaphysical claims consonant with 
those made by previous figures in the philosophical tradition, face a big 
obstacle. How do Nietzsche's claims about the will to power constituting the 
essence of all life sit with his perspectivism, his view that truth is something 
you create depending on your perspective? According to Nietzsche, each and 
every perspective is a manifestation of particular wills to power. We could 
call this the descriptive sense of the will to power. On the other hand, some 
perspectives are more powerful than others, more in accord with the urge 
towards self-transcendence in life. This is the normative sense of the will to 
power. It is with this normative dimension that the tension between the will 
to power and perspectivism becomes most pronounced. Does this mean that 
the will to power in its normative sense is a non-perspectival, objective 
truth? This is Richardson's position. He argues that the will to power is 
ontologically prior to perspectivism insofar as all perspectives presuppose 
the will to power, and manifest particular degrees of power. Thus, whilst 
there is 'only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing', such seeing 
and knowing are better of worse, more or less valuable, according to the 
extent to which they accord with the non-perspectival truth that the essence 
of life is will to power. But how is anybody - such as Nietzsche - able to 
sufficiently abstract themselves from their particular perspectives in order to 
make such a judgement? Moreover, what are we to make of the bountiful 
passages in which Nietzsche emphasises the provisionality of his views, such 
as the following (they both occur at the end of his books, almost as a 
warning against us taking on the ideas expressed earlier in the books in a 
dogmatic fashion): 
[The hermit] will doubt whether a philosopher could have 'final and 
real' opinions at all, whether behind each of his caves there does not 
I ie another, deeper cave - a stranger, more comprehensive world 
beyond the surface, an abyss behind every ground, beneath every 
'foundation'. Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy- that is a 
hermit's judgement: 'there is something arbitrary in the fact that he 
stopped, looked back, lookecj around here, that he stopped digg~ng and 
75 
laid his spade aside here - there is something suspicious about it.' 
Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy (BG: 289 I p.216). 
We aeronauts of the spirit! -All those brave birds which fly out into 
the distance, into the farthest distance - it is certain! somewhere or 
other they will be unable to go on and will perch on a mast or a bare 
cliff-face - and they will even be thankful for this miserable 
accommodation. But who would venture to infer from that, that there 
was not an immense open space before them, that they had flown as 
far as one could fly! ... Other birds will fly further!' (D: 575 I p.228). 
As we saw 111 the previous chapter, Nietzsche treats philosophies as 
'unconscious memoirs' on the parts of their authors, and insists that 
philosophers' remotest metaphysical assertions originate in the particular set 
of values, the particular drives that motivate him or her. Obviously, the same 
applies to Nietzsche. His interpretation of the world is a product of his 
particular set of drives. This does not preclude Nietzsche's views from 
proving very illuminating to other people - those with quite dissimilar 
drives, in search of the 'worthy opponent' Nietzsche himself always sought, 
as much as those with similar ones. What it does seem to mean, however, is 
that Nietzsche is not claiming, with his philosophy of the will to power, to 
have pronounced the final word in philosophy, to have finally unravelled the 
enigma of the world. (Here he contrasts strongly with Schopenhauer, who 
claimed to have done precisely this: 'Subject to the limitation of human 
knowledge, my philosophy is the real solution of the enigma of the world', 
he wrote. 45). As he himself writes in Beyond Good and Evil, 'Granted that 
this too [the theory of the will to power] is only interpretation - and you will 
be eager enough to raise this objection? - well, so much the better.-' (BG: 22 
I p.53 ). Perhaps, then, a better way of interpreting the wi II to power is to see 
it as a kind of performance, as a demonstration of somebody enduring the 
inherent meaninglessness of the world by 'organizing a small portion of it 
oneself'(WP: 585 I p.318). 
45 Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms (London: Penguin, 1970), p.31. 
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However, this interpretation robs Nietzsche's philosophy of much of 
its force, for without being able to claim that the will to power is in some 
sense a better interpretation of the world than ascetic nihilist 
interpretations, his whole philosophical project collapses. Moreover, he does 
consider the will to power to be a much better interpretation of the world 
than, say, a Christian one. Again, this raises the question of how coherent it 
is to insist so strongly on the extent to which the world is a product of our 
agency, to the point where the idea of the world making very definite 
demands on us 1s radically diminished. In my view, Nietzsche 
overemphasises our role in constituting reality, for rhetorical effect, and for 
various historical reasons it is these aspects of his philosophy that have 
come to greater prominence of late. 
2. 4.1. The Will to Power and the Question of Suffering 
In Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power we have, then, an answer 
to the question of what criteria to employ in creating new values, in 
responding to nihilism: values which accord with the will to power, which 
affirm the body and this world, on their own terms, without consolation. For 
Nietzsche, the highest expression of the will to power is the ability to affirm 
this world, in its most dubious, harshest aspects, without consolation - 'a 
pessimism of strength' - without the lies which rob man of his power by 
causing him to deny some aspect of himself or the world. Thus he writes, in 
The Will to Power: 
My new path to a 'Yes'. - Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood 
and lived it, is a voluntary quest for even the most detested and 
notorious sides of existence .... 'How much truth can a spirit dare?' -
this became for me the real standard of value .... [Such a philosophy] 
wants ... to cross over to the other side of [ascetic nihilism] - to a 
Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, 
exception, or selection ... The highest state a philosopher can attain: 
to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence - my formu Ia for this 
_is amorfati(WP 104l/p.516). _ ____ _ __ .. ____ _ 
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Here we find Nietzsche returning to ideas which he had first sketched out 
eighteen years previously (this note dates from 1888), in The Birth of 
Tragedy', returning to the non-nihilistic response to suffering that he 
discerned in Greek tragedy prior to the arrival of Socrates on the scene and 
the advent of the ascendancy of rationality and subsequently ascetic 
nihilism. He contrasts this way of responding to suffering with the nihilistic 
method of the ascetic ideal thus: 
Dionysus versus the 'Crucified': there you have the antithesis .... One 
will see that the problem is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a 
Christian meaning or a tragic meaning. In the former case, it is 
supposed to be the path to a holy existence; in the latter case, being is 
counted as holy enough to justify even a monstrous amount of 
suffering. The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering: he is 
sufficiently strong, rich and capable of deifying to do so. The 
Christian denies even the happiest lot on earth: he is sufficiently 
weak, poor, disinherited to suffer from life in whatever form he meets 
it (WP: I 052 I p.542-3). 
Here we have expressed very directly the difference between the ascetic 
nihilistic response to suffering, and Nietzsche's own, Dionysian, affirmative 
response. The crucial phrase is, 'being is counted as holy enough to justify 
even a monstrous amount of suffering'. The task of overcoming nihilism is 
essentially the task of coming to revere this world without reference to 
another, 'better' or 'truer', world, coming to count becoming as holy. As 
Smith puts it in a quotation already cited, 'Nietzsche saw his task, the task 
of present philosophy, as one of trying to develop a means by which mankind 
could again esteem and revere with a good conscience. ' 46 Nietzsche's 
'vision' of the will to power is his attempt to make such reverence possible. 
Thus we return, at the end of our consideration of Nietzsche's account 
of nihilism, to the issue of suffering, with which we began. Nietzsche 
contrasts his own, Dionysian and tragic response to suffering with the 
"--ascetic_c nihilistic response of _Christianity. The _Jatter, ___ on_ Nietzsche's 
46 Smith (1996}, p.72. 
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account, as we have seen, responds to suffering by shifting the centre of 
gravity of human life into a fictitious 'beyond' which, in some way, 
compensates us for our suffering here in this, to some extent 'unreal', world. 
The most obvious version of this response is the Christian idea that one goes 
to heaven when one dies, and is rewarded eternally for having led a good life 
on earth. Nietzsche objects to this response because it falsifies the reality of 
suffering by offering a fictitious means of escape from it, and thereby 
inclines us to undervalue the only life we have in the only world there is -
this one! Thus, his response to suffering is to recognise its necessity within 
the overall economy of life. Such a recognition constitutes the heart of the 
twin ideas of 'amor fati' ('love of fate') and the eternal recurrence. Before 
turning to these ideas, however, it is important to realise that Nietzsche did 
not consider suffering as something to be merely tolerated patiently whilst 
waiting for the good times to come, but rather as the essential ingredient in 
any meaningful, creative life: 
You [hedonists, pessimists, utilitarians, eudaemonists- we might also 
add Buddhists!] want if possible- and there is no madder 'if possible' 
- to abolish suffering; and we? - it really does seem that we would 
rather increase it and make it worse than it has ever been! ... The 
discipline of suffering, of great suffering - do you not know that it is 
this discipline alone which has created every elevation of mankind 
hitherto? That tension of the soul in misfortune which cultivates its 
strength, its terror at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness 
and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting ... - has it not been 
bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? 
(BG: 225 I p.lSS). 
Nietzsche is writing here from bitter experience, as a man who suffered 
severely, both physically - from headaches, near blindness, and a very weak 
stomach - and mentally- from loneliness and tremendous social isolation. It 
is always well to bear this in mind when reading Nietzsche - they are the 
works of a suffering man. He recounts in his 'autobiography', Ecce Homo, 
_o just how central his own suffering has been to his own creative development 
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(see, e.g., p.l 0, 16, 26, 62). This led him to desire the following kind of 
disciples: 
Type of my disciples. - To those human beings who are of any concern 
to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities-
I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-
contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the 
vanquished: I wish them the only thing that can prove today 
whether one is worth anything or not - that one endures (WP: 910 I 
p.481 ). 
Such are the consolations of Nietzsche's philosophy! However, the attitude 
that Nietzsche takes to suffering fails to distinguish adequately between 
different kinds of suffering. Yes, some forms of suffering can be spurs to 
greater levels of creativity, creativity that would not have been possible 
without the suffering. No doubt Nietzsche's own creativity is an example of 
this, of an immensely creative response to intense physical and mental 
suffering. But surely there are all kinds of suffering which simply cannot 
realistically or appropriately be viewed in this way, as opportunities for 
greater creativity; and which, moreover, should not be viewed in this way, 
because the causes of such suffering are not irremovable. Nietzsche's views 
on suffering might be helpful when faced with an illness for which there is 
no cure, or the loss of a loved one, say, in a tragic accident; but surely a 
different attitude is required in response to the manifold forms of suffering 
caused by one's fellows human beings, through violence, hatred, greed, 
exploitation. The problem is that, at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy, in 
his doctrine of the will to power, is a view of life that aims at 'translating 
man back into nature', returning us to the 'innocence of becoming' (T: VI 8, 
p.65), a nature and innocence that can potentially be used to justify all sorts 
of exploitation and inequality on the grounds that life itself sanctions such 
actions. Nietzsche's 'innocence of becoming' is not quite as innocent as he 
would have us believe, not for those on the lower echelons of hierarchies of 
power, anyway, as we shall see shortly. 
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2.5. Eternal Recurrence 
Nietzsche's attitude to suffering is reflected in one of his central 
teachings, the teaching of the eternal recurrence, a doctrine he was to attach 
a perhaps surprising amount of importance to, referring to his beloved 
Zarathustra as 'the teacher of the eternal recurrence'. This teaching is an 
intensification of the imperative which Nietzsche recommends to love one's 
fate: 'My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one 
wants nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in 
all eternity. Not merely to endure that which happens of necessity, still less 
to dissemble it ... but to love it .. .' (EH: 4 I 0 I p.37-8). Both the doctrines of 
'amor fati' and the eternal recurrence are injunctions to affirming the role 
that suffering plays in constituting meaning in life. Thus, when teaching his 
disciples about the eternal recurrence Zarathustra says: 'Did you ever say 
Yes to one joy? 0 my friends, then you said Yes to all woe as well. All 
things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love' (TZ 4 I 0 I 
p.331-2). 
The eternal recurrence is a symbol for the ability to affirm suffering 
due to its irreplaceable efficacy in challenging human beings to lead 
creative, non-nihilistic, lives. As such, it is also a kind of practical test of 
one's ability to overcome nihilism (a test Nietzsche himself fails, as he 
admits in Ecce Homo (EH: 2 3 p.ll)). Nietzsche writes, in the 'Discipline 
and Breeding' section of The Will to Power, 'A doctrine is needed powerful 
enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and 
destructive for the world-weary' (WP: 862 I p.458), and: 'My philosophy 
brings the triumphant idea of which all modes of thought will ultimately 
perish. It is the great cultivating idea: the races that cannot bear it stand 
condemned; those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule' (WP: 
I 053 I p.544). The 'triumphant idea' of the eternal recurrence would, so to 
speak, sort out the wheat from the chaff: the weak would be consumed by its 
weight, leaving only those higher men - 'those human beings who are of any 
concern to' Nietzsche! - who are able to endure and affirm this world 
without recourse to mendacious consolations. A I ittle later in The Will to 
Power we have the following key passage: 
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3. Means of enduring it [the eternal recurrence]: the revaluation of all 
values. No longer joy in certainty but in uncertainty; no longer 'cause 
and effect' but the continually creative; no longer wi II to preservation 
but will to power; no longer the humble expression, 'everything is 
merely subjective,' but 'it is also our work! ~ Let us be proud of it!' 
(WP I 059 I p.545). 
The man who is able to affirm the eternal recurrence of his life and of the 
whole cosmos does not see suffering as an objection to life, as something 
that, in an 'ideal world', would not be there. Rather, he sees not only its 
necessity, but also the creativity that suffering alone affords ('anybody who 
has ever built a 'new heaven', only mustered the power he needed through 
his own hell', (OM: 3 I 0 I p.89)). The eternal recurrence is a symbol of what 
Nietzsche elsewhere terms the 'innocence of becoming', an attitude to I ife 
which revels in and celebrates the sheer contingency of things rather than 
objecting to them as absurd, capricious and inhuman. 
However, there is a problem concerning the coherence of Nietzsche's 
idea of the eternal recurrence. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche writes, 
'ls living not valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited?' (BG: 9 I 
p.39); and, in Zarathustra, 'I honour the obstinate, fastidious tongues and 
stomach that have learnt to say '[' and 'Yes' and 'No.' But to chew 
everything and digest everything ~ that is to have a really swinish nature! 
Always to say Yea- only the ass and those like him have learned that' (TZ: 
3 II I p.212). How does such fastidiousness and discrimination sit with the 
eternal recurrence and 'amor fati', in which one is to be equally well~ 
disposed to all moments, all events? Is such a possibility liveable, let alone 
desirable, or might it be a case of Nietzsche's rhetoric getting the better of 
him, and allowing him to conjure up in words an ideal that fails to apply in a 
realistic or constructive way to life as it is actually lived, and as Nietzsche 
himself experienced it. Michael Tanner makes a similar point thus: 
... at a micros~opi~ ley~l [Nietzsche] remains more acute than anyone 
else ~ so acute that he has to move to the other extreme - to those 
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'heights' he is so keen on. He is prepared to be extraordinarily careful 
and thorough in explaining how dreadful things - including especially 
people - are. And as long as he remains at the level of things and 
people the paralysing horror continues to grow. So when he affirms, it 
cannot be by selecting approved items, for they are all 'ensnared' in 
what he detests. He has to take all the phenomena which he loathes, 
achieve a 'pathos of distance' from them, look down on them; and then 
he is at last able, thanks to the blurred vision, to say yes to 
everything. In doing that, he betrays all that he actually values, by 
pretending that he does not value one thing more than another. 
Sublimity of this kind is indistinguishable from insensibility. 47 
We find in the eternal recurrence and 'amor fati' a hankering after the kind 
of metaphysics Nietzsche himself so sharply attacks, a kind of 'view from 
above or nowhere' which redeems the brute contingency of things. Can we 
not detect in these ideas a desire to escape the harshness of the very reality 
Nietzsche is so insistent that we affirm, this world of becoming, a world in 
which we are vulnerable to all sorts of contingencies that it is impossible 
and absurd to welcome with equal relish? Does not this craving to affirm life 
in its totality sit awkwardly with Nietzsche's very definite views on what 
does and does not possess value, on the deep-seated dualism in his thought 
between more and less power, the strong and the weak, I ife-affirmation and 
life-negation, masters and slaves, and, indeed, between anti-nihilism and 
nihilism? 
2. 6. The Political and Ethical Dimension to Overcoming Nihilism 
Nietzsche's thinking on the overcoming of nihilism needs to be 
understood with reference to Darwin, and the massive impact that his theory 
·of evolution has had on Western culture. Nietzsche argues in both Human, 
all too Human (40 and 247) and The Gay Science (115) that the false belief 
that man was somehow different from the animals (e.g. made in God's 
image) has given us our 'humanity, humaneness, and 'human dignity' ' (GS: 
47 Michael Tanner, Nietzsche: a very short introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p.I03-4. 
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115 I p.174). Now that this belief, thanks to Darwin's discoveries, is no 
longer credible, there is no guarantee that we as a species - over a massive 
period of time, albeit- will not devolve back into apes (H: 247). This is why 
a revaluation of all values is required, and the conscious breeding of a new 
kind of being: 'The problem I raise here is ... what type of human being one 
ought to breed, ought to will, as more valuable, more worthy of life, more 
certain of the future.' (A: 4 I p.J28). The issue of how to breed a new kind 
of being- the overman - is at the heart of overcoming nihilism. What I have 
written so far about such breeding - creating one's own values, self-
overcoming to achieve greater states of power, facing up to the harshest 
aspects of existence, affirming the eternal recurrence - may seem reasonable 
enough, and consonant in some respects with our current, liberal democratic 
sensibilities, our current understanding of what it means to be human, to not 
cause too much cause for concern. Such a picture does Nietzsche a 
disservice. I have yet to consider the social implications of these ideas, more 
specifically the kind of social arrangements that he thought would best 
facilitate the overcoming of nihilism, and the breeding of a non-nihilistic 
human being. 
Nietzsche's concern with breeding a higher type of being goes right to 
the heart of his views on culture. For him, the significance of culture lies 
not in the happiness of the many but in the greatness of the few. This was a 
theme of his earlier writings as much as his later ones. Thus, in 
'Schopenhauer as Educator' he writes, ' ... the fundamental idea of culture, 
insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task [is]: to promote the 
production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without 
us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature' (UM 3 5 I p.160). Twelve 
years later, in Beyond Good and Evil, he expresses a similar idea as follows: 
'A people is a detour of nature to get to six or seven great men' ( 126 I p.99). 
As Kaufmann comments on Nietzsche's remark, 'The goal of humanity 
cannot lie in the end but only in its highest specimens' (UM 3 5 I p.l60), 
'Perhaps there is no more basic statement of Nietzsche's philosophy in all 
his writings than this sentence. ' 48 
48 Kaufmann(1974), p.l49. 
84 
Having pointed this out, Kaufmann then ducks the issue of what kind 
of political arrangements this view led Nietzsche to advocate. Ivan 
Karamazov argues in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov that the cries 
of a single baby cannot be justified by the existence of the world. 
Nietzsche's view contrasts nicely with Karamazov's. He argues that 
tremendous amounts of suffering are justified for the sake of the production 
of 'six or seven great men'. It is worth remembering that Nietzsche began his 
philosophical life concerned with the issue of education (one of his first 
works is called On the Future of our Educational Institutions). He was 
concerned with how practically to bring about certain results, certain forms 
of culture. The same holds true for his later philosophy. The task of new 
philosophers, he writes, is: 
To teach man the future of man as his will, as dependent on a human 
will, and to prepare for great enterprises and collective experiments in 
discipline and breeding so as to make an end of that gruesome 
dominion of chance and nonsense that has hitherto been called 
' h is tory ' ( B G: 2 0 3 I p. 1 2 6). 
The philosopher is 'the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who 
has the conscience for the collective evolution of mankind' (BG: 61 I p.86). 
Thus Nietzsche is reviving Plato's notion of 'philosopher kings'. He is 
preparing in his philosophy for 'great enterprises and collective 
experiments' for the breeding of an elite caste of new beings, 'a new ruling 
caste for Europe' (BG: 251 I p.l83). The nature of these enterprises and 
experiments is made most explicit in section nine of Beyond Good and Evil, 
'What is Noble?'. Here are two passages from it: 
Every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been the work of an 
aristocratic society- and so it will always be: a society which believes 
in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man 
and man and needs slavery in some sense or other. Without the pathos 
of distance such as develops from the incarnate differences of classes, 
fr'!n!. the ~-~lin~. c_~ste.'s _co!lstam lo()kin~ out can<J 12o!'-_i~lg_ down_ on 
subjects and instruments and from its equally constant exercise of 
And: 
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obedience and command, its holding down and holding at a distance, 
that other, more mysterious pathos could not have developed either, 
that longing for an ever-increasing widening of distance within the 
soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, more remote, tenser, 
more comprehensive states, in short precisely the elevation of the type 
'man', the continual 'self-overcoming of man', to take a moral 
formula in a supramoral sense (BG: 257 I p.l92). 
[a good and healthy aristocracy] therefore accepts with a good 
conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to 
be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and 
instruments. Its fundamental faith must be that society should not 
exist for the sake of society but only as foundation and scaffolding 
upon which a select species of being is able to raise itself to its higher 
task and in general to a higher existence (BG: 258 I p.l93). 
In another passage he asserts that in such a society 'one has duties only 
towards one's equals; that towards beings of a lower rank, towards 
everything alien, one may act as one wishes or 'as the heart dictates' and in 
any case 'beyond good and evil' -: it is here that pity and the like can have 
a place' (BG: 260 I p.J96). Here we see, in naked, unadorned fashion, what a 
society would be like, in Nietzsche's eyes, which was attempting to 
overcome nihilism. It would be utterly unegalitarian, ruthless in its 
suppression of the majority for the sake of a minority engaged in acts of 
self-overcoming and self-creation. Indeed, in the first passage quoted, 
Nietzsche insists that without differences in rank between human beings 
self-overcoming is not possible: that such distinctions need to be maintained 
in order to facilitate more subtle distinctions within the souls of those few 
engaged in self-overcoming. Moreover, he sees society not as an end 111 
itself, but as a means for the production of human greatness, seemingly no 
matter what the human cost. 
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It is in passages like this that one becomes aware of the dark social 
side to Nietzsche's philosophy of aristocratic flourishing, and of the radical 
consequences of his extramoral view that life is essentially will to power, 
'appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, 
severity, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and, at the least and 
mildest, exploitation' (BG: 259 I p.194). This feature of his philosophy - an 
absolutely central feature has consistently been down played by 
commentators in an attempt to sanitize Nietzsche. As Jonathan Glover 
remarks at the start of his book, Humanity: a moral history of the twentieth 
century, '[Nietzsche's] many modern defenders rightly point out the 
distortions [in Nazi interpretations of his work] but perhaps they explain 
away too much. A sense that Nietzsche is harmless may be created. I want to 
remove that impression.' 49• So do I. And, as Simon May points out in his 
stimulating Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on Morality: 
... with Nietzsche there is not even an attempt to produce a systematic 
safety net against cruelty, especially if one judges oneself to be a 
'higher' type of person with life-enhancing pursuits - and, to this 
extent, his philosophy licences the atrocities of a Hitler even though, 
by his personal table of values, he excoriates anti-Semitism and 
virulent nationalism .... the supreme value he places on individual 
I ife-enhancement and self-legislation leaves room for, and in some 
cases explicitly justifies, unfettered brutality. 50 
Moreover, his attack on all established canons of meaning and insistence on 
individuals' seizing the freedom to create their own values has an even 
darker side than the possibility of the emergence of the last man, a darker 
side which was realized in Nietzsche's own country forty years after his 
death, and in his name. These dangers were something Dostoyevsky - 'the 
only psychologist, by the way, from whom I had anything to learn' (T: X 45 I 
p.ll 0), according to Nietzsche - was only too well aware of, and expressed 
through the character of the 'Grand Inquisitor' in The Brothers Karamazov, 
49 Jon~than_Giover, Humanity: a moral history of the twenJieth century (London:J>imlico, 200 1), p. U. 
so Simon May, Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p.l32. 
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thus: man has 'no more pressing need than to find somebody to whom he can 
surrender, as quickly as possible, that gift of freedom which he, unfortunate 
creature, was born with.' 51 Nietzsche's philosophy emphasises this gift of 
freedom, a gift which plenty of men and gods are willing to take away, as the 
century which came after Nietzsche can attest to. Rollo May suggests: 
Totalitarianism is a cultural neurotic symptom of the need for 
community - a symptom in the respect that it is grasped as a means of 
allaying anxiety resulting from the feelings of powerlessness and 
helplessness of the isolated, alienated individuals produced in a 
society in which complete individualism has become the dominant 
goa I. 52 
Nietzsche's philosophy can potentially help to create such isolated and 
alienated individuals, who might turn to a more drastic solution than the 
television set and 'retail therapy' to assuage these feelings. 
We can discern in Nietzsche's fierce opposition to Christian morality 
the radical implications for politics and morality of the doctrines of the will 
to power and the breeding of the overman. He is so opposed to Christianity 
because its solution to our constitutional nihilism is anti-life, which means, 
in Nietzsche's view, anti-will to power, anti-appropriation, overpowering, 
exploitation, imposition. The Antichrist, which was to form the first section 
of Nietzsche's projected book on nihilism, The Will to Power, contains the 
strongest declamations in this vein: 
One should not embellish or dress up Christianity: it has waged a war 
to the death against this higher type of man, it has excommunicated 
all the fundamental instincts ofthis type, it has distilled evil, the Evil 
One, out of these instincts: the strong human being as the type of 
reprehensibility, as the 'outcast'. Christianity has taken the side of 
everything weak, base, i 11-constituted, it has made an ideal out of 
_ 
51
_Quotedjn David Loy,A Buddhist History qfthe West (Albany: State University_of_New York Jlress, 
2002), p.22. 
52 Quoted in Loy (2002), p.22. 
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opposition to the preservative instincts of strong life; ... values of 
decline, nihilistic values hold sway under the holiest of names (A: 6 I 
p.l29-30). 
And, from Ecce Homo: 
The morality of unselfing is the morality of decline par excellence, 
the fact 'I am perishing' translated into the imperative 'you all shall 
perish' - and not only into the imperative! ... The sole morality which 
has hitherto been taught, the morality of unselfing, betrays a will to 
the end, it denies the very foundations of life (EH: 16 7 I p.l 02). 
Chief amongst the nihilistic values of the morality of 'unselfing' is pity, 
which Nietzsche calls 'practical nihilism' (A: 7 I p.l30). This is because 
pity increases the hold that suffering has over life by multiplying it 
unnecessarily amongst a larger number of people than just the sufferer, and 
because, more importantly, 'It preserves what is ripe for destruction; it 
defends life's disinherited and condemned' (ibid.). So we can be certain that 
Nietzsche's ideal of a non-nihilistic culture would either completely lack or 
severely minimise the role of certain values which we hold to be most 
essentially human, those of fellow-feeling and altruism- a point, of course, 
that Nietzsche was only too well aware of, and made much of (see, for 
example, T: IX 5 I p.S0-1). Nietzsche reviles such values as hostile to the 
essence of life as will to power. Thus, his solutions to nihilism must give us 
pause for thought. He devalues most of the ordinary aspects of human life, 
and one could argue that this devaluation is itself nihilistic. As Ophelia 
Shutte puts it, in Beyond Nihilism, 'There is an important split between 
[Zarathustra's] desire to affirm life and his inability to affirm human life. 
Human life still appears to be too small, too insignificant and wretched to 
Nietzsche. Thus he constantly seeks grandeur.' 53 1s it accurate to characterise 
as life-affirming and non-nihilistic a style of thinking that condemns the 
lives of most people as essentially meaningless (remember that what 
Zarathustra most abhors about the eternal recurrence is the possibi I ity of the 
eternal r~curr~nce of <;Quntles_s_ petty, worthless lives)? Nietzsche's six of 
53 Schutte (1984), p.189. 
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seven great individuals for whose sake it is possible to affirm life are 
beginning to occupy a position vis-a-vis life as tyrannical as Plato's theory 
of the Forms or any other principle o1· 'true world' in whose name this life is 
besplattered. The greatness of the higher men is in danger of becoming 
another ascetic ideal and, by being deferred to some unspecified point in the 
future, is coming to seem as chimerical as the various 'true worlds' the 
postulation of which Nietzsche so virulently castigates. 
In defence of Nietzsche, one might argue that his hostility to pity, his 
aristocratism and elitism are not entailed by his critique of Judea-Christian 
morality and his doctrines of self-overcoming. I think that the extent to 
which one finds this argument convincing depends upon the respective 
weight which one gives to the 'perspectivist' and 'will to power' aspects of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. As I mentioned earlier, a helpful distinction can be 
made between those commentators who emphasize the former and those who 
emphasize the latter. I have chosen to emphasize the latter, and have insisted 
on a strong link between Nietzsche's doctrine of the 'will to power' and his 
aristocratic elitism, which permits the expenditure of the many for the sake 
of the few. However, if one emphasizes the former, and insists that there is a 
formalism to Nietzsche's advice about how to overcome nihilism which does 
not imply a specific content, one is still left with the problem of how one is 
able to criticize, for instance, the kind of claims that Nietzsche makes in 
part nine of Beyond Good and Evil, if all values are self-created. This is a 
point Simon May makes, as we have already seen, and is one which we shall 
be returning to later on, with reference to Heidegger and Levinas (see 5.6.3). 
2. 7. Summary 
We have seen that, for Nietzsche, the issue of nihilism revolves 
around different ways of responding to suffering and thereby rendering life 
meaningful. He praises the Dionysian response to suffering, the 'pessimism 
of strength' that he discerns in Greek tragedy, and this response deeply 
informs his doctrine of the will to power. On the other hand, he condemns 
vario1,1s forms of ascetic '!ihilism f<>r retr~ati_~g fr()m the hll~l!_!eali!i~s of 
earthly life, its sheer contingency, in the name of something or somewhere 
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more reliable and 'better' (the 'true worlds' of Plato and Christianity). With 
the undoing of ascetic nihilism, largely due to a radicalised version of 
Kant's epistemology, we are left with the need to find a new way of 
responding to the flux. This undoing creates an opening out of which it is 
possible that a new, non-nihilistic, 'Dionysian' form of life-affirmation may 
result, though much more likely, in Nietzsche's view, is the onset of a 
corrosive and vacuous mediocrity, a kind of 'brave new world' of petty 
people. Nietzsche devotes himself, at times maniacally, to the averting of 
this latter possibility. 
Zarathustra tells his disciples that a teacher is a bad teacher if their 
pupils always remain pupils, and, in one of his last letters, written on the 
brink of insanity, he wrote: 'After you had discovered me, it was no trick to 
find me: the difficulty now is to lose me.' 54 Losing Nietzsche might not be as 
difficult as he would like us to think. There are grave deficiencies in his 
account of nihilism and its overcoming, several of which I have already 
flagged up. Firstly, there is the question of how coherent Nietzsche's 
epistemology is, given that he abandons talk of a 'thing-in-itself' (saying it 
is worth a 'Homeric laugh') and insists on the primacy of our role as 
'creators' of truth and values. Moreover, how does this claim sit with other 
claims to the effect that there is a definite character to whatever exists 
independently of us, which it is our job to respond to as affirmatively as we 
can? 
Secondly, how radically new is Nietzsche's attempt to revalue all 
values? He seems at times to have an obsession with originality for 
originality's sake, to betray an anxiety of influence, a fear that one's 
autonomy is threatened unless one is able to make a complete and radical 
break with the past, to banish all of 'God's shadows' and become 'those who 
we are - human beings who are new, unique, incomparable' (GS: 335 I 
p.266). Is such a goal realistic, or even desirable? Morrison, at the end of 
his b.ook Nietzsche and Buddhism, suggests, ' ... if Nietzsche had lived in an 
age where Buddhism was better understood, he might even have considered 
54 Quoted in WCT: 53. 
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the Buddha to be an Ubermensch. '55 Similarly, Hollingdale, in his 
introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, draws several suggestive parallels 
between the advice for overcoming nihilism that we find in that book, and 
various Christian doctrines (TZ: p.28-9). The fact of the matter is that many 
of Nietzsche's descriptions of the overman and the kind of values he would 
embody are so formal ('I ive dangerously', 'become who you are') that they 
could be applied to, for instance, traditional religious figures like the 
Buddha and Jesus, or it could be insisted, as Nietzsche does time and again, 
that they embody in many ways the antithesis of such figures. It is certainly 
worth questioning the extent to which Nietzsche's ideal of the overman does 
represent something as radically new and different from other ideals as he 
would have us believe. 
Thirdly, there is the question of to what extent such a view of truth is 
liveable, and to what extent self-posited values can be valuable. Iris 
Murdoch wrote, on behalf of Plato, 'The spirit must have something 
absolute, otherwise it goes crazy.' 56 Nietzsche has not shown us that this is 
not the case, for the overman, the man who is able to affirm this conception 
of truth and use it creatively, remains a future possibility. Nietzsche is 
suggesting that we create our own values. But this raises the question of how 
it is possible for something to be a value if we have chosen it? Is something 
valuable simply because I have posited it as valuable? More generally, is the 
epistemological position Nietzsche argues for and which the overman views 
as an opportunity for creation a liveable position? This is a question David 
Cooper considers in chapter seven of The Measure of Things. He argues that 
it is not, and cites three testimonies to this effect: from Heidegger and his 
account of anxiety in Being and Time, from Eastern philosophy, and from a 
variety of artists, as varied as T.S.Eiiot and Sartre. Nietzsche provides us 
with no evidence to the contrary: the overman has not yet existed. 
Fourthly, might it not be the case that it is just such a conception of 
truth that might lead in the direction that Nietzsche so greatly feared, that of 
55 J\1orrison,_Robert, Nietzsche and [Judrjhism: a study in nihilism and ironic qffinities (Oxford: Oxford 
university press, 1997), p.225. 
56 Quoted in Cooper (2002), p.222. 
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the 'last man', who has discovered happiness, and blinks - to a corrosive 
relativism exacerbated by the rise of modern technology? These last two 
points are both dealt with by Martin Heidegger, as we shall see. 
Fifthly, in a post-Hitler, post-Stalin world, what are we to make of the 
troubling ethical and political side of Nietzsche's revaluation of all values, 
so often ignored by commentators? This will lead me into a discussion of the 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, in whom we find an account of ethics 
potentially not susceptible to Nietzsche's critique. 
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Chapter Three: Heidegger on Nietzsche and Nihilism 
lntroducl ion 
Why Heidegger? How might he help us respond to Nietzsche and to 
nihilism? Aside from the obvious fact of his enormous influence on 
philosophy in the twentieth century, there is also the equally obvious fact 
that he spent a long time (four years, in fact) explicitly addressing 
Nietzsche's philosophy, and was concerned, especially in his later work 
(post Being and Time), with the issue of nihilism, and what we might think 
of as considerations of a more cultural nature. More specifically, what 
Heidegger offers us is an alternative account of nihilism in which 
Nietzsche's very solutions to nihilism are exposed as its ultimate form, and a 
strikingly new and thought-provoking account of the history of Western 
philosophy. In Being and Time, we have a sustained attack on the Cartesian 
world view which Heidegger argues underlies Nietzsche's thinking on 
nihilism. In his reflections on 'technology' we have a sketch of how 
Nietzschean nihilism manifests itself in various of our cultural forms. In his 
reflections on authenticity, art, language, the 'fourfold' and the nature of 
thinking, we have intimations of how to respond to nihilism. So, the outlook 
is promising for making some headway on the question of nihilism in the 
company of Martin Heidegger. 
I shall examine Heidegger's critique ofNietzsche and his own account 
of nihilism in the present chapter, the notion of the 'history of being· and 
the relationship between nihilism and technology. In chapter four I attempt 
to show how Being and Time, with its attack on several key presuppositions 
of Cartesianism, can be read as an attack on Nietzsche's couching of the 
issue of nihilism in terms of 'values'. In chapter five I consider what else 
Heidegger has to say about responding to nihilism, with particular reference 
to authenticity, art, language, thinking and the 'fourfold'. 
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3. l. Being. being, and the Forgetfulness of b/Being 
Heidegger is hardly the easiest person to write upon. As Scruton 
remarked of his work, not entirely flatteringly, 'No one has claimed to 
understand [Heidegger's philosophy] completely .... How much of it 
is really philosophy, and how much an embroidered description of a 
private spiritual journey?.s7• This remains to be seen. Before I consider 
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, I need to establish some working 
definitions. Heidegger's central concern is the 'question of Being'. A recent 
book on Heidegger, by Hermann Phillipse, draws attention to the lack of 
consensus amongst the secondary literature on what this question actually is. 
He writes, 'The very fact that there are many different and incompatible 
interpretations of the question of Being points to the problematic nature of 
this question, and, indeed, to the problematic nature of any attempt to 
interpret it. ,ss What provisional definition of the question of being am I 
going to work with? When I say to you, 'This chapter of the thesis is on 
Heidegger' and you understand me, we have both drawn upon an implicit 
understanding of a whole manner of things, in order for such communication 
to take place: of what a thesis is, who Heidegger is, what a philosopher is, 
what a student is, what a commentary is, and so on. In turn, to understand 
what a dissertation is, what a student is, and so on, we must have an 
understanding of the wider human practices and purposes in the context of 
which students, dissertations take their place. For Heidegger, in Being and 
Time, 'being' indicates the broadest, most fundamental conditions our 
implicit understanding of which enables any particular entity to figure for 
us as the entity it is. 
What Heidegger means by an understanding of being can be made 
clearer with the help of a comparison with Kant. Just as, for Kant, all 
experience presupposes certain forms of intuition and certain categories that, 
as it were, make experience possible, enable us to have it - space, time, 
51 Roger Scruton, Philosophy from Descartes to Wittgenstein: a short history of modern philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 1981),"p.259, 263-4. 
58 Hermann Philipse, Heidegger 's Philosophy of Being: a critical assessment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p.3. 
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substance, etc.- so, Heidegger claims, our experience (not a word he likes to 
use, incidentally, because he thinks it is riddled with subjectivism) is made 
possible by our understanding of 'being', our inchoate, implicit grasp of 
what it means for things to be: people, dissertations, U.F.O.s, mediocrity, 
soul-searching, etc .. As he puts it: 
... we are always already involved in an understanding of being .... 
What is asked about in the question to be elaborated is being, that 
which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have 
already been understood no matter how they are discussed .... This 
guiding look at being grows out of the average understanding of being 
in which we are always already involved and which ultimately belongs 
to the essential constitution of Dasein itself(BT: 25-8). 
So, being is something we already 'know' something about, something with 
which we are very familiar- perhaps too familiar- in the very essence of our 
being. This is one of the central reasons why Heidegger's philosophy is 
difficult: it tries to elaborate on phenomena that are so close to us that we 
do not usually see them, just as we do not normally notice that we are 
breath in g. Far from being concerned with abstruse metaphysical matters, 
1-leidegger is the philosopher of the everyday par excellence. 
So, the question of being, Heidegger's central question, involves, we 
could say, uncovel'ing the conditions that make possible the understanding of 
being of which we are constituted, conditions which, in his magnum opus 
Being and Time, Heidegger refers to as 'existentiales'. When I refer to 
'being', then, I shall be using it in the sense just adumbrated. However, 
there is another aspect to Heidegger's question of Being that needs flagging 
up before we proceed, and this is a sense that I shall refer to by writing 
'Being'. Unfortunately, perhaps, Heidegger himself never makes this 
distinction, though this may be because the two senses of being I Being I am 
distinguishing ultimately blend into one. This second sense is harder to 
specify than the first. I shall gloss it for the time being by saying that any 
parH~ui~J I.IJHkrstllnditJg ~f being nec_essarily involves not understanding 
being in a manifold of other ways, of, as it were, covering over other ways 
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of disclosing the world, other ways of understanding what it means for 
things to be. Being in this second sense captures this concealment, evokes 
the 'depth' of reality, the fact that there is not just one way of disclosing the 
world, of understanding being. Being in this sense, as we shall see, becomes 
increasingly important for the later Heidegger. He comes to think of it as the 
source of being in the other sense, and it carries theological I spiritual 
overtones in the way that being does not. 59 
To reiterate: Heidegger himself does not distinguish the two, thus 
lending his writings a richness and ambiguity that can be frustrating. For 
instance, in the famous phrase, 'Language is the house of Being', we can see 
both aspects of b/Being I have outlined above at work: language is the 
medium of any particular understanding of being, and Being is the source of 
language. In my discussions of Heidegger, I will write being to denote the 
first kind of being mentioned, and Being to denote the second kind, and the 
first and second kind at the same time. I should emphasise, however, that 
this distinction is ultimately artificial one, and that I am employing it for 
strategic reasons, to try to make it clearer what I think Heidegger is getting 
at. 
Lastly, it is worth sketching out what Heidegger might mean by the 
phrase 'forgetfulness of Being', which he uses time and again, and which is 
his repeated charge against most of his philosophical predecessors. The 
resonances of this rich phrase will become apparent as we proceed, but for 
now, I shall define it as a way of thinking and acting which pays no heed to 
Being, which is oblivious to the possibility of other ways of disclosing the 
world than its own, and oblivious to Being as the source of its particular 
understanding of being. As he puts it, in his grandiose way: 
We today, and many generations before us, have long forgotten the 
realm of the unconcealment of beings, although we habitually take it 
for granted. We actually think that a being becomes accessible when 
59 It s~q.!JJd be_poi_n!ec_Lo_unh_at thlsB_ei_llgll;l~i_l)g disti.l!ctioll ~ _I!Ot th_e_ OJie liSed by Hei.d~gg~r's various 
translators, such as Macquarrie and Robinson, J.Gienn Gray, John Sallis and Joan Stambaugh. Indeed, 
this is the problem: that these various translators do not use 'Being' and 'being' in identical senses. The 
distinction that I am making between the two is taken from Julian Young's very good book Heidegger's 
Later philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2002), p.l 0-25. 
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an 'I' as subject represents an object. As if the open region within 
whose openness something is made accessible as object for a subject, 
and accessibility itself, which can be penetrated and experienced, did 
not already have to reign here as well! (N4: 93). 
In a similar vein, he writes, at the start of Being and Time: 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really 
mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should 
raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays 
even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'? 
Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the 
meaning of this question (BT: 1 ). 
Our inability to even understand that there is a question of Being is 
evidence, in Heidegger's view, of an aberration in philosophy, a losing sight 
of what is fundamental. 60 
Before leaving this initial attempt to orientate ourselves with 
Heidegger, however, it is worth pointing out that, definitions aside, the 
essential impulse behind Heideggerian thinking is what we might call a 
poetic impulse - even in Being and Time, which is less obviously poetical 
than some of the later works. As Richard Rorty writes, 'The question 'What 
is Being?' is no more to be answered correctly than the question 'What is a 
cherry blossom?' But the latter question is, nevertheless, one you might use 
to set the theme for a poetry competition.' 61 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in a 
passage quoted by Steiner at the end of his introduction to Heidegger, 
conveys better than any definition the kind of sensibility out of which 
Heidegger addresses himself and his readers to the question of being: 
60 Milan Kundera, in The Art of the Novel, makes the very interesting suggestion that whilst modern 
philosophy might indeed have forgotten Being, a remembering and recollecting of Being has been 
going on in the modem era in the form ofthe novel- a possibility Heidegger neglects to consider. 
Kundera writes, 'Indeed, all the great existential themes Heidegger analyzes in Being and Time-
considering them to have been neglected by all earlier European philosophy- had been unveiled, 
displayed, illuminated by four centuries of the novel' (Kundera, The Art of the Novel (London: Faber 
al1a Faoer;-1988); r>:s: - -- ---- -
61 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I 991 ), 
p.36. 
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Hast thou ever raised thy mind to the consideration of EXISTENCE, 
in and by itself, as the mere fact of existing? Hast thou ever said to 
thyself, thoughtfully, IT IS! heedless in that moment, whether it were 
a man before thee, or a flower, or a grain of sand? ... If thou hast 
indeed attained to this, thou wilt have felt the presence of a mystery, 
which must have fixed thy spirit in awe and wonder. 62 
So, more than anything, the term 'forgetfulness of Being' registers a 
sensibility that is no longer capable of astonishment before the sheer fact 
that things are rather than that they are not, no longer capable of suspending 
an appropriative attitude towards the world in favour of a more appreciative 
one. The artist Paul Klee wrote, 'Imagine you are dead. After many years of 
exile, you are permitted to cast a single glance earthward. You see a 
lamppost and an old dog lifting his leg against it. You are so moved that you 
cannot help sobbing.' 63 Our concern with being in the world, whilst always 
there, attuning us to Being, generally only becomes apparent to us in certain 
revelatory moments, often moments of deprivation, pain or loss. In such 
moments we may becomes aware of the depth of our connection with the 
world, our astonishment at the sheer fact that there is something rather than 
nothing. This is the kind of sensibility out of which Heidegger is speaking, 
which causes one eminent commentator on Heidegger to write, 'the first time 
one truly understands 1-leidegger's questions one knows it by a cold shiver 
running down one's spine.' 64 
With these definitions and hints in place, we are now in a position to 
consider Heidegger's views on nihilism and Nietzsche. 
62 Quoted in George Steiner, Heidegger (London: Fontana, 1978}, p.l57-8. 
63 Quoted in Ezra Bayda, At Home in the Muddy Water (Boston: Shambala, 2003}, p.l37. 
64 Magda King,Heidegger 's fhilosophy:_aguide_to his basic_thought (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 
p.4. 
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3. 2. Heidegger 's Interpretation of Nietzsche 
Having oriented ourselves around Heidegger's central concern, the 
question of Being, we can now turn to his account of Nietzsche. In 
discussing Nietzsche, we have questioned both the coherence and the 
feasibility of Nietzsche's account of truth. We also saw that Nietzsche 
considered this account to have potentially dangerous consequences, for it 
could lead to a deadening kind of relativism in which more and more people 
acquiesce, and in which all meaningful distinctions are erased. Heidegger's 
critique of Nietzsche centres around these twin concerns. He portrays 
Nietzsche's account of truth, and his posing of the problem of nihilism in 
terms of values, as symptoms of a 'forgetfulness of Being'. As such, 
Nietzsche's philosophy marks the end of the line, a line that begun with 
Plato, and thus Nietzsche is, in Heidegger's eyes, the last metaphysician of 
the West, and far from having overcome nihilism actually represents its 
culmination. Nihilism consists, for Heidegger, in this forgetfulness of Being 
coterminous with the history of Western philosophy since Plato, and 
culminating in Nietzsche's alleged antidote to nihilism - disposing with an 
old set of values and adopting new ones. He a1·gues that nihilism, 
forgetfulness of Being, manifests itself in a 'technological' understanding of 
being, which obscures Being, and leads to the kind of relativism Nietzsche 
so feared. As we shall also see, such relativism is not, in Heidegger's view, 
a product of weakness of will, of the inability to posit one's own values, so 
much as a product of too much will, of an overly wilful and anthropocentric 
comportment towards Being which has been entrenching itself for two 
thousand five hundred years. Thus, an appropriate response to nihilism lies 
not so much in strength of will as in a relinquishing of will and openness to 
being claimed or called by something which in some sense transcends us- a 
claim ruled out by Nietzsche's account of truth. 
3. 2.1. Heidegger 's Interpretative Strategies 
Before turning to his Nietzsche interpretation, I want to point out 
three of the m~jor f!_Ssump_!i()ns_ tl}~t u_nderli~ H~id~gger's jlt_terj!rt:t~iQI!S o_f 
philosophers from the Western tradition. I am indebted here to the concise 
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summanes of Schrift and Pattison on this topic. Firstly, he works on the 
assumption that, 'The doctrine of a thinker is that which IS left unsaid in 
what he says' (WCT: I 00). This means three things in the case of Nietzsche. 
Firstly, the 'unsaid' is that which he did not publish, all of the material 
contained in his notebooks, the Nachlass. Heidegger focuses particularly on 
The Will to Power, insisting that, 'What Nietzsche himself published during 
his creative years was always foreground .... His philosophy proper was left 
behind as posthumous, unpublished work' [N4: 12]. Secondly, the 'unsaid' 
refers to Being, which, according to Heidegger, has remained unsaid in the 
writings of all Western metaphysicians. Lastly, and most importantly, the 
unsaid refers to the unspoken presuppositions which allows a particular 
thinker to think in the way that he does. As he puts it, 'It [interpretation] is 
simply a matter of listening to the tradition in return, and thereby examining 
the prejudices and pre-judgements in which every thinking, in its own way, 
must dwell' (Pa: 332). This last point is worth emphasising. 1-leidegger's 
intriguing view is that, to understand a philosopher, one needs to try to 
reconstruct and make explicit the implicit understanding of Being he was 
working with, embodied in the everyday practices of his time. The 
understanding of being that Heidegger thought Nietzsche was working with 
will be of central concern in what follows, for it forms the basis of his 
reflections on 'technology.' 
His second working assumption is, 'Every thinker thinks only a single 
thought' (N3: p.4). Here the suggestion is that, whilst the thoughts of many 
of us engaged in philosophical thinking might display a certain lack of 
coherence and integration, and possess no overriding unity, the thought of a 
great thinker will not exhibit such qualities. In Nietzsche's case, in 
Heidegger's view, Nietzsche's single thought is the thought of the eternal 
recurrence, and thus Heidegger arranges other themes of Nietzsche's around 
this thought (see N4: 3). His third working assumption is that all senous 
thinking is metaphysics. This means that a thinker's 'single thought' will be 
about 'being as a whole' (WCT: 80). 
Whether we conclude from these a~s~lHllptiQns and from wh11t follyw§ 
that, as his one time student Hans Georg Gadamer put it, 'all in all, 
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Heidegger's attempt to think through the history of philosophy exhibits the 
violence of a thinker who is driven by his own questions and who seeks to 
recognize himself in everything' ,65 remains to be seen. My concern is not so 
much with the faithfulness of Heidegger's interpretation to Nietzsche's body 
of work, as with whether or not he has discerned something fundamental 
about Nietzsche's thinking, which can also be detected in many other 
thinker's in the Western tradition: namely, a 'forgetfulness of Being'. 
3.2.2. 'God is Dead' 
For my purposes, the best place to begin explaining Heidegger's 
interpretation of Nietzsche is a lecture called 'The word of Nietzsche: 'God 
is dead", which is a kind of summary of the many lectures that Heidegger 
gave on Nietzsche between 1936 and 1940. Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's 
phrase 'God is dead' to be a reference to the supersensory world in general, 
and to the inability of the supersensory world to affect men, to play a vital 
role in the orientation of their lives, in their understanding of Being. As he 
puts it: 'The pronouncement 'God is dead' means: The suprasensory world is 
without effective power. It bestows no life .... [it] has suffered the loss of its 
obligatory and above all its vitalizing and upbuilding power' (QCT: 61 ). He 
then goes on to point out that, not only is it God that no longer has the 
power to give meaning to people's lives, but whatever principle or ideal is 
placed within the suprasensory world, such as the moral law, the authority of 
reason, and so on. This whole way of being in the world has become 
bankrupt. Thus he indicates that Nietzsche's task, in response to this 
nihilism, is not to populate the old suprasensory realm with some new idol, 
but, rather, to establish meaning in some different way, a way that can 
vitalize man in a way that the supersensory world no longer does. As 
Heidegger puts it, 'Revaluing becomes the overturning of the nature and 
manner of valuing' (QCT: 70). Nietzsche thereby seeks out 'what is most 
alive', ' 'the ideal of superabundant life' ' (ibid.). Because the new values 
and their standard of measure must be drawn from beings themselves, rather 
65 Quoted inA Jan Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of fnterpretation.(London:_ Routledge, 1990), 
p.ll7. 
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than from a realm over and above beings, a new interpretation of beings is 
required which can serve as such a standard, and this interpretation is what 
Nietzsche calls the 'will to power', so Heidegger argues. 
He then turns to a question which Nietzsche himself asks, in the 
'death of God' passage: namely, how did we kill God? How is it that the 
suprasensory world, the lights of which have guided men for over two 
millennia, has lost its power? We have considered Nietzsche's answer in 
chapter one: the will to truth, in the form of science and Kant's critical 
philosophy, compels us to admit the untruthfulness of belief in God. Thereby 
God, as the highest value, gets dethroned. Heidegger's answer is equally 
emphatic, and goes right to the heart of his critique of Nietzsche: it is due to 
thinking of God as a value in the first place that man has killed God: 
The ultimate blow against God and against the suprasensory world 
consists in the fact that God, the first of beings, is degraded to the 
highest value. The heaviest blow against God is not that God is held to 
be unknowable, not that God's existence is demonstrated to be 
unprovable, but rather that the god held to be real is elevated to the 
highest value (QCT: I 05). 
Heidegger's story of how it is that we have come to think of God in terms of 
values, and in terms of value at all, is what must first occupy us, then. It is 
central to his discussion of Nietzsche, and central to his charge that the 
essence of metaphysics and of nihilism is 'forgetfulness of Being.' Before 
we tell this story, however, we need to establish precisely what Nietzsche 
means by a value. 
3.2.3. What are Values, and What Does Heidegger Think is Wrong with 
Them? 
In Heideggerian fashion, we might ask, 'What is the ontological status 
of a value?'. In a more 'down-to-earth' fashion, we could ask what talking in 
terms of values - as we habitually do - says ~~out our understanding of 
being. We are so accustomed to hearing and using the word today that we 
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perhaps do not really 'bat an eyelid' at its use, and presume that what it 
means is very obvious, that thinking 111 terms of values is the only 
conctivable way to think - that the Greeks had their values, the Aborigines 
have theirs, Christians have theirs, and so on. Much of Heidegger's merit as 
a philosopher lies 111 making the obvious seem not so obvious, indeed 
decidedly strange. He is insistent that it is only we moderns who have 
'values' and who speak in terms of values, and that this reveals something 
fundamental about the way that we understand being. He points out that 
Nietzsche defines values, in The Will to Power, thus: 'The point-of-view of 
'value' is the point-of-view constituting the preservation-enhancement 
conditions with respect to complex forms of relative duration of life within 
becoming' (WP: 715 I p.380). Heidegger is quick to seize upon the fact that 
the essence of a value lies in its being a point-of-view, and that this point of 
view is adopted with a definite aim in mind. It is, 'a seeing that aims at 
something' (QCT: 71). Clearly, something possesses value as a means to a 
particular end, a feature that will become important as we proceed. 
Heidegger's opposition to thinking in terms of values was long 
standing. In an early series of lectures he gave, Towards a Definition of 
Philosophy, he attacks this style of thinking in certain neo-Kantians. Such 
opposition reaches its height in the Nietzsche lectures and after. He claims, 
'The very positing of these values in the world is already nihilism' (N4: 44), 
and, 'No one dies for mere values' (QCT: 142). His reasons for thinking this 
are expressed most clearly in the 'Lette1· on Humanism': 
it is important finally to realize that precisely through the 
characterization of something as 'a value' what is so valued is robbed 
of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value 
what is valued is admitted only as an object for man's estimation. But 
what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, 
particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing, 
even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let 
beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid- solely as the objects 
of jts doing .... When one proclaims 'God' the altgg_ether 'highe~t 
value,' this is a degradation of God's essence. Here as elsewhere 
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thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being. 
To think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum for 
the valuelessness and nullity of beings. It means rather to bring the----
clearing of the truth of Being before thinking, as against 
subjectivizing beings into mere objects (BW: 251 ). 
I quote this passage at length because of its supreme importance for my 
concerns. Firstly, note the theological tone, as Heidegger calls valuative 
thinking a 'blasphemy' against Being. His reason for thinking this is 
completely clear here: values are always relative to specific people, and 
hence involve a subjectivizing (and thereby objectiving) of the world, in 
which beings are treated solely in terms of their capacity to bring about the 
goals of man's striving. He opposes to this a way of thinking and living 
which attends to 'the clearing of the truth of Being', the source of being and 
beings, which is occluded by a life concerned solely with actualizing certain 
ends. He is suggesting that, in our talk of values, we come to feel, as our 
ancestors did not, that our values are merely our values, that they do not 
possess a reality above and beyond our positing them as such, which is why, 
Heidegger suggests, 'No one dies for mere values'. Here we see the rift 
between Heidegger and Nietzsche, and therewith Heidegger and the rest of 
the philosophical tradition (at least in his characterisation) begin to emerge. 
Whereas Nietzsche celebrates the recognition that our values are just that -
our values- as a way to facing up to man's true creative capacities to forge 
his own scheme of values and posit his own meanings, Heidegger recoils 
from such a stance as a 'blasphemy against Being' because it renders what is 
valued valueless, uncompelling and unbinding. 
Heidegger thinks that, far from Nietzsche's attempt to instigate a 
revaluation of all values being a possible way of overcoming nihilism and 
reorienting man, this way of thinking is exactly the kind of thinking that will 
leave us mired in nihilism and disoriented. This leads him to undertake an 
analysis of how it is possible for nihilism to have come about in the first 
place. His answer is quite simple: the 'calculative thinking' and 
'fo[g~tf!JII!_ess of Being' engende~ed at_ the dawn of_ Western culture by Pl!lto, 
which attempts to gain some 'purchase' on Being rather than to 'let beings 
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be', and which culminates in the nihilism and value-thinking of Nietzsche. 
This is how we have been able to 'drink up the sea, to wipe away the entire 
horizon, to unchain the earth from its sun'. Let us now turn, then, to the 
roots of Nietzschean nihilism in Plato. 
3.3. How Have We Come to Think in Terms of Values'! Plato and the Essence 
of Truth 
As far as Heidegger is concerned, the 'slippery slope' that culminates 
in the subjectivism and value thinking of Nietzsche began with Plato. It was 
Plato who set Western philosophy on its ineluctable course towards 
subjectivism. He argues for this in his 1931/2 essay, 'Plato's doctrine of 
truth'. There he writes: 
The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same 
time the beginning of 'humanism' .... humanism means the process ... 
whereby human beings, in differing respects but always deliberately, 
move into a central place among beings ... What takes place in each 
instance [of humanism] is a metaphysically determined revolving 
around the human being (Pa: 181 ). 
He discerns in Plato's allegory of the cave the beginnings of the move away 
from truth conceived of as unhiddenness, to truth conceived of as 
correspondence. What is so crucial about this shift, for Heidegger, is that it 
paves the way for a conception of truth as dependent on man, and of the 
subject as the locus of truth, as evidenced in the philosophies of Descartes 
and Nietzsche. 
What, then, is the difference between truth as correspondence and 
truth as unh iddenness? According to the correspondence theory of truth, a 
statement is t1·ue if it corresponds to a given state of affairs. Thus, Aquinas 
speaks of 'adaequatio intellectus et rei', Descartes states, 'Truth or 
falsehood in the proper sense can be nowhere but in the intellect alone', and 
Katlt wr_ites of 'th~ ~greem~n! _gf_~no~J~gge witJJ its object'. This~ all seems 
very obvious; indeed, to be common sense. So, 'Chloe is in the meadow' is 
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true if and only if Chloe 1s in the meadow. Straightforward enough. What 
can Heidegger mean when he refers to truth as unhiddenness? This question 
goes right to the heart of his philosophy, and therefore is not an easy one to 
answer quickly. Still, we can say that the term 'truth as unhiddenness' refers 
to our understanding of being, to the shared background 'within' which 
things - Chloe, the meadow - become 'lit up' in the first place - a 
background that is so implicit (being a background) that we generally do not 
notice it. But it is only on the basis of this background that we are able to 
refer to particular beings in the first place. This is what I defined as 'being' 
in section one, and is one of the central features of Division I of Being and 
Time. There Heidegger makes a point that we have also come to associate 
with the later Wittgenstein, to the effect that social practices give meaning 
to assertions: 
The pointing out which assertion does [e.g. 'Chloe 1s tn the meadow'] 
is performed on the basis of what has already been disclosed in 
understanding or discovered circumspectively. Assertion is not a free-
floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, might be capable of 
disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it 
always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world. (BT : 199, 
ita I ics mine). 
What is crucial about truth as unhiddenness, about our understanding 
of being, the background or horizon that allows anything to show up in the 
first place, is that it is not dependent on the subject. This is because it 
occurs between subjects, and allows subjects to be subjects in the first 
place: it is, to requote a passage we encountered earlier, ' ... the open region 
within whose openness something is made accessible as object for a subject 
... accessibility itself' (N4: 93). This is a point that shall become clearer in 
my analysis of some of Division I of Being and Time, in chapter four. With 
Plato, Heidegger argues, the move is made towards a 'forgetting' or glossing 
over of this background, a glossing over of what makes truth as 
correspondence possible, with the concomitant result that truth gets 
conceived of as_it]creasingly dependent on the hutnit_n s_ttiJJ~ct: 
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As unhiddenness, truth is still a fundamental trail (~f beings 
themselves. But as the correctness of the 'gaze, ' it becomes a 
characteristic of human comportment toward beings. Taking the 
essence of truth as the correctness of the representation, one thinks of 
all beings according to 'ideas' and evaluates all reality according to 
'values'. (That which alone and first of all is decisive Js not which 
ideas and which values are posited, but rather the fact that the real is 
interpreted acco•·ding to 'ideas' at all, that the 'world' is weighed 
according to 'values' at all) (Pa: 177, 182, italics mine). 
3.3.1. Plato and Nietzsche as Philosophers of Power 
Before we proceed, it is important to be clear on the link between 
Plato's theory of the Forms, and Nietzsche's valuative thinking. Heidegger 
detects in Plato's theory a will to mastery and control, a 'calculative' way of 
thinking that attempts to get a clear view of what things essentially are- the 
'ideas' - in order to act in as effective a way as possible. Consequent upon 
this, 'the very essence of [philosophy] consists in making the human being 
free and strong for the clarity and constancy of insight into essence .... all 
our efforts must be concentrated above all on making such seeing possible' 
(Pa: I 76). Heidegger is accusing Plato of adopting an assumption about the 
way that we should think when doing philosophy that manifests a desire for 
control and to escape from contingency: namely, the assumption that we 
must have certainty in our thinking, which can be achieved by getting clear 
and distinct before our 'mind's eye' what the essences of things are. Plato's 
theory of the Forms is, as it were, a description of what the world must be 
like, or of how we are to think of the world, if we want to achieve such 
certainty and power. As Rorty eloquently puts it, Heidegger discerns in Plato 
a concealed wi II to power in his assumption, 
... that truth has something to do with evidence, with being clear and 
convincing, with being in possession of powerful, penetrating and 
deep insights or arguments- insights or arguments which will put you 
in a cg_I1LnHH1_din_g po~iti911 vis-a-vis some_thjng p_r so_m_e"b_o_dy e_ls_e_._ The 
West, Heidegger thinks, has been on a power trip ever since, with the 
j;__ 
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Greeks, it invented itself .... This is the ironic result of Plato's 
attempt to rise above the pragmatism of the marketplace, to find a 
world elsewhere. 66 
3.3.2. The History of Being, from Plato to Nietzsche 
As I mentioned earlier, Heidegger regards what is unthought in a 
philosopher as what is most illuminating, and by this unthought element he 
means the understanding of being within which each thinker was working, 
and struggling to articulate. This leads him to give various sketches of what 
he calls a 'history of Being', which is a history of the successive ways in 
which people have understood themselves and the world, understood being. 
Heidegger thinks that truly decisive events in history are not battles, 
revolutions, rises and falls of empires, but rather, little noticed changes 
which occur, as it were, behind our backs, and which change the very way 
we look at the world or understand being. As he puts it, 'The history of 
being ... sustains and defines every 'condition et situation humaine' ... The 
rare and simple decisions of history spring from the way in which the 
original essence of truth essentially unfolds.' (Pa: 240, 146). Crucially, the 
history of Being is determined by Being, not by man. We, as 'shepherds of 
Being', are sent particular understandings of being by Being itself. Thus our 
role is essentially a passive one - we cannot control the history of Being. In 
this respect the history of Being is the complete antithesis of Nietzsche's 
histories and genealogies, which are narratives of power struggles between 
competing interpretations of the world, and thus are controlled by humans. 
Moreover, the history of Being is opposed to Hegelian and Marxist 
philosophies of history, in so far as it is not teleological: 'The epochs can 
never be derived from one another and forced into the course of a continuous 
history' (Pa: 154). 
The history of Being begins with a kind of 'Golden Age', before 
Being was forgotten, a Golden Age that Heidegger discerns in the writings of 
the pre-Socratics, such as Heraclitus and Parmen ides (the same age that 
66 Rorty ( 1991), p.31. 
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Nietzsche also evokes as a kind of Golden Age, but for very different 
reasons, as I have mentioned). Of this period he writes: 
That which is does nut come into being at all through the fact that man 
first looks upon it, in the sense of a representing that has the character 
of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon 
by that which is; he is the one who is - in company with itself -
gathered towards presencing, by that which opens itself. To be beheld 
by what is, to be included and maintained with in its openness and in 
that way to be borne along by it, to be driven about by its oppositions 
and marked by its discord - that is the essence of man in the great age 
of the Greeks .... that the beingness of whatever is, is defined by Plato 
as eidos [aspect, view] is the presupposition, destined far in advance 
and ruling indirectly in concealment, for the world's having to become 
picture [and, we might add, for thinking in terms of values] (QCT: 
131 ). 
This is an important passage because it describes a non-subjective way of 
experiencing Being, with which Heidegger contrasts the subjectivism of 
Western philosophy as he sees it, from Plato to Nietzsche. The rest of the 
history of Being is concerned with Plato to Nietzsche, and the forgetfu I ness 
of Being. 
Plato's theory of the Forms, according to this history, sets in motion a 
way of understanding Being captured well by Michael Zimmerman's phrase 
'productionist metaphysics' 67 • Heidegger suggests that Plato's vision of the 
world as consisting of basic designs and their copies is based on a view that 
the structure of all things is akin to the structure of products or artefacts. 
This assumption can also be seen in Aristotle's conception of things as 
formed matter. Plato, by conceiving of truth as lying in a realm distinct from 
the physical world of change, abstracts truth from being, from our implicit 
understanding of what things are, the rich, holistic, unthought experience 
that encompasses our experience of particular things. In doing so, the 
presencing of things is forgotten inofavour of their presence, their emergence 
67 Michael Zimmennan, Heidegger 's Confrontation with Modernity: technology, politics and art, 
(Bloomington: Indiana university press, 1990), p.263. 
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Js lost sight of in favour of what emerges, being is glossed over in focusing 
on beings. As Heidegger puts it, 'the openedness of beings gets flattened out 
into the apparent nothingness of what is no longer a matter even of 
indifference, but rather is simply forgotten' (Pa: 147). In Plato's philosophy, 
a Form is what a thing really is before it is produced. His concern is with 
essences. Heidegger's point is that Plato, in focusing on beings and what 
causes them, loses sight of the more fundamental but harder to articulate 
event of the presencing of things, and inaugurates metaphysics as the search 
for the causes of beings rather than an attendance on b/Being. Thus, 'the 
essential origin of being as making possible and as causing rules throughout 
the future history of being' (N2: 420). 
The next crucial event in the history of Being is the translation of the 
Greek world into Roman Latin. Heidegger thinks that, with this event, being 
comes to mean 'beingness', in the sense of what is actual, and what each 
being has in common, rather than the horizon within which things emerge as 
such or such. This is compounded by medieval Christianity, which 
theologizes the forgetfulness of Being by conceiving of God as the 
'manufacturing cause' of the world. This dispensation in the history of 
Being gives way to the modern era and the rise of science in which, in the 
philosophy of Descartes, being comes to mean to be the object for a self-
certain subject (N2: 129). The self-certifying cogito becomes the ontological 
basis for all beings: to be means to be present in a clear and distinct fashion 
to this cogito. Nothing really is unless it can be represented: things are not 
accepted as they present themselves, but re-presented in terms amenable to 
the standards and purposes of the representing subject. So, for Descartes, the 
real is only that which can be represented in terms which are as certain as 
the self-certainty of the subject's own presence to itself- thus, what is real 
are extended objects that can be measured mathematically. What we have 
here, in Heidegger's view, is the natural consequence of Plato's theory of 
the Forms and the 'productionist metaphysics' which he inaugurated. In 
Heidegger' view, it is just a step from Descartes (albeit a two hundred and 
fifty year long step- the reverberations of big ideas go on for a long time!) 
to Nietzsche's understanding of being as will to power, of the will as that 
which causes, effects, and makes possible all things. For Nietzsche, 
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according to Heidegger's interpretation, to be means to be produced by will 
and to be useful for enhancing that will. As Clark puts it, summarising 
Heidegger's history very well: 
Contemporary nihilism is only the most overt manifestation of an 
anthropocentric, exploitative thinking that has been entrenching itself 
for over two thousand years .... [Nietzsche's doctrine of the superman] 
renders explicit the destructive tendency of Western thought to 
conceive the world merely in terms that serve to enhance the apparent 
power and mastery of the thinker. 68 
So long as we remain enthralled to such a way of thinking, and its 
tremendous practical effects, we remain, Heidegger thinks, occluded from a 
more reverential kind of existence, which he invokes in his later writings, as 
we shall see. 
3. 4. The Step from Descartes to Nietzsche 
In what sense, then, is Nietzsche a Cartesian, the ultimate 
subjectivist? Does not Nietzsche explicitly attack Descartes in The Will to 
Power, and thereby distinguish his position from the Frenchman's? Indeed, 
does not Nietzsche - as we have seen - deny the very thing that Descartes 
rests the whole edifice of his thought on, a self-certain subject, arguing 
instead that the subject is a fiction created by lumping together various 
sensation and drives under the same word (see, e.g., WP: 267-72)? Heidegger 
was well aware of all of this, and yet he sti II insists that, for all these 
differences, there is a deeper lying unity between the two thinkers: ' ... it has 
gone unnoticed that behind Nietzsche's exceedingly sharp rejection of the 
Cartesian 'cogito' stands an even more rigorous commitment to the 
subjectivity posited by Descartes' (N4: 123). The central point of conversion 
between the two is that the subject decides what is to count as truth. 
Heidegger writes: 
68 Timothy Clarke, Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge, 2002), p.29 
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For Descartes, man is the measure of all beings in the sense of the 
presumption of the de-limitation of representing to self-securing 
certitude. For Nietzsche, not only is what is represented as such a 
product of man, but every shaping and minting of any kind is the 
product and property of man as absolute lord over every sort of 
perspective in which the world is fashioned and empowered as 
absolute will to power (N4: 137). 
So, Descartes' emphasis on subjectivity as the ultimate locus of truth 
establishes a way of thinking in which truth is thought of as what we posit as 
true in order to increase our power. This decisive shift in our understanding 
of being began at the dawn of the modern age. Heidegger points out that, 
around this time, a new answer to the 'guiding question of metaphysics', 
'What is being?' was sought, to replace biblical Christian revealed truth and 
church doctrine. He argues that a new basis for freedom is posited, which 
consists 'in the fact that man himself legislates, chooses what is binding' 
(N4: 98-9). Man achieved, at this time, liberation from the revealed certitude 
of Christian doctrine to 'a certitude in which man can by himself be sure of 
his own definition and task.' (N4: 99). This has led, Heidegger argues, man 
to assume an increasingly dominating relationship to being: 
The securing of supreme and absolute self-development of all 
the capacities of mankind for absolute dominion over the entire earth 
is the secret goad that prods modern man again and again to new 
resurgences, a goad that forces him into commitments that secure for 
him the surety of his actions and the certainty of his aims (N4: 99). 
This is, for Heidegger, the essence of nihilism. At this point in his 
reflections on Nietzsche we find perhaps his most concise and helpful 
de fin it ion of nih i I ism: 
[Nihilism] must seek the true and the real in the absolute 
humanization of all being. Metaphysics is anthropomorphism -
the,formation and apprehension of the world according to man's 
image .... [metaphysics as will to power] ... thrusts man as no 
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metaphysics before it into the role of the absolute and unique 
measure of things (N4: 83-4). 
This is the essence of nihilism, for Heidegge•·: the occlusion of Being by 
man. This is why Nietzsche, far from discerning a way beyond nihilism, 
actually remains deeply mired in it, due to the very way in which he -
unconsciously - tries to tackle nihilism. The very fact that Nietzsche thinks 
of nihilism as something that we have brought about (think of the 'death of 
God' passage, in which the madman screams, 'We have killed him- you and 
I. All of us are his murderers', (GS: 125 I p.181)) betrays his inability to 
perceive the essence of nihilism, as far as Heidegger is concerned, which is 
'forgetfulness of Being'. From this perspective, nihilism is not something 
that we have brought about, but is rather an event of the history of Being 
itself, and is thus sent to us by Being. Recognising this is central to 
preparing a way beyond it, as we shall see when we consider Heidegger's 
reflection on technology. As he puts it, in 'Nihilism and the history of 
Being': 'The essence of nihilism is not at all the affair of man, but a matter 
of Being itself' (N4: 221 ). 
3.5. The Step from Nietzsche to 'Technology' 
Descartes prepares the way for Nietzsche, and Nietzsche prepares the 
way for 'technology', which is, in Heidegger's view, the latest episode in the 
history of Being. We can see the roots of Heidegger's reflections on 
'technology' in writings prior to those in which he explicitly addresses this 
question. In a series of lectures given in 1929-30, The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger attempted to awaken in his listeners, 
there and then in the lecture room, what he calls a 'fundamental attunement.' 
What he means by such an attunement is a mood or way of disclosing the 
world that is fundamental to a particular period of history, to a particular 
episode in the 'history of Being'. Such attunements reveal, as it were, the 
'spirit of the times', the way in which being is understood during that 
period. Heidegger's claim in this lecture course is that boredom is one of the 
fundamenta) attunements of our age, and this claim relates very closely to 
his critique of Nietzsche and of 'technology', which came several years 
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later. His claim 1s very similar to (and no doubt influenced by, but 
unacknowledged) Kierkegaard's claim that, in the present age, we have 
forgotten what is means to exist, what it means to exist inwardly. As the 
Dane complains, 'My principal thought was that in our age, because of the 
great increase in knowledge, we had forgotten what it means to exist, and 
what inwardness signifies' .69 In the lectures, Heidegger bases his claim 
partly on the prevalence of a certain kind of writing 111 our time, which 
offers interpretations of our contemporary situation. He gives Spengler, 
Klages, Scheler, Ziegler and Nietzsche as examples, and detects in these 
writings a kind of nihilism of the kind he has been adumbrating so far with 
reference to Nietzsche's subjectivism and value thinking, because all four 
writers exe1_11pl ify a tendency to impart to contemporary man a world 
historical role, which suggests that he does not possess any significance 
aside from this role. He asks: 
What lies behind the fact that we give ourselves this role and indeed 
must do so? Have we become too insignificant to ourselves, that we 
require a role? why do we find no meaning for ourselves anymore, i.e., 
no essential possibility of being? Is it because an indifference yawns 
at us out of all things, an indifference whose grounds we do not know? 
Yet who can speak in such a way when world trade, technology, and 
the economy seize hold of man and keep him moving? And 
nevertheless we seek a role for ourselves . ... Why must we do this? 
Perhaps because we have become bored with ourselves? ... Do things 
ultimately stand in such a way with us that a profound boredom draws 
back and forth like a silent fog in the abysses of Dasein? (FCM: 77). 
When life becomes, as it does for Heidegger's Nietzsche, life for the sake of 
life, enhancement of power for the sake of enhancement of power, change for 
the sake of change - a state captured by Heidegger's evocative phrase 'the 
will to will' - no particular thing possesses authority anymore, qualitative 
distinctions are levelled out. This can lead to a quest for the ever new - as 
we can see so clearly in our society today - a restlessness, and obsession 
with what Heidegger calls the 'gigantic': being able to send spaceships to 
69 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr.L.M. and D.F.Swenson, (Princeton: 
Princeton university press, 1996), p.26. 
115 
Mars, or to make computers that fit into your pocket. Underlying this, 
however, Heidegger detects a deep-seated boredom, a boredom that he 
devoted much of the \929-30 lecture course to trying to awaken in his 
students. This early diagnosis of our age as prey to a devastating boredom 
can be seen as a forerunner to Heidegger's later thinking on nihilism and 
'technology'. 
3. 6. What is 'Technology', and Why is it Nihilistic? 
'Technology', 70 as Heidegger uses the word, denotes the latest epoch 
in the history of Being, an epoch prepared for by Nietzsche's subjectivism 
and value thinking. and hence the epoch in which nihilism as Heidegger 
understands it, the 'forgetfulness of Being', manifests itself in its ultimate 
form, in the understanding of being within which we all live and move. The 
'technological' understanding of being discloses the world as so much 
'standing reserve' [Bestand] available for human manipulation and use (BW: 
322). Heidegger calls this understanding of being whereby beings are 
'levelled down' to the status of resources 'enframing' [Gestell] (BW: 324). 
How plausible is this claim? Do we moderns really understand being 
in this way? Obviously, no black or white answer can be given to this 
question, given that our understanding of being is not something that is 
transparent to us, it is something that we are 'always already' in. 
Nevertheless, there are several salient features of modern I ife that fit 
Heidegger's claim very well. Firstly, though, let us become clearer on what 
he is claiming. The claim that we understand the world in a 'technological' 
way, as so much en framed standing reserve on tap for human use, imp I ies 
that means to ends are increasingly becoming ends in themselves. Thus we 
have ever increasing levels of productivity, of speed of travel, of ease of 
communication; and yet the questions of what the productivity, the travel, 
the communication is for become increasingly difficult to answer, and 
therefore the means themselves become ends. As Hannah Arendt, one of 
Heidegger's students, puts it: 
70 I have adopted the practice throughout the thesis of placing inverted commas around the word 
'technology' when used in Heidegger's sense. 
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The perplexity of utilitarianism is that it gets caught in the unending 
chain of means and ends without ever arriving at some principle which 
could justify the category of means and ends, that is, of utility itself. 
The 'in order to' has become the content of the 'for the sake of'; in 
other words, utility established as meaning generates 
. I 11 mean1 ng essness. 
Heidegger detects in Nietzschean metaphysics this dissolution of ends into 
means. Analysing the will to power, he writes: 'Power is power only when 
. and so long as it remains power-enhancement and commands for itself 'more 
power' .... To the essence of power belongs the overpowering of itself .... 
Thus power is indeed constantly on the way to itself (QCT: 78, italics 
mine). When being gets understood as will to power, meaning comes to 
consist in the incessant overpowering of a particular level of power for the 
sake of more power, in constantly enhancing one's means without ever 
arriving at an end. This is the essential meaning of Nietzsche's doctrine of 
the eternal recurrence, in Heidegger' s view (see N4: 81 ). 
In what forms does enframing manifest itself in everyday life? One 
could give manifold examples. The increased emphasis on calcalulability in 
more and more aspects of life, not least in education, is a good example. 
Consumerism generally and the advertising industry are also good examples 
of means eclipsing ends, as yet another shopping trip fails to live up to the 
expectations one had concerning it, has still not managed to slake the thirst 
of the heart - but nevermind, there is always the next trip! Certainly one of 
the most striking ways in which means have dissolved into ends is in our 
attitude towards money. Simmel, in his book The Philosophy of Money, puts 
it as follows: 
Never has an object that owes its value exclusively to its quality as a 
means, to its convertibility into more definite values, so thoroughly 
and unreservedly developed into a psychological value absolute, into a 
71 Quoted in Loy (2002), p.l89. 
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completely engrossing final purpose governing our practical 
conscious ness. 72 
In a similar vein, Schopenhauer wrote, 'Money is human happiness in 
abstracto; consequently he who is no longer capable of happiness in 
concreto sets his whole heart on money.' 73 His point is similar to Simmel's. 
In the absence of genuine meaning, genuine ends for action, means become 
ends in themselves, no means more so than money. So, perhaps our 
preoccupation with money as an end in itself is the ultimate symbol of our 
forgetfulness of being, and our nihilism. 
3.6. I. Technology Makes us Forget Being 
We are beginning to see in what way a technological understanding of 
being is nihilistic. Firstly, it turns means into ends, locking us into a pattern 
whereby we do x for the sake of y for the sake of z and so on ad infinitum, 
without ever reaching a terminus whereby something is done purely for its 
own sake, as an end in itself rather than just a means. Here is Heidegger's 
claim to this effect: 
What threatens man in his very nature is the view that technological 
production puts the world in order, while in fact this ordering is 
precisely what levels every ordo, every rank, down to the uniformity 
of production, and thus from the outset destroys the realm from which 
any rank and recognition could possibly arise (PL T: 114). 
Secondly, Heidegger argues that this way of disclosing being makes 
us more likely than ever to forget Being, the 'source' of all disclosures of 
being, and to forget that there are other, more 'original' and 'primal' ways 
of disclosing the world: 
Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility 
of revealing. Above all, enframing conceals that revealing which, in 
the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance. 
72 /bid., p.l83. 
73 Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms (London: Penguin, 1970), p.170. 
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... The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it 
could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and 
hence to experience the call of a more primal truth (BW: 332-3). 
What might be the nature of 'a more original revealing and ... a more primal 
truth' we shall consider in chapter five. For now the point to note is that the 
great danger, in Heidegger's eyes, that 'technology' poses is that enframing 
becomes the only mode of revealing entities, and hence prevents us from 
entering into a more primal relationship to Being. This would result in an 
obscuration of man's essence as 'the one spoken to [by Being]', the 
'shepherd of Being', so that 'he himself will have to be taken as standing-
reserve' (BW: 332), as a 'human resource'. As he goes on to write, in a 
passage which makes clear the link between Heidegger's interpretation of 
Nietzsche and 'technology': 
Meanwhile, man ... exalts himself and postures as lord of the ea1·th. In 
this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters 
exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in 
turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and 
always encounters only himself .... Man stands so decisively in 
subservience to the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not 
grasp enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one 
spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he 
ek-sists, in terms of his essence, in a realm where he is addressed, so 
that he can never encounter only himself (BW: 332). 
Clearly, the concepts of 'enframing' and 'standing reserve' have 
counterparts in Nietzschean metaphysics, in the will to power imposing order 
on the world in a particular way in order to realise a particular set of values. 
In both his writings on Nietzsche and 'technology' there is adumbrated a 
strong critique of anthropocentrism, of making human will the measure of 
what counts as real, as being. In both critiques, Heidegger's concern is with 
the forgetfu I ness of Being this entai Is, forgetfulness of other possible ways 
of disclosing the world, more primordial ways which are not so 
an th ro pocen tr ic. 
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Thirdly, and related to the prevtous two points: enframing the world 
as so much standing reserve on tap for human use can make us lose touch 
with tradition, with the meaningfulness we have inherited from previous 
generations, with what Heidegger terms in Being and Time our 'heritage' 
(BT: 435). Mark Okrent makes this point well in Heidegger's Pragmatism: 
... technicity dissolves all traditional and substantial determinations 
for being human - by measuring the value of all factical human 
determinations in light of their pragmatic efficacy and by giving 
humans the seeming power, through technical mastery of their natural 
and social environment, to recreate their own facticity and 'nature' 
from the ground up. 74 
Obviously Okrent has in mind, in his reference to having the ability 'to 
recreate their own facticity and 'nature' from the ground up', such things as 
genetic engineering. Heidegger attaches great importance to tradition, 
particularly the Black Forest peasant tradition, as is well known: 'As far as 
my own orientation goes, in any case, I know that, according to our human 
experience and history, everything essential and of great magnitude has 
arisen only out of the fact that man had a home and was rooted in a 
tradition. ' 75 The dissolution of home and tradition Heidegger refers to as 
'homelessness', in the 'Letter on Humanism': 
Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world .... 
Homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of 
Being by beings. Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of Being. 
Because of it the truth of Being remains unthought .... Nietzsche was 
the last to experience this homelessness. (BW: 241-3). 
These are, then, the three ways in which 'technology' is nihilistic and poses 
a great danger to us: by turning means into ends there is a levelling of 
meaningful distinctions; by preventing us from remembel'ing that technology 
itself is one particular understanding of being, and as such has been granted 
74 Mark Okrent, Heidegger 's Pragmatism (Cornell: Cornell university press, 1988), p.270. 
75 Quoted in Okrent ( 1988), p.271. 
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to us by Being; and by obliterating traditions and particular people's sense 
of place and 'ethos'. Whilst all three are intertwined, it is the second of 
these dangers that will be the focus of much of the remaining two chapters 
on Heidegger, as we turn to a consideration of how best to respond to 
nihilism in his view. 
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Chapter Four: Being and Time and the Subject-Object 
Distinction 
4.1. Heidegger 's critique of Descartes in Being and Time 
In his Nietzsche lectures Heidegger writes, 'the question concerning 
Being as such stands outside the subject-object relation' (N4: 142). It is in 
Being and Time that we find Heidegger's most sustained critique of this 
framework, the framework that underlies the forgetfulness of Being, and thus 
nihilism generally, and Nietzsche's nihilism and value-thinking in particular. 
As Heidegger puts it, in a quotation cited earlier: 
We actually think that a being becomes accessible when an 'I' as 
subject represents an object. As if the open region within whose 
openness something is made accessible as object for a subject, and 
accessibility itself, which can be penetrated and experienced, did not 
already have to reign here as well! (N4: 93). 
Being and Time represents his most systematic and sustained attempt to 
uncover 'the open region within whose openness something is made 
accessible as object for a subject, and accessibility itself', to uncover the 
very presence of things, a presence which is temporal. Being and Time is 
often read as an attack on the Cartesian picture of an isolated 
epistemological subject trying desperately hard to re-establish its connection 
with the 'external world'. This attack can also be seen as an attack on the 
notion of a Nietzschean isolated moral subject pasting its own values onto 
'chaos', and it is this attack which, whilst left largely implicit in Being and 
Time, I want to focus on, for it is central to Heidegger's hostility to talk of 
'values'. 
Donald Crosby, in his book The Spectre of the Absurd, writes of 
Descartes, 'The qualitative, evaluative, affectional, informal, non-scientific 
ways of relating to the world ... have no veridical significance, according to 
Descartes' first Archimidean point .... Descat·tes' method ... rapes our senses 
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[and] brutally assaults our most instinctual responses and predilections.' 76 
In doing this, Descartes almost literally invites the nihilism of Nietzsche, 
whereby our 'values' have no veridical significance, but are simply pastings 
onto 'chaos'. The rich, holistic, unthought experience that encompasses our 
experience of particular things, our understanding of being, is left out of the 
Cartesian picture of the world, with its stark delineation of being into res 
cogilans and res extensa. That which makes I ife mean ingfu I is thus confined 
to one side of a strict dividing line, the subjective side, a division which 
paves the way for Nietzsche's value thinking and account of truth as the 
necessarily false imposition of permanence and form onto that which truly 
possesses neither. 
In the following analysis of division one of Being and Time r shall 
bring out the way in which Heidegger, through the phenomenological 
method, attempts to capture just those 'qualitative, evaluative, affectional, 
informal, non-scientific ways of relating to the world' that Descartes leaves 
out, thereby impressing upon us how wrong-headed the subject-object 
distinction underlying Descartes' and Nietzsche's thought is. Whilst Being 
and Time is often read in a N ietzschean manner (Rorty remarks somewhere 
that the book dresses up Nietzsche 111 philosophically respectable, 
professorial garb), causing Heidegger himself to later worry about its 
subjectivism and to turn to a different style of thinking; nevertheless, if we 
read it in the I ight of Heidegger' s later writings, and his overall concern 
with the question of Being, we can find in it a profound criticism of the 
subject-object distinction, which, so he argues in his later writings, is most 
pronounced 111 Descartes' thought and provides the framework for 
Nietzsche's account of nihilism in terms of values. 
4.1.1. Descartes' Search for a New Ground 
As I have mentioned, Heidegger begins his detailed treatment of the 
philosophy of Descartes (in Nietzsche 4) and his establishment of the human 
subject as the new 'tmth of beings and essence of truth', with an account of 
76 Donald Crosby, The Spectre of the Absurd (New York: State university of New York press, 1988), 
p.212. 
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the specific kind of insecurities that led Descartes to think in this radically 
new way. As the authority of Biblical revelation began to wane, a search 
began for a new way of grounding man and truth, based on foundations that 
were more solid than the Christian foundations were now considered to be: 
Thus the question arises as to how we can attain and ground a 
certitude sought by man himself for his earthly life, concerning his 
own human being and the world. While in the medieval world it was 
precisely the path to salvation and the mode of transmitting truth 
(doctrina) that was firmly established, now the quest for new paths 
becomes decisive (N4: 89). 71 
We all know what this quest issued in. The human subject becomes the new 
metaphysical foundation for beings and truth. The modern age begins. 
4.1.2. The Presuppositions of Cartesianism Heidegger is Criticising 
Before looking in detail at Heidegger's critique of Cartesianism, we 
first need to be clear of its central features, or, at least, those features which 
Heidegger considers central to it. I do this also with a consideration of those 
-- ~-- --- --- --- ---features of ___ C-al·-tes I ani sm -- w11Tc-11--HeTd egger--tnii1ks ____ a_re ___ eml>eef<lea -- in - ----- -- -- ----
Nietzsche's value-thinking. Firstly: the hard and fast distinction that 
Descartes makes between subject and object, insid~ and outside, mind and 
external world; and, secondly, the quest for secure and explicit foundations 
for our beliefs about the world. Heidegger's central concern, in division one 
of Being and Time, is to demonstrate that there is a deeper understanding of 
ourselves and the world that these assumptions of Cartesianism both rely on 
and fail to notice, and his intention is to bring these phenomena- which are 
so obvious and implicit that we generally tend to not notice them- to light. 
He calls them our 'being-in-the-world.' Our 'Dasein', our 'being there', is 
not that of an isolated moral subject choosing his own table of values, but is 
rather that of a being who 'always already' understands being in a particular 
77 For a good, brief discussion of the intellectual context of Descartes thought, see Charles Guignon, 
Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indiana: Hackett publishing company, 1983), p.20-2. 
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way. This understanding of being has a moral dimension, and thus Being is 
'al-ways already· muking claims upon us. 
4.1 .3. Descartes Forgot the 'World' 
The most direct way, to my mind, of showing Heidegger's opposition 
to the Cartesian model of knowledge is to focus on his concept of 'world', 
which is the explicit subject of sections fourteen to eighteen of Being and 
Time, and the implicit subject of the whole book. To do this, let us focus on 
a simple sentence: 'Because it was Sunday, I was unable to fix my printer in 
time to hand in my essay.' Simple enough, we might think- we understand 
what it means straight away. But how is this possible? This is one way of 
looking at Heidegger's essential question in Being and Time. As Dreyfus 
aptly puts it, he is trying to 'make sense of our ability to make sense of 
things' 78• On the Cartesian model, what is involved in understanding this 
sentence is having an accurate inner model of what is being said, of knowing 
what the words 'Sunday', 'able', 'fix', 'printer', and so on, refer to or 
represent. However, when we come to look closer at this very simple 
sentence, it becomes clear that there are nuances essential to our 
understanding of it which are not registered by this model of understanding. 
For example, to understand the word 'unable' in this sentence, we make the 
assumption - without rehearsing it, of course - that it refers to the fact that I 
myself am unable to fix my computer, that I need to go to a computer repair 
shop to do so, and that such shops are closed on Sundays. Similarly, to 
understand the word 'Sunday', we need to understand what it is about 
Sundays that is pertinent to the sentence - namely, that the shops are closed, 
and not that, for example, it is the day of the week on which one is most 
likely to fall prey to emptiness and boredom. Similarly, to understand my 
inability to hand my essay in on time involves an understanding of time, of 
deadlines, and so on. As Clark, to whom I am indebted for his lucidity in 
this sort of analysis, points out: ' ... when we pause to unravel it, even the 
most mundane sentence or action draws on a vast and inchoate mass of 
78 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: a commentary on Heidegger 's 'Being and Time', Division I 
(London: MIT press, 1991 ), p.l 0. 
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assumed understanding that gets bigger the more one tries to explicate it' 79• 
The crucial point, missed by the Cartesian model, is that human 
understanding depends upon an implicit and shared mode of being (what 
Wittgenstein calls 'stage-setting' or 'agreement in forms of life'). This is 
what Heidegger means by his concept of 'world'. As Clark puts it, '[it] is 
that presupposed and disregarded space of familiarity and recognition within 
which all the beings around us ... are for us' 80 • It is our understanding of 
being. 
In a lecture given as early as 1919 Heidegger elucidates very clearly 
what he means by 'world': 
I see the lectern at a single stroke, as it were; I don't only see it in 
isolation, I see the lectern adjusted too high for me. I see a book lying 
on it, directly disturbing to me ... I see the lectern in an orientation, in 
a lighting, against a background ... In this experience of the lectern-
seeing, something presents itself to me from an immediate 
environment. This environmental something ... these are not things 
with a definite character of meaning, objects, moreover conceived as 
meaning this or that, but the significant aspect is the primary 
experience, which presents itself to me directly, without any mental 
detour via a grasping of things. Living in an environment, it means to 
me everywhere and always, it is all of this world, it is worlding. 81 
Heidegger's claim here that we do not see things in isolation is part of his 
insistence that our understanding is based on what he refers to here as an 
'orientation', 'lighting', 'background', 'environmental something'. Things, 
like the lectern, 'world'. This verb is one of many of Heidegger's word 
creations, designed to describe phenomena for which no name previously 
existed in philosophy, in his view. It means that our understanding of things 
is only possible on the basis of a 'world', an implicit and shared mode of 
79 Clark (2002), p.14. 
80 Ibid., p.l6. 
81 Quoted in Rudiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), p.94-5. 
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being, in this case, the academic 'world', with its lectures, students, 
assessments, books, and so on. Thus his view of understanding is holistic: an 
overall sense of things precedes and makes possible a grasp of the specific 
parts. When he denies that the 'world' can be reduced to a collection of 
objects with particular meanings, he is referring to the phenomenology of his 
teacher. Husser!, and his model of a meaning-giving transcendental ego, 
which is a good example of the Cat·tesian model of understanding that I am 
using Heidegger to criticise. Heidegger's point is that the 'world' is more 
fundamental than - indeed makes possible - subjects and objects, and that, 
therefore, this 'world' is not something that occurs in the minds of subjects. 
We are now in a position to return to our consideration of the first of 
the two assumptions of Cartesianism adumbrated above: the hard and fast 
distinction drawn between subjects and objects. For Heidegger, the subject-
object framework evoked by Descartes is only made possible by 'being-in-
the-world', by the shared and implicit social practices that go to make up 
ourselves and our world. What is so crucial about this, for my purposes, is 
that it strikes at the heart of the subjectivism that Heidegger thinks 
characterises modern philosophy, and reaches its apotheosis in Nietzsche. As 
far as Heidegger is concerned, the philosophical tradition has glossed over 
the phenomenon of the 'world' (in his sense), and in so doing, the 
subjectivism of modern philosophy has come to seem 'common sense', 
which, Heidegger remarks, is simply, ' ... the shallow product of that manner 
of forming ideas which is the final fruit of the Enlightenment of the 
eighteenth century' (WCT: 66). Heidegger's description of Dasein stresses 
its inseparability from something which is not the product of individual 
agency, namely, the world, the shared disclosure of things which we find 
ourselves 'always already' in, in our thoughts, practices, beliefs, and so on, 
a world that can never be rendered fully present, in a clear and distinct 
fashion, to the subject. So, when he claims that Dasein is 'being-in-the-
world', it is world in this sense that he primarily means, and not 'world' as 
in 'the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the 
world' (93: BT). 
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4./. 4. Where Does the World Come From, if not the Subject? 
This raises the crucial question, 'Whodunit?', who or what has 
constituted the 'world' in the way that it is constituted? A lot turns on our 
answer to this question, as will become clear later on. For now, let us 
consider the (provisional) answer that Heidegger gives in Being and Time 
and the lecture courses given around that time. Heidegger turns to this 
question in part four of division one of Being and Time, beginning with 
section twenty five, 'An approach to the existential question of the 'who' of 
Dasein'. Dreyfus remarks that this section could well be considered to be the 
most important section of the book, but that Heidegger's failure to 
adequately distinguish between the two main points that he is making in it 
severely confuses matters. These two points are, on the one hand, the 
Wittgensteinian type point about the publicness of meaning, and, on the 
other, Kierkegaardian point that 'the truth is never in the crowd'. There is a 
deep tension between these two points that to some extent division two is an 
attempt to resolve. For now, the important point for us is the first one. What 
is so crucial about Heidegger's concept of the 'world', and this is 
highlighted in the section now under consideration, is that it cannot be 
reduced to either of the two poles of the Cartesian model, res extensa and 
res cogitans, external physical space, or internal psychic space. It is not the 
former, because it is Dasein related, but it is not the latter, either, because it 
occurs between individuals. As Dreyfus puts it: 'He rejects the Husserlian 
and Sartrean [we could add Cartesian here] claim that philosophy must start 
with a separate sphere of own ness .... Heidegger seeks to show that while 
there are a plurality of 'selves', these selves presuppose the disclosure of a 
shared world.' 82 So intelligibility, significance, meaning, occurs between 
'subjects', and cannot, contra the Cartesian model, in any sense be said to 
occur within the minds of individual subjects. 
4./.5. The World's Groundlessness 
Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, is trying to get us away from a kind of 
narcissism in the philosophical tradition, according to which the subject is 
82 Dreyfus ( 1991 ), p.l42. 
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treated as the locus of meaning. On this account, meaning is not grounded in 
anything 'ultimate' or secure, like God, the Forms, or the subject. Meaning 
is simply how we have carried on, and continue to carry on. Thus Heidegger 
writes, in An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
Insofar as Being is as ground, it itself has no ground. This is not the 
case because it grounds itself, however, but because every grounding-
and that includes precisely those grounds that ground themselves -
remains inappropriate to Being as ground. Every grounding, and 
indeed every appearance that something should be grounded, must 
degrade Being to the level of entities. As Being, Being remains 
ground-less .... Being: the abyss [Ab-grund] (IM: 185). 
It is this feature of Heidegger's philosophy that is initially the most 
disconcerting. His point is that the 'world' that we are beings in, the 
background of shared practices, beliefs, language and so on, makes possible 
the disclosure of beings in the first place, and so cannot be grounded in a 
being of any kind, for to do so would 'degrade Being to the level of 
entities', Heidegger's tirelessly repeated charge against 'metaphysics'. It is 
akin to a point often made by Wittgenstein, for example, when he writes, 
'you must bear in mind that the language-game ... is not based on grounds. It 
is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there - like our life'H.1• Along 
similar lines, Heidegger writes,' 'In itself' it is quite incomprehensible why 
entities are to be discovered, why truth and Dasein must be.' (BT: 228). 84 
This can be read as a criticism of the second feature of Cartesianism 
that I highlighted: the search for an indubitable rational grounding, which 
Descartes claims to find in the self-certain subject. More generally, 
Heidegger thinks that this search for a grounding to our understanding of 
being characterises the whole of the Western philosophical tradition, from 
Plato and the theory of Forms to Nietzsche's will to power. In Being and 
Time he tries to reopen the question of being without answering it in a 
83 LudwigWittgenstein, On Certainty (tr.Dennis Paul and G.E.M.Anscombe) (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1969), p.559. 
84 I am indebted here to Charles Guignon for his ability to clarify some of Heidegger's remarks with 
reference to Wittgenstein. See Guignon ( 1983), p.177. 
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metaphysical way with reference to a ground, a procedure which, he thinks, 
ultimately leads to nihilism, to the forgetfulness of Being, as we have seen. 
4.1. 6. Our Primordial Guilt 
This leads on to Heidegger's characterisation of Dasein as 
primordially or ontologically 'guilty'. His point is that, to be the beings we 
are, Dasein, we are dependent on something utterly outside of our control, 
and something without grounds - namely, the shared 'world' into which we 
are thrown: 
Although [Dasein] has not laid [the basis of its potentiality-for-
Being] itself, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to 
it as a burden by Dasein's mood . 
... [Dasein] is never existent before its basis, but only from it 
and as this basis. Thus 'Being-a-basis' means never to have power 
over one's ownmost Being from the ground up (BT: 330). 
The world that we are beings in is not something that we have chosen, nor 
something we can control, nor is it something with transhistorical grounds 
that can somehow assure us that we are 'on the right track' or 'guaranteed of 
salvation' in some sense. 
4.2. Implications for Language 
The subject-object view of ourselves and our relationship to the world 
fosters a view of language to which, naturally, Heidegger· is as equally 
opposed as he is to the subject-object framework itself. According to this 
view, a clear distinction can be drawn between word and world, name and 
object, and language is grounded in some prior grasp of the nonsemantic 
significance of the contexts in which we find ourselves. This view is termed 
an 'instrumentalist'· view of language by Guignon, and 'language-as-
representation' by Edwards. 85 It seems to have been held, in one way or 
another, by Aristotle, Descartes, and Locke. On this view, the subject forms 
85 See James Edwards, The Authority of Language (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1990), 
p.60, and Guignon (1983), p.ll7. 
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beliefs about objects, which he then puts into words. Two important 
corollaries of this view of language are the idea that the assertion, with its 
subject-predicate structure, epitomises language in its most essential mode, 
and the idea that truth as correspondence between these assertions and 
objects is the most essential mode of truth. 
If we consider that Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of our 
being-in-the-world is designed to show, amongst other things, that we cannot 
draw a clear distinction between the 'inner experiences' that are in the mind, 
and objects in the external world, then it is not surprising that he comes to a 
similar view about language, viz: we cannot draw a clear distinction between 
word and world. For Heidegger, the idea of a nonsemantic encounter with the 
world is unintelligible, because there can be no world without language. 
This is the heart of his objection to the instrumentalist view of language 
adumbrated above. As he puts it: 'In no case is a Dasein, untouched and 
unseduced by this [everyday] way in which things have been interpreted, set 
before the open country of a 'world-in-itself', so that it just beholds what it 
encounters' (BT: 213). He tells us that the everyday way in which things 
have been interpreted, in language, is something from which there is 'never a 
possibility of extrication'. Elsewhere in Being and Time he makes a similar 
point: 
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over 
some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on 
it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the 
thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our 
understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets 
laid out by the interpretation (BT: 190-1 ). 
Heidegger's point is that we do not encounter such 'objects' as chairs, tables 
and houses and then, subsequently, give them names. Rather, in order for us 
to encounter them in the first place, understanding, and therefore language, 
has been presupposed: ' ... Language already hides in itself a developed way 
of conceiving' (BT: I 99). 
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This way of approaching language, which Heidegger first develops in 
Being and Time, finds more bountiful expression in his later works, and 1s 
one of the implications of the rich metaphor, 'Language is the house of 
Being' (B W: 217). In his An Introduction to Metaphysics he states this view 
very succinctly: 'Words and language are not wrappers in which things are 
packed for the intercourse of talking and writing. It is in words and language 
that things first come into being and are' (IM: 35). I shall be making more of 
the significance of Heidegger's account of language for responding to 
nihilism in the next chapter, for, as we shall see, it assumes greater 
prominence in his later works. 
4.1. 1. Summary 
What have we learnt from this reading of Being and Time as a critique 
of Cartesianism? Heidegger's later writings presume familiarity with Being 
and Time. As he puts it in the preface to the seventh German edition of that 
work, 'Yet the road [Being and Time] has taken remains even today a 
necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being' (BT: 
Preface). In no other place in his writings does Heidegger spell out with so 
much rigour and precision the question of Being, a rigour the Jack of which 
would turn the more poetic later writings into something far less powerful 
than they might have been. What I hope to have brought out in this short 
chapter is more of what Heidegger means by forgetfulness of Being, and 
therefore what he means by nihilism. I hope to have shown that the division 
of the world into subjects and objects is parasitic on a more primordial 
understanding of being within which we dwell, which cannot be demarcated 
neatly into subject and object, and is in no need of grounding. Understanding 
ourselves in this way, we are less likely to fall prey to the Nietzschean 
nihilist picture of us as fragmented subjects positing 'truths' and 'values' 
onto a chaos in order to constantly be enhancing our power over ourselves, 
one another, and the world. The burden of Heidegger's response to Nietzsche 
and nihilism revolves around developing this sense of ourselves as first and 
foremost given over to Being and receptive to the demands that Being makes 
upon us, rather than first and foremost centres of domineering will imposing 
ourselves on Being. To stress it once more: this shift begins in Being and 
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Time, in which the foundations are laid for the later work. As Zimmerman 
puts it in his article, 'A comparison of Nietzsche's overman and Heideggcr's 
authentic self': 
... the goal of Being and Time is not to construct a philosophical 
anthropology, or to depict what the human 'species' ought to make 
with itself. The goal is to disclose the meaning of Being as such, 
which 'is' beyond man's control, and which is in fact what determines 
the nature of each historical epoch. 86 
4.3. Is Being and Time Nihilistic or Pragmatic? 
Before moving on, however, I want briefly to deflect two charges 
often made about Being and Time: those which accuse it of being nihilistic, 
and those which accuse it of pragmatism. The nihilistic charge might run as 
follows: has Being and Time not left us in a worse position than the one we 
started with, by dismantling the traditional task of philosophy, namely the 
critique of doxa from the standpoint of episteme? lf, as Being and Time 
argues, our social practices, especially language, make possible an 
intelligible world in the first place, an understanding of being, against what 
might we measure this understanding to, so to speak, check its credentials, to 
insure that we are not wandering in the bleary half light of opinions, in a 
dark, damp cave? By emphasising truth as unconcealment over and above 
truth as correspondence, Heidegger seems to leave us with no criteria for 
assessing the disclosure of beings within which we find ourselves. Surely 
this is a form of nihilism. 
The pragmatist reading of Being and Time is not so much an 
accusation as a recommendation. It has become very popular, not least 
because its chief spokesman, Richard Rorty, writes in such a charming and 
accessible way. Basically, as is well known, Rorty finds within division one 
of Being and Time, as well as in Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
86 Michael Zimmerman, • A comparison of Nietzsche's overman and Heidegger's authentic selr 
Southern Journal of Philosophy XIV (1976 spring), p.228. 
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Investigations, the philosophical blueprint for the kind of character 
presumably he himself is, and which he most admires: the ironist. As Cooper 
puts it, in his article 'Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Humility', Rorty, 
congratulate(s) [Heidegger and Wittgenstein] on having finally 
scotched all pretensions to transcendental, universal criteria of truth 
or right~ on paving the way for a frank admission that justification and 
criticism can only be an 'ethnocentric', bootstrapping matter of 
appealing to the epistemic and political commitments of one's 
• 87 COI11111Unlty. 
Rorty' s hero, the iron ist, is someone who, 
has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she 
currently uses ... realizes that argument in her present vocabulary can 
neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts ... [and] does not think 
that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch 
with a power not herself. 88 
Whilst it is very clear how Rorty can discern such a person in the pages of 
Being and Time, it is clear that division two of that book, as well as much of 
Heidegger' s later writings, point away from such an interpretation, as we 
shall see- a point Rorty is, of course, well aware of, and explicitly criticises 
(see his essay 'Heidegger, Wittgenstein and the Reification of Language' 89). 
What both of these characterisations of Being and Time - as nihilistic 
and pragmatic - have in common is that they raise the rather tricky question 
of what 'court of appeal' there is left, if we accept the findings of division 
one of Being and Time. To put it another way, if truth as disclosure is more 
primordial that truth as correspondence, how are we to access the truth of 
87 David Cooper, 'Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Humility' Philosophy 72 ( 1997), p.l 09-10. 
88 Quoted in Anderson (1995), p.l 0 I. 
89 In Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
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disclosures? This seems like an impossible task, for if nothing else, Being 
and Time has abandoned any pretensions to a 'view from nowhere'. 
Heidegger's argument is that grounds, explanations, justifications, 
'courts of appeal' are inappropriate once one is attuned to the question of 
Being. Moreover, the need for such a court 1s a symptom of an overly 
narrow, constricted conception of Being, involving a division between the 
Good and Being which, in his view, has been entrenching itself in Western 
culture since the time of Plato. Once we have identified such a narrowing, 
we are in a position to attend to the understanding of being within which we 
'always already' dwell, and to open ourselves up to claims it makes on us. 
He spells this out in the 'Letter on Humanism': 
Only so far as man, ek-sisting into the truth of Being, belongs 
to Being can there come from Being itself the assignment of those 
directives that must become rule and law for man. Nomos is not only 
law but more originally the assignment contained in the dispensation 
of Being. Only the assignment is capable of dispatching man into 
Being. Only such dispatching is capable of supporting and obligating. 
Otherwise all law remains merely something fabricated by human 
reason. More essential than instituting rules is that man find the way 
to his abode in the truth of Being. This abode first yields the 
experience of something we can hold on to. The truth of Being offers a 
hold for all conduct (BW: 262, italics mine). 90 
So, our essential task in the face of nihilistic 'forgetfulness of Being' is to 
'find the way back to [man's] abode in the truth of Being.' The following 
chapter will be devoted to exploring what this far from transparent 
9
° Compare this with the following passage from the Taoist text which 1-leidegger collaborated on in an 
aborted translation attempt, the Tao Te Ching: 'When they lose their sense of awe I People turn to 
religion' (p.72, tr. Stephen Mitchell, (London: Kyle Cathie limited, 1996). Just as, for Heidegger, 
explicit discourse about a domain called 'ethics' only arises once Being has been forgotten, around the 
time of Plato, so for Lao-Tzu, religion, in the sense of an explicit codification of a particular way of life, 
only becomes necessary when people lose touch with the genuine source of religion, the 'Tao' or 
'Way'. See Reinhard May, Heidegger's Hidden Sources (London: Routledge, 1996) for more on the 
link between Heidegger and Eastem philosophy. 
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injunction might mean, and to noting some of its dangers. In so doing we 
shall be tracking Heidegger's transition from a concern with being to a 
concern with Being, as I distinguished these terms at the start of chapter 
three: from a concern with the 'clearing' to a concern more with the quasi-
divine ·source' of the 'clearing'. 
136 
Chapter Five: Heidegger 's Response to Nihilism: 
Authenticity, Art, Language and Thinking 
Introduction 
Thus far we have seen how, for Heidegger, the essence of nih,ilism is 
' 
'forgetfulness of Being'. This forgetfulness began around the time of Plato, 
and reaches its apotheosis with Nietzsche and his characterisation of 
nihilism in terms of values. Heidegger detects in such an approach an overly 
restrictive notion of Being, which is the product of an overly wilful, 
anthropocentric and hubristic view of man's position in the world. These 
attitudes have led to a 'technological' understanding of Being, in which 
Being is reduced to the status of a resource or 'standing reserve', enframed 
for human use. I have tried to show how Being and Time, with its attack on 
the subject-object distinction and the Cartesian emphasis on grounds, 
constitutes a powerful thrust against such nihilism. We now need to consider 
how this beginning is developed in Heidegger' s later thought. We have taken 
as our guiding thought Heidegger's insistence that man must find the way 
back to his abode in the truth of Being. Well: how does he do this? 
5.1. Overcoming Nihilism is itself Nihilistic: Nihilism issues from Being, not 
Man 
Right away we hit a problem here. Nihilism is upon us- what must we 
do? This question seems such an obvious response. However, in Heidegger's 
view this question is simply another symptom of the problem. All talk of 
'overcoming' nihilism is simply, in his view, another version of the very 
wilfulness and anthropocentricity that constitutes the essence of nihilism. As 
he puts it: 
To want to overcome nihilism - which is now thought in its essence-
and to overc.ome it would mean that man of himself advance against 
Being in its default. But who or what would be powerful enough to 
a·ttack Being itself, no matter with what perspective and with what 
intent, and to bring it under the sway of man? An overcoming of Being 
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itself not only can never be accomplished - the very attempt would 
revert to a desire to unhinge the essence of man. The hinge of that 
essence consists in the fact that Being itself, in whatever way, even as 
staying away, lays claim to the essence of man .... One could 
understand the impossibility of such a plan [to overcome Being]as if 
it were an absurd gesture of thought, which as such thinks on the 
basis of Being while wanting to launch an attack against Being (N4: 
223-4 ). 
This is from an essay called 'Nihilism and the history of Being'. He makes a 
similar point with reference to 'technology' in 'The Question Concerning 
Technology', writing, 'All attempts to reckon existing reality ... in terms of 
dec I ine and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely 
technological behaviour' (QCT: 48), and, 'The instrumental conception of 
technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relationship 
to technology" (BW: 313). The most important point that Heidegger makes 
about responding to nihilism is that, in a good and the most obvious sense, 
there is nothing we can do about it. It is our destiny to be under its sway: it 
is a 'destining' [Geschick] (BW: 329) which has issued from Being itself. 
Nihilism is not, pace Nietzsche, someth.ing that we have brought upon 
ourselves through our (Christian) commitment to telling the truth, and the 
science (especially Copernicus and Darwin) and philosophy (Kant and 
Nietzsche) this commitment has produced. It is not something that has arisen 
because Plato, Descartes and Nietzsche made successive mistakes about the 
nature of truth, locating it in correspondence (or, in Nietzsche's case, lack 
of correspondence) rather than in unconcealment. Rather, these scientists 
and philosophers have been responding to events in the history of Being, the 
latest of which is the epoch of nihilism and 'technology'. Heidegger is quite 
clear about this: 
Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how 
God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing 
of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in 
the destiny of Being. But for man it is ever a question of finding what 
is fitting in his essence that corresponds to such destiny; for in accord 
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with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being. 
Man is the shepherd of Being (BW: 234). 
We need to find 'what is fitting in [man's] essence that corresponds to [the 
destiny of Being]'. We need, to put it in the kind of language that Heidegger 
himself often uses, to listen to the voice of Being, to realise that nihilism 
comes from Being, that it is a way in which Being gives itself to us, for us to 
shepherd and guard. Nowhere is his anti-Nietzschean stance more 
pronounced, because for Nietzsche whether and how God and the gods come 
to presence is decided by man, albeit generally unconsciously, and by his 
need to secure for himself value and power. 
Part of Heidegger's point here is that the recuperation of a lost 
solidarity or primordial 'ethos' is not something that we can manufacture or 
wilfully bring about. Deep set forms of I ife cannot be engineered or 
contrived. What we can do, however, is to heed, amidst our 'technological' 
understanding of being, Being itself as the source of this understanding. We 
can, to use Hubert Dreyfus's nice phrase, 'disclose that we are disclosers' .91 
It is this aspect of Heidegger's writings on authenticity that survives into the 
later writings, and I shall now use this aspect to flesh out what it might 
mean to 'heed the voice of Being' and 'disclose that we are disclosers'. 
5.2. Authenticity, Anxiety, and Being: 'disclosing that we are disclosers' 
Heidegger writes, at the end of the lecture course An Introduction to 
Metaphysics: 
But where is the real nihilism at work? Where one clings to 
current beings and believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just 
as the beings that they are. But with this, one rejects the question of 
Being and treats Being as nothing (nihil), which in a certain way it 
even 'is,' insofar as it essentially unfolds. Merely to chase after 
beings in the midst of the oblivion of Being - that is nihilism. 
91 Hubert Dr·eyfus et al, Disclosing New Worlds: entrepeneurship, democratic action and the 
cultivation of solidarity (London: MIT press, 1999), p.l8. 
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Nihilism thus understood is the ground for the nihilism that Nietzsche 
exposed in the first book of The Will to Power. 
In contrast, to go expressly up to the limit of Nothing in the 
question about Being, and to take Nothing into the question of Being-
this is the first and only fruitful step toward the true overcoming of 
nihilism (IM: 217-8). 
Here we have a very succinct statement of disease and cure, what nihilism is, 
and how to respond to it. Wh i 1st Heidegger here uses language that, in the 
1945 essay 'Nihilism as determined by the history of Being', he repudiates, 
as we have just seen, nevertheless the overcoming involved is exactly the 
kind of response I have just outlined above, of awakening to Being and to 
the nature of the particular understanding of being within which one dwells. 
Let us examine this quotation in more detail. 'To chase after beings in the 
midst of the oblivion of Being' might be glossed as closing oneself off to 
other ways of disclosing the world, other ways in which Being could 
manifest itself, other ways of receiving Being. In my introduction to 
Heidegger in chapter three, I pointed out that, as time went on, Being came 
to mean more to him than simply 'understanding of being'. In fact, it came to 
mean almost the opposite of this - it came to designate the limits of our 
understanding of being, the fact that this or that particular understanding of 
being does not exhaust Being. He gestures towards this 'non-phenomenon' in 
various ways, for example calling it 'the mystery' in his essay 'On the 
Essence of Truth' (BW: 130). It becomes more and more important in his 
writings post-Being and Time, a shift which is first registered in this essay 
on truth, of 1930. 
This nihilism of 'chasing after beings in the midst of the oblivion of 
Being' is contrasted with going 'expressly up to the limit of Nothing in the 
question about Being'. What does this mean? One of the fundamental 
insights of Being and Time is that we are always disclosing the world 111 a 
particular way, always understanding beings in a particular way, and that 
this understanding is primarily practical, non-explicit. Indeed, successful 
everyday coping with the world necessitates that that very coping, that way 
of disclosing beings, becomes invisible. Life has to be lived, the show must 
140 
go on- the children need to be fed, the dog taken for a walk, and so on. But 
if this was all there was to our lives as human beings - successful coping, 
successful dealing with beings - then we would indeed be condemned to 
nihilism. However, this is obviously not all that there is to our lives. As 
Michael Inwood vividly puts it, 'The normal human condition is suspended 
somewhere between the angst-less insect and the angst-ridden angel. We 
need sometimes to ascend to angels to make sure that we do not become 
insects. ' 92 We make sure that we do not become insects by disclosing to 
ourselves that we are disclosers, by becoming increasingly aware of our role 
as disclosers of Being. This idea lies at the heart of Heidegger's conception 
of authenticity, and is sketched out by Dreyfus in Disclosing New Worlds. 93 
Becoming authentic, on this interpretation, involves becoming increasingly 
sensitive to the ways in which we disclose the world, the ways in which we 
understand being, the ways in which Being opens itself up to us. In so doing 
we become aware of the limits of that understanding, and thereby of the 
depth of Being. Here is where Heidegger first explicitly mentions what 
mean to designate by Being, in the essay on truth of 1930 mentioned above: 
The concealment of beings as a whole, untruth proper, is older than 
every openedness of this or that being. It is also older than letting-be 
itself, which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself 
towards concealing .... [the] mystery (the concealing of what it 
concealed) as such holds sway throughout man's Da-sein (BW: 129-
30). 
In his Nietzsche lectures Heidegger gives a very perspicuous account 
of what it means to disclose that one is disclosing being in this way and 
therefore not that way: 
That [philosophical] categories are silently expressed as claims in our 
o1·dinary thoughts and everyday comportment toward beings, that they 
are really never experienced, acknowledged, or even conceived as such 
92 Michaellnwood,c'Does the Nothing Noth?', in (A. O'Hear ed.), German philosophy since Kant 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.292. 
93 Dreyfus et al ( 1999), chapter one. 
141 
tacit claims by most men throughout their 'lives,' neither these nor 
other such reasons are sufficient grounds for thinking that that these 
categories are something indifferent, something construed by a 
philosophy that is supposedly 'far removed from life.' ... That there 
exists something like a diesel engine, for example, has its decisive and 
wholly sufficient ground 111 the fact that the categories of 
mechanically and technically useful 'nature' were once expressly and 
thoroughly thought out by philosophers (N4: 39). 
Authenticity, as I am interpreting it, means becoming more aware of the 
'claims' that particular ways of understanding being make on us. How does 
one do this? Well, by being 'held out into the nothing' in the experience of 
angst or anxiety. Heidegger memorably describes this experience (one 
cannot help but think that he was quite intimate with it) towards the end of 
division one of Being and Time, and then again in the 1929 lecture 'What is 
Metaphysics?': 
In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, 
in general, do entities within the world. The 'world' can offer nothing 
more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes 
away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in 
terms of the 'world' and the way that things have been publicly 
interpreted (BT: 232). 
In anxiety one becomes aware that one is understanding the world in a 
particular way, and that one could understand it in a different way. One 
thereby becomes alive to what Heidegger calls 'the mystery', the plenitude 
of Being, that is never exhausted by any particular understanding of being. 
He contrasts this with forgetfulness of Being thus: 
this bearing toward concealment [the fact that Dasein is 
disclosedness] conceals itself in the process, letting a forgetfu I ness of 
the mystery take precedence and disappearing in it. Certainly man 
takes his beari~gs constantly in his comportment towards be_ings; but 
for the most part he acquiesces in this or that being and its particular 
And: 
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openess. Man clings to what is readily available and controllable even 
where ultimate matters are concerned .... 
... to reside in what is readily available is intrinsically not to 
let the concealing of what is concealed hold sway (BW: 131 ). 
... we usually lose ourselves altogether among beings in a certain way. 
The more we turn toward beings in our preoccupations the less we let 
beings as a whole slip away as such and the more we turn away from 
the nothing. Just as surely do we hasten into the public superficies of 
existence (BW: 104). 
Ultimately, it is the extent to which a particular understanding of being is 
able to include or be transparent to Being, to the 'source' which grants 
particular world disclosures, which provides us with some form of measure 
of particular understandings of being. 
So, Heidegger's response to nihilism is to sensitize us to the fact that 
we are 'always already' moving about within a particular understanding of 
being, 'always already' disclosing the world in a particular way. This 
sensitivity is something that is made possible through an experience of 
anxiety, of 'the Nothing', the limits of meaning, of our primordial guilt, of 
the ungroundedness of any and all understandings of being. As we have seen, 
Heidegger wants more specifically to sensitize us to the particular 
understanding of being of our epoch, which he sees as a 'technological' one 
whereby Being is 'enframed' as so much 'standing reserve' on tap for human 
use. Through becoming more aware of the nature of our disclosing we are in 
a position to not be so enslaved by it, to be released from it to some extent, 
released to appreciate that there are other ways of disclosing being, and to 
thereby become attuned to the source of all disclosures, Being. 
It is important to realise that Being represents Heidegger's ultimate 
response to Nietzschean nihilism. Heidegger's central charge against 
Nietzsche is that his account of truth and of ethics is far too humanistic, 
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subjectivistic, 'Promethean' - that, to put it bluntly, it completely distorts 
the relationships between us, truth and ethics by characterising them as 
instruments of the will in the service of achieving more power. Heidegger's 
Being denotes a source - the source - of truth and 'ethos', a mysterious 
source which we can never fathom, still less control, and which we are 
beholden to, for the sense that we make in our lives. Julian Young, in 
Heidegger's Later Philosophy, describes 'Being' as the 'essentially 
'theological' ' matter of Heidegger's thinking, and says it is, 
... an object of something close to, or identical with, religious 
veneration .... If ... we think of Being as the god of an authentic 
('originary') theology ... if we think of it as, not the God of Christian 
dogma, but as, rather, 'the god of the poet', the 'unknown God' who, 
in Holderlin's poetry, approaches us in the sight of 'familiar' things, 
then Being, to be brief and blunt, is God. 94 
Brief and blunt as this point might be about something it is dangerous to be 
brief and blunt about, still, it conveys well the kind of connotations which 
Being carries for Heidegger, connotations it is crucial we hear if we are to 
understand his later philosophy, and how it opposes Nietzschean nihilism (as 
well as American pragmatism). It is for this reason that I quoted Coleridge at 
the start of chapter three, to evoke a sense of this dimension. I shall now 
further explicate the role of Being in responding to Nietzsche, with 
reference to art and the concept of 'earth', language and 'dif-ference', 
thinking and the 'fourfold'. 
5.3. Heidegger 's 'Anti-Humanism': Art, World and Earth - Being Further 
Developed 
Dreyfus, tn Disclosing New Worlds, distinguishes between two forms 
of disclosure, 'customary', and 'historical' .95 Customary disclosure is 
nihilistic in so far as it involves the forgetfulness of Being, and capitulation 
to the sway of what Heidegger terms, in Being and Time, 'the They' (BT: 
94 Julian Young, Heidegger 'sLater Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.22. 
95 Dreyfus et al ( 1999), p.16. 
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164). In customary disclosure one is unconscious of oneself as a discloser, 
unconscious of the particular way in which one is understanding being, and 
therefore oblivious to the depth of Being, the plenitude of other possible 
disclosures. Historical disclosure, on the other hand, involves awareness of 
oneself as a discloser, awareness of the particular way in which one is 
understanding being, and therefore awareness of the depth of Being. It 
thereby makes possible new ways of disclosing the world. One of the central 
ways in which new ways of disclosing the world come about, Heidegger 
argues in the mid-1930s, is through art. 
5.3.1. Art Sets Up a World 
What, then, is the nature of a work of art, in Heidegger's view? What 
he calls a 'great' work of art sets up a 'world' (in Heidegger's sense) that 
radiates authoritatively and thus gives measure to a people's lives. Thus art 
is a way in which we become aware of 'the world's worlding', of our 
understanding of being. Heidegger begins his attempt to demonstrate how 
this is the case with a now famous evocation of an encounter with Van 
Gogh's painting of a pair of shoes. The passage deserves quoting in full, for 
the force and economy with which it conveys the way in which a work of art 
'works': 
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the 
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged 
heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow 
trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the 
field swept by a raw wind. On the leather I ie the dampness and 
richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the 
field path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the 
earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-
refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is 
pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the 
wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling 
before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding 
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menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it is 
protected in the world of the peasant woman (BW: 159-60). 
Heidegger's Tolstoyan reverence for peasant life is fully in evidence in this 
marvellous passage. Leaving aside for the time being what Heidegger means 
by the 'earth', this passage evokes the understanding of being of the peasant 
woman, 'that presupposed and disregarded space of familiarity and 
recognition within which all the beings around us ... are for us', as Clark 
puts it: what it means for her to be. Work in the fields, walking home at 
close of day, fear of crop failure, joy at producing enough food to live for 
another year, child rearing, the omnipresence of death: all of these elements 
make up the world of the peasant woman, and are evoked by Van Gogh's 
painting. But, importantly, ' ... perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice 
all this about the shoes.' The woman who wears the shoes is herself unlikely 
to see them in this way. It is the artwork which 'lets us know what shoes are 
in truth .... This being [the pair of shoes] emerges into the unconcealment of 
its Being' (BW: 161). 
The second example that Heidegger gives of the way in which art 
helps us to recollect Being is very different to his first example. It is of a 
monumental work of art which would reside in an open public space, rather 
than in, say, an art gallery or in someone's home. The Greek temple makes 
the point even more clearly than the Van Gogh painting: 
It is the temple that first fits together and at the same time gathers 
around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and 
death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and 
decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-
governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this 
historical people. Only from it and in this expanse does the nation 
first return to itself for the fulfilment of its vocation (BW: 167). 
As Heidegger has argued in Being and Time, in our 'average everydayness', 
our 'world' remains yery miJch in ~he background, murky a!l~ <?bscure. Due 
to 'idle talk', 'curiosity' and 'ambiguity', we 'fall' (BT: 210-24), we lose 
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sight of the basic meanings that our lives and our world possesses, and of 
our role as disclosers of Being. This falling ultimately results in nihilism, as 
we have seen. Great art counters nihilism by restoring us to a more explicit 
awareness of these meanings. Importantly, such art does not create the world 
in the first place. This is something that has 'already happened unnoticed in 
language' (BW: 199) (a point to which I will return later). Rather, it brings 
it to conspicuousness. Heidegger is trying to capture the sense in which, in 
encountering a great work of art, we return to ordinary life as it were 
refreshed, better able to go on, with a stronger sense of the meanings that 
constitute our life, of what constitutes 'disaster and blessing, victory and 
disgrace, endurance and decline.' As Shelley puts it, in 'A Defence of 
Poetry': '[Poetry] purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which 
obscures from us the wonder of our being ... It creates anew the universe 
after it has been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions of 
blunted by familiarity.' 96 
5.3.2. What is Earth? 
This is only one aspect of what a great work of art does, though, 
according to Heidegger. Not only does it set up a world, it does so in such a 
manner that that world becomes authoritative for a people. He writes of the 
world 'glowing' in the work, and: 'To e-rect means: to open the right in the 
sense of a guiding measure, a form in which what is essential gives 
guidance' (BW: 169). For, in Heidegger's view, not only does the work of 
art set up a world, it sets it forth on what he calls the 'earth'. This is a rich 
96 P.B.Shelley, 'A Defence of Poetry', in Poems and Prose (ed.Timothy Webb) (London: Everyman, 
1995), p.276. In fact, Shelley's 'A Defence of Poetry' contains some remarkably 'Heideggerian' ideas, 
for instance: 'The cultivation of those sciences which have enlarged the limits of the empire of man 
over the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportionally circumscribed those of the 
internal world, and man, having enslaved the elements, remains himself a slave.' (p.272). I think it is 
fair to say that Heidegger seems to have experienced quite strongly the 'anxiety of influence' whereby 
one seeks to claim for oneself and one's ideas a more unique position than they in fact occupy, and 
therefore is sometimes inclined to see the recollecting of Being only in select places, such as in German 
poets and pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, and neglects to acknowledge or consider examples of it in 
Eastern thought, the Romantic tradition, or in the American tradition of'transcendentalism', for 
example. 
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term, which obviously cannot be paraphrased or cashed out in a more literal 
way. In its most obvious sense, it refers to the material out of which the 
work of art is constructed - stone, tones, language, whatever. However, what 
I want to focus on is the sense in which the 'earth' can be seen as a 
metaphor for a notion that becomes increasingly important in Heidegger's 
later work: that of mystery. This is the interpretation that Young privileges 
in his characteristically lucid Heidegger 's Philosophy of Art. 97 In 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' we find the following passage, which is key to 
understanding Heidegger's later philosophy, and the connotation of earth 
that I want to emphasise: 
There is much in being that man cannot master. There is but little that 
comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, what is mastered 
insecure. Beings are never of our making, or even merely our 
representations, as it might all too easily seem (BW: 178). 
This passage is of great import, for it sounds the keynote of Heidegger's 
response to Nietzschean nihilism, and sets the tenor for much of his later 
work. It is what we might call his 'anti-humanistic' or 'anti-Promethean' 
stance. The concept of earth in 'The Origin' is an attempt to register this 
stance. Having defined 'world' as, 'the paths ... with which all decision 
complies', he writes, 'Every decision, however, bases itself on something 
not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a 
decision' (BW: 180). What he means here is that to understand being in one 
way is necessarily not to understand it in another. Just as, in Robert Frost's 
famous poem, 'The Road Not Taken', the poet laments, 'Two roads diverged 
in a yellow wood, I And sorry I could not travel both I And be one traveller, 
long I stood' 98; so Heidegger insists on the finitude of our understanding, on 
how, because being is temporal, any understanding of it is partial, inexact -
such partiality and inexactness is a necessary condition of such 
understanding. That which is not mastered, the concealed and confusing, is 
one of the connotations of earth, and is what gives a world its gravitas, its 
97 Julian Young, Heidegger 's Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 200 I), p.38-
50. 
98 Robert Frost, Selected Poems (London: Penguin, 1973), p.77. 
148 
seriousness and authority. Thus we can see that what Heidegger here means 
by earth is similar to what I defined at the start of chapter three as Being. 
5. 3. 2.1. Earth and the Irreducibility of Works of Art 
'The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world' 
(BW: 174). In what sense, however, can Heidegger claim that, in setting up a 
world, a work of art sets it forth as mysterious, and thus as autho•·itative, by 
offsetting it against the earth? Heidegger, being Heidegger, hardly spells 
this out, but the answer lies, in my opinion, at the core of his later thinking, 
and links it up with crucial ideas from Being and Time. It centres around 
what we might call the irreducibility of great works of art. They cannot be 
'translated' or 'put in another way' without ceasing to be the things that 
they are. They cannot be cashed out into a series of propositions (Clark very 
illuminatingly gives the example of trying to make an index of 'Hamlet'! 99). 
As Schopenhauer puts it, 'We are entirely satisfied by the impression of a 
work of art only when it leaves behind something we cannot bring down to 
the distinctness of a concept' 100• Vattimo defines Heidegger' s concept of 
earth as like, 'a sort of nucleus that is never used up by interpretation and 
never exhausted by meanings' 101 • Young makes an illuminating comparison 
between Heidegger's 'earth' and the concept of the sublime in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century aesthetics, as that which is so vast and unlimited that 
it eludes conceptual comprehension. Along similar Jines, Dreyfus glosses the 
concept of 'earth' by stressing that great works of art cannot be rationalized 
as a representation of an underlying set of beliefs or values (of course, this 
does not hold for allegories, but, for this very reason, we might not consider 
them great art, as Schopenhaue1· did not). 
How does this link up with Being and Time? One of the central points 
of Being and Time, as we have seen, is that all of our understanding is based 
on a non-cognitive precondition, a precondition lost sight of by the Western 
philosophical tradition since Plato. Our explicit understanding relies on 
something that cannot be made explicit, reduced to a concept, namely: our 
99 Clark(2002), p.57-8. 
100 Schopenhauer (1969), vol./1, p.409. 
101 Quoted in Clark (2002), p.55. 
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understanding of being. Heidegger is quite explicit about this (if we can read 
through the 'Heideggerese'): 
... -the 'in-order-to', the 'for-the-sake-of', and the 'with-which' of an 
involvement - is such that they resist any sort of mathematical 
functionalization; nor are they merely something thought, first posited 
in an 'act of thinking.· They are rather relationships in which 
concernful circumspection as such already dwells (BT: 122, italics 
mine). 
This 'fore-having·, as Heidegger calls it, means that human beings and the 
objects we encounter are formed by cultural practices which cannot be 
objectified. Art becomes so important to Heidegger as his thinking 
progresses because it vividly demonstrates the non-intelligibility of the 
grounds of our intelligibility, a point made in a more abstract way in Being 
and Time. Through thinking about the inherent mysteriousness of works of 
art, we may be in a position to better appreciate the mysteriousness of 
everyday life, the mysterious fact that 'a world is worlding around us at all, 
that there are beings rather than nothing, that things are and we are in their 
midst, that we ourse I ves are'. 102 
5.3.2.2. The Strife of World and Earth 
A last point to be made about the art work is that the relationship 
between world and earth is not one of peaceful co-existence. Rather, as 
Heidegger puts it: 
The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-
opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as 
sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself 
and keep it ther·e .... 
... The earth cannot dispense with the open region of the world 
if it itself is to appear as earth in the liberated urge of its self-
102 Quoted in Richard Polt, Heidegger: an introduction (London: UCL press. 1999), p.l. 
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seclusion. The world in turn cannot soar out of the earth's sight if, as 
the governing breadth and path of all essential destiny, it is to ground 
itself on something decisive (BW: 174). 
What Heidegger is trying to convey here is something essential to his 
thought: the fragility of meaning, of any and all understandings of being. 
There is, he suggests in this passage, a constant tension between being and 
Being, between intelligibi I ity (world) and non-intell igibi I ity (earth). Because 
Being unfolds in time, meaning is always fragile, always implies the threat 
of meaninglessness, of 'the nothing'. The 'earth' is always striving to 
surmount the understandings within which we dwell, just as our 
understandings are always trying to surmount the earth. However, without 
the earth, there would be no meaning. The very insecurity of the earth is a 
condition for meaning in the first place. As we saw earlier, every decision 
depends on that which it cannot master in order to be a decision in the first 
place. And, without the world, the earth would not be able to show itself. 
To draw together the import of what I have written so far about 
Heidegger's account of art, I shall now briefly turn to the question of the 
origin of the work of art. As we have seen, Being and Time emphasises the 
pre-theoretical conditions of theory, our implicit understanding of being 
which makes possible explicit understanding. This emphasis is reflected in 
1-Ieidegger's later writings in his concern with articulating a more 
fundamental, pre-reflective non-appropriative relationship to being - a 
relationship which he discerns in traditional craftsmen, in peasants, and in 
art and poetry. What defines this relationship is a sense of responding to 
something greater than oneself, of letting something emerge into presence 
rather than wilfully bringing something about. This is how Heidegger 
understands the origin of the work of art. As is well known, not only to 
people who consider themselves to be artists (even PhD. philosophy students 
might get some inkling of this!), there is a sense in acts of artistic creativity 
of something already there waiting or struggling to be said. Obviously, this 
sense is paradoxical, insofar as how can something be said to be there 
already if it is waiting or struggling to be said? But this is the crucial point. 
This sense - which, as I have said, is not uncommon - only seems 
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paradoxical within a certain framework of understanding the world in terms 
of subjects and objects, language and thing - the very framework that 
Heidegger 's philosophical endeavour is designed to undermine. What this 
sense points to, crucially, is that the power of disclosure is not our own. As 
Michel Haar puts it, the artist 'can compose only what of itself gathers 
together and composes itself. Heidegger cites a letter written by Mozart in 
which he says, 'I seek notes that love one another' '. 103 David Loy, in his 
Nonduality: a study in comparative thinking, in chapter four on nondual 
thinking (which includes a section on Heidegger), gives many examples of 
artists avowing this sense of responding to something beyond them, of 
gathering together something that is in some sense already there. He refers 
to Mozart, Tschaikovsky, Brahms, Nietzsche, Milton, Blake, Lewis Carroll, 
George Eliot and Dickens amongst others. 104 
What is also operative 111 the origin of the work of art is a holism. 
Clark, to whose elucidations on this topic I am much indebted, quotes 
Rilke's account of the genesis of his 'Duino Elergies', in which a line comes 
to the poet- 'Who, if I cried out, among the hierarchy of angels would hear 
me?' - around which, over time, the rest of the poems gather. Again, this 
seems to plunge us into the dilemma of how the poem can be already there in 
some sense, if the poet has yet to write it. Clark writes: 
In that revelation the poet responds to something that comes from the 
outside. On the other hand (and this seems at first to imply a 
contradiction), neither is the tone something merely there already in 
the world and which the poet must subsequently translate into words. 
It resonates from out of the poet's listening to the language and it 
needs the act of the poet to sound out and be apprehensible .... Does 
the revelation come first or the words? The answer is that there is only 
a contradiction here on the surface, for linear thinking. The revelation 
of the world in the resonance of the ground tone and its coming to 
language for the poet are simultaneous or equi-primordial. It all takes 
103 Quoted in Clark (2002), p.49-50. 
104 David Loy, Nonduality: a study in comparative philosophy (New York: Humanity books, 1988), 
p.150-161. 
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place too holistically -too non-foundationally -to be disentangled in 
terms of any one element being the 'cause' and the other an 'effect' . 105 
This passage is extremely helpful for understanding the heart of Heidegger's 
work. Heidegger is trying to negotiate a middle way between the absolutism 
of Plato and the relativism of Nietzsche, trying to think Being without 
collapsing into the objective (Forms) or subjective (will to power) side of a 
relationship which is 'equiprimordial'. This is why 'Being-in-the-world' is 
written with hyphens throughout Being and Time, and 'stands for a unitary 
phenomenon' (BT: 78). The genuine task of a thinking which has not 
forgotten Being, then, is not to explain away Being with reference to beings, 
be they subjective or objective, but to meditate upon the equiprimordiality 
of our 'being-in-the-world'. 'The Origin of the Work of Art' constitutes a 
key moment in such reflection. 
5. 3. 2. 3. Summary 
What we have, then, in 'The Origin of the work of Art', is, in very 
broad outline, a way of responding to nihilism ('The Origin' was given as a 
lecture the year before Heidegger began lecturing on Nietzsche): through a 
work of art that sets forth a world against the earth, which gives it authority. 
However, just as we cannot will the overcoming of nihilism more generally, 
we can not wi II the arising of a great work of art. What we can do, however, 
is to prepare, to wait in an appropriate manner, about which I shall have 
more to say shortly. A part of such waiting is meditation on the form that a 
'saving power' (as he was later to call it) might take, and this is what 
Heidegger does in 'The Origin'. As he writes, at the end of the essay: 
Such reflection cannot force art and its coming-to-be. But this 
reflective knowledge is the preliminary and therefore indispensable 
preparation for the becoming of art. Only such knowledge prepares its 
space for art, their way for the creators, their location for the 
preservers (BW: 202). 
105 Quoted in Clark (2002), p.ll4. 
153 
now turn to Heidegger reflections on language to further explore 
Heidegger's response to nihilism, and his insistence on the equiprimordiality 
of man and world, language and thin g. 
5. 4. Language and 'Dif-ference' 
We have already encountered Heidegger's views on language in the 
discussion of Being and Time as an attack on the subject-object distinction 
prevalent in Descartes, underlying Nietzsche's account of nihilism, and 
ultimately indicating a 'forgetfulness of Being'. We saw how Heidegger 
attacks accounts of language that draw a sharp distinction between word and 
world, and picture language as the expression in words of a preverbal 
meaning. This picture of language portrays its function as primarily 
referential, and Heidegger thinks that such a view of language is another 
symptom of the 'forgetfulness of Being'. He writes, in 'The Way to 
Language', of how, 
the kinship of showing with what is shows ... is transformed into the 
conventional relationship between a sign and its signified .... From 
the Hellenistic (and Stoic) period onward, as the convention becomes 
sheer stipulation, the sign comes to be an instrument for designating; 
by means of such designation, representation is co-ordinated and 
directed from one object to another. Designation is no longer a 
showing in the sense that it lets something appear. The alteration of 
the sign- from that which shows to that which designates- is based 
on a transformation in the essence of truth (BW: 40 1-2). 
This transformation in the essence of truth is something I have explained 
earlier, in my account of the history of being. A central symptom of the 
'forgetfulness of Being' is to think of language in terms of designation 
rather than disclosure. (Roughly speaking, thinking of language primarily rn 
terms of designation is the view that Wittgenstein attributes to Augustine at 
the start of the Philosophical Investigations, and sets up as the object of his 
attack). 1 ~6 
106 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M.Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwells, 
1963), p.l-2. 
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As we have seen, for Heidegger language is essentially disclosive, it 
brings beings into being, and so in this sense is creative, meta-phorical in 
the original sense of that word as a 'bringing across'. Prior to a given way of 
speaking, the beings that are disclosed by this way of speaking did not 
possess being. This is how Heidegger puts it in 'On the Origin of the Work 
of Art': 
... language alone brings beings as beings into the open for the first 
time. Where there is no language, as in the Being of stone, plant and 
animal, there is also no openness of beings, and consequently no 
openness of nonbeing and of the empty. 
Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings 
beings to name and appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to 
their Being/rom out oftheir Being (BW: 198). 
To be thoroughly clear: Heidegger is not endorsing a form of idealism here, 
of the 'to be is to be perceived or referred to in language' variety. If human 
beings were to wiped from the face of the planet tomorrow, many things 
would still exist- stones, plants and animals amongst them, jugs and bridges 
too. And yet, they would not possess 'being', because there would be no 
language to bring them into 'being'. Heidegger calls this feature of 
language, whereby beings are brought into being, 'showing'. It is part of 
what is meant by his resonant and now famous phrase, 'language is the house 
of being'. Language possesses, for Heidegger, a transcendental status - it is 
what makes experience possible (which is why his position is sometimes 
referred to as 'linguistic Kantianism'). It is this aspect of language that he 
wants to draw our attention to, to get us to meditate upon and ultimately 
experience. He is trying, in his reflections on language, to use Merleau-
Ponty's lovely phrase, to oversee 'the birth of meaning'. 
However, his view of language creates a philosophical conundrum 
analogous to the one we encountered when discussing the origin of art. If, as 
1-leidegger is fond of quoting, 'Where word breaks off I No thing may be' 
(Stefa.n George), then how _can there be things in the. first placeo for words to 
disclose? To put it another way - if meaningful distinctions can only be 
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established by language, and language can only be based on meaningful 
distinctions, which comes first, which is more primordial, in Heidegger 
speak? Another way of stating the question is to put it in terms of 
Heidegger's thinking on the relationship between parts and wholes, things 
and worlds. As we have seen, for a thing to be, to possess meaning, it must 
be part of a larger whole that refers to possibilities of Dasein's being, it 
must possess a world. However, this world or meaningful whole is not 
something that exists independently of the parts that gain their meaning from 
their place in it- it is comprised of these parts, and thereby becomes greater 
than the sum of its parts. Thus, for Heidegger, thing and world are 
'equiprimo1·dial' - neither can be given more ontological weight than the 
other. For later Heidegger, it is through language that things and worlds are 
essentially disclosed. So, the question arises of how language is able to 
disclose things if there is not first a world in place, or of how language is 
able to disclose worlds if there are not already things disclosed to comprise 
such worlds. 
The 'answer' to this 'philosophical problem' lies right at the heart of 
Heidegger's meditations on language, and especially their anti-humanistic -
and therefore anti-nihilistic - element. My reflections on Heidegger's work 
here are influenced substantially by James Edwards, chapter two of his book 
The Authority of Language. Heidegger responds to this 'philosophical 
problem' by using various different ways of speaking, in his central essays 
on language. I shall focus, following Edwards, on the essay called 
'Language', which presents itself as a commentary on a poem by Trakl called 
'A Winter Evening'. Here he uses the word 'dif-ference', to try to intimate 
the transcendental condition for language, that on which language depends, 
which, crucially, we can say nothing about, and which must be prior to all 
human doing and making. This last point is the most crucial of all, for my 
argument. Here is what Heidegger writes about the dif-ference: 
The dif-ference is neither distinction nor relation. The dif-ference is, 
at most, dimension for world and thing .... The dif-ference is the 
dimension, insofar as it measures out, apportions, world and thing, 
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each to its own. Its allotment of them first opens up the separateness 
and toward ness of world and thing (PL T: 203 ). 
Edwards helpfully glosses what Heidegger might mean by 'dif-ference' by 
defining it as 'that unifying differentiation (or differentiating unification) 
that makes human life and thought possible' . 107 Again, we see Heidegger 
avoiding the two positions of locating the ol'igin of meaning on the objective 
(Plato) or subjective (Nietzsche) side of the subject-object divide, and trying 
to think it as the fusion of the two, a fusion he terms, in this essay, 'dif-
ference'. David Cooper explains his position well 111 'Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger and Humility': 
Either claim [that reality depends on our view of it, or vice versa] 
ignores the seamless character of the fusion between language and 
reality, responsibility for which cannot be doled out to each element 
in separation. Yet there is something that the world and language 
depend upon, namely that very fusion. Only where there is language is 
there world, and only where there is world is there language. Since, 
moreover, human beings are what they are - human - precisely in 
virtue of that fusion, of being the creatures enabling things to come to 
be in speech, human life is also dependent upon it. What they are thus 
dependent upon, finally, is not a fact or state of affairs within the 
world, for it is what makes a world possible. 108 
What we depend upon for the possibility of anything like a human life is 
language. But language in turn depends upon 'dif-ference', upon the fusion 
between language and reality which, because it makes a world possible in the 
first place, cannot then be explained in terms of the world (for example, 
through an evolutionary explanation of the kind that Nietzsche is so fond 
of). Here explanation (Leibniz's 'principle of sufficient reason') 'bottoms 
out' - further down or back than this it is not possible to go. In 'On the Way 
to Language' Heidegger makes this point thus, this time using the term 
'propriating' in a similar fashion to the way he uses 'dif-ference' in 
107 Edwards ( 1990), p.ll 0. 
108 David Cooper, 'Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Humility' Philosophy 72 1997, p.ll6-7. 
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'Language': 'What the propriating yields through the saying as never the 
effect of a cause, nor the consequence of a reason .... Propriating is not an 
outcome or a result of something else' (BW: 415). And: 
... the world's worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can 
it be fathomed through anything else. This impossibility does not lie 
in the inability of our human thinking to explain and fathom in this 
way. Rather, the inexplicable and unfathomable character of the 
world's worlding lies in this, that causes and grounds remain 
unsuitable for the world's worlding (PL T: 177). 
1-Jeidegger's point Js again similar to one Wittgenstein makes when he 
writes, 'What is spoken can only be explained in language and so in this 
sense language cannot be explained. Language must speak for itself' . 109 We 
can see here how Heidegger's reflections on the ungroundedness of language 
link up with his writings on guilt, in Being and Time, and with the history of 
Being, in which we have an account of the arising and dissolving of various 
epochs 'without why'. We can see here quite clearly the paradoxical nature 
of Heidegger's endeavour, and therefore one of the reasons that he can be 
difficult to understand: he is trying to do transcendental philosophy, to 
inquire into the conditions of possibility for experience, whilst at the same 
time insisting that those conditions cannot be represented, in the manner of 
Kant or Husser!, that they cannot be objectified. He spells out why this is in 
the following passage: 
We human beings, in order to be who we are, remain within the 
essence of language to which we have been granted entry. We can 
therefore never step outside it in order to look over it circumspectly 
from some alternative position. Because of this, we catch a glimpse of 
the essence of language only to the extent that we ourselves are 
envisaged by it, remanded by it. That we cannot know the essence of 
language - according to the traditional conception of knowledge, 
defined in terms of cognition and representation - is certainly not a 
defect; it is . rather the advantage by which we advance to an 
109 Quoted in Clark (2002), p.88. 
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exceptional realm, the realm in which we dwell as mortals, those who 
are needed for the speaking of language (BW: 423). 
For my purposes, the point that most needs emphasising concerning 
Heidegger's reflections on language and the 'dif-ference' is that they make it 
clear that language is not primarily a human creation, a tool of our devising, 
for ordering Being and putting it to use, exerting our power over it. This is 
one of the connotations of Heidegger's enigmatic phrase, 'Language speaks' 
(PL T: 207). In 'On the Way to Language' he is more explicit: 
However, in view of the well-joined structure of the saying, we dare 
not attribute showing either exclusively or definitely to human doing . 
... Even when showing is accomplished by means of our saying, such 
showing or referring is preceded by a thing's letting itself be shown 
(BW: 410). 
Our speaking is preceded by 'a thing's letting itself be shown.' This occurs 
due to the 'dif-ference'. The 'dif-ference' so to speak 'sends' us humans 
ways of unconceal ing: 'Every proper language, because it is allotted to 
human beings through the way-making movement of the saying, is sent, 
hence fateful'(BW: 422). This is what Edwards means by his phrase 'the 
authority of language'. As we have seen already, a central part of responding 
to nihilism is recognising that it is not we humans who have brought it 
about, that nihilism has been sent by Being or the 'dif-ference', and hence is 
our fate. 
What is most important, as far as Heidegger is concerned, is to 
experience 'dif-ference' in language, and he thinks that this is possible 
through poetry. Our task as human beings, our highest vocation, is to be 
'envisaged' and 'remanded' by language, to heed its call, to become, in the 
broadest sense of the word, poets, by opening ourselves to 'the unforeseen 
and uncontrolled pregnancy of things' . 110 We need to, as it were, stand at the 
edge of language, looking out of our house of being, onto the mystery, and to 
heed 'd.if-ference.' -This is why Heidegger's early emphasis on authenticity is 
110 Edwards (1990), p.l 08. 
------
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relevant in his later writings, for both the early authentic hero and the later 
'poet' need to have sufficient distance from the 'idle talk' of 'the They', 
sufficient awareness of their roles as disclosers, to perform their respective 
tasks. I shall now consider in more detai I what this might mean. Before 
doing so, however, I want briefly to flag up a concern about Heidegger's 
reflection on language, to which I shall return shortly (see 5.7.). 
There is a worrying side to the later Heidegger's reflections on 
language, and this is the potential loss of autonomy that is simultaneously 
what is so important to Heidegger about them, and which enables them to be 
used to argue against Nietzschean nihilism. On Heidegger's picture, our 
I ives are primarily I ives of obedient response to the speaking of language, 
not lives of self-conscious self-direction. Heidegger sees the danger of 
making human will the locus of the absolute, as Nietzsche does - but might 
he not be going too far in the opposite direction, and thereby laying us open 
to some equally disturbing possibilities'? This is the same question, albeit in 
slightly different guise, as the one I asked at the end of my discussion of 
Being and Time, concerning the dismantling in that book of the traditional, 
Platonic I Cartesian task of distinguishing doxa from episteme. To put it in 
terms of Heidegger's reflections on language, if there is no conceivable 
authority outside of 'dif-ference' and what it sends, how are we able to be 
anything more than the playthings of an inscrutable 'Being'. This seems a 
big price to pay for overcoming nihilism. 
5. 5. Meditative Thinking and the Fourfold 
So, ultimately Heidegger's response to Nietzsche's nihilism takes him 
into a consideration of the 'dif-ference', the very fusion of language and 
reality that makes a world possible. Heidegger' s later writings are attempts 
to exhibit and encourage such thinking in his readers. It is important to note, 
however, that this is not a purely theoretical exercise. This does not mean to 
say, of course, that the kind of thinking that Heidegger is advocating is of a 
practical or 'applied' kind, in which we come up with 'action plans' and 
'strategies' to 'implement' in response to nihilism. Rather, he questions the 
very distinction between theory and practice, asserting that the kind of 
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thinking he is concerned with 'comes to pass before this distinction' (BW: 
259), and suggests, 'Perhaps thinking, too, is just something like building a 
cabinet. At any rate, it is a craft, a 'handicraft' .... All the work of the hand 
is rooted in thinking' (BW: 380-1). 
What is the nature of this thinking that Heidegger advocates? The two 
most obvious places in which to search for an answer to this question are the 
Discourse on Thinking and What is Called Thinking?. In the former, an 
address given to the people of Heidegger's hometown, Messkirch, in 1955, 
Heidegger distinguishes between two types of thinking: 'calculative' and 
'meditative'. 'Calculative thinking' is the kind of thought which enframes 
things as 'standing reserve' for human use. It is the style of thought which 
Heidegger thinks has been dominant since the time of Plato, reached its 
apotheosis with Nietzsche, and manifests itself everyday in our 
'technological' society. Such thought is essentially nihilistic because it 
neglects to attend to Being in favour of beings, in favour of what can be 
manipulated, put to use. Heidegger argues in the address that such thinking 
is alien to man's essential nature, for man is essentially 'a thinking, that is, 
a meditating being' (DT: 47). What, then, 1s 'meditative thinking'? 
Heidegger gives various suggestions: it is 'thinking which contemplates the 
meaning which reigns in everything that is' (DT: 46), and is characterized by 
'releasement toward things' and 'openness to the mystery' (DT: 54-5). 
In What is Called Thinking?, having been told that 'The question 
['What is called thinking?'] cannot be settled, now or ever', and that 'To 
answer the question is to always keep asking', we find the following: 
Being struck by actuality is what we I ike to regard as constitutive of 
the actuality of the actual. However, in being struck by what is actual, 
man may be debarred precisely from what concerns and touches him -
touches him 111 the surely mysterious way of escaping by its 
withdrawal. The event of withdrawal could be what is most present 
throughout the present, and so infinitely exceed the actuality of 
everything actual (BW: 374). 
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Slightly later on he praises Socrates as a good example of somebody who 
was able to "think' this event of withdrawal: 'All through his life and right 
into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, 
this current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker 
of the West. This is why he wrote nothing' (BW: 382). Finally, in the 'Letter 
on Humanism' Heidegger writes, 'Thinking ... lets itself be claimed by Being 
so that it can say the truth of Being' (BW: 218). 
From these quotations we can begin to piece together what 
Heideggerian thinking might involve. It is thinking that becomes aware of 
the particular understanding of being within which it moves, and which 
makes it possible, but which is simultaneously aware of 'that which 
withdraws', the source of this and all other particular understandings of 
being. Such awareness fosters a releasement from the hold of one's 
particular understanding of being, and openness to its source, 'the mystery', 
Being. 
Useful as such a definition is, what is far more useful is to consider 
an example of such thinking. Heidegger himself provides such an example in 
his thinking about the 'fourfold'. It is of the utmost import, when reading 
Heidegger's later writings, and especially his strange meditations on the 
'fourfold', to be clear that he has abandoned traditional philosophical 
argumentation - having spent many years pursuing such argumentation with 
great depth and rigour - in favour of attempts to inculcate a certain 
sensibility, a sensibility which is profoundly at odds with the sensibility of 
our age. Having said this, Heidegger's 'song' of the fourfold is, to place it 
with in a recognisably philosophical framework, an attempt to trace the 
conditions of possibility for the emergence of beings. Thus his endeavour is 
sti II akin to the endeavour of Being and Time, only he undertakes it, twenty 
four years later, in a very different, much more poetic, way. He is trying to 
exhibit the 'worlding of the world.' 
So, what is the fourfold? This is undoubtedly as aspect of Heidegger's 
work that is most resistant to paraphrase, because of its poetic nature and 
intent, and therefore I shall quote at some length: 
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Mortals dwell in that they save the earth ... To save means to 
set something free into its own presencing .... 
Mortals receive the sky as sky. They leave to the sun and moon 
their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing 
and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day or day into 
harassed unrest. 
Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities. In 
hope they hold up to the divinities what is unhoped for. They wait for 
the intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their 
absence. They do not make their gods for themselves and do not 
worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune they wait for the weal 
that has been withdrawn. 
Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature - their 
being capable of death as death - into the use and practice of this 
capacity, so that there may be a good death (PL T: 148). 
What on earth is Heidegger up to here? I take these writings to be a kind of 
meditation on the conditions that make one's life possible, an 
acknowledgement of one's indebtedness to that which transcends one's own 
will and capacities. In Whal is Called Thinking? Heidegger, in one of his 
notorious etymologies, draws our attention to the common root of the words 
'think' and 'thank' in the old English 'thencan'. Regardless of the 
authenticity of this particular piece of philology, it leads into an important 
point about the nature of thinking as thanking, as gratitude for that which 
allows us to be human: 
In giving thanks, the heart gives thought to what it has and 
what it is. The heart, thus giving thought and thus being memory, 
gives itself in thought to that to which it is held. It thinks of itself as 
beholden, not in the sense of mere submission, but beholden because 
its devotion is held in listening. Original thanking is the thanks owed 
for being .... The things for which we owe thanks are not things we 
have from ourselves. They are given to us. We receive many gifts, of 
many kinds. But the highest and most lasting fit given to us is always 
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our essential nature, with which we are gifted in such a way that we 
are what we are only through it. That is why we owe thanks for this 
endowment, first and unceasingly (WCT: 141-2). 
Heidegger's meditation on the fourfold is a thanksgiving for the conditions 
that make our life possible, and, ultimately, a thanksgiving for the gift of 
our 'essential nature', which is to understand Being. Our essential nature is 
not our own achievement, it is something that is given to us, and the task of 
thinking is to acknowledge this. 
How is the fourfold an example of such thinking? Each of the four 
'folds' locates an essential precondition of a distinctively human life. Some 
are more self-explanatory than others. Thus, human life is lived on the earth, 
from the earth, and the food that it produces, both with and without our help. 
It is lived under the sky, in the light that comes from the sky, the warmth 
that comes from the sun, which helps things to grow. Moreover, the sky 
provides us with spiritual sustenance too (one thinks of the passage in War 
and Peace in which Prince Andrew Bolkonski, having nearly died on the 
field of battle, looks up at the sky, and thinks, 'How was it I did not see that 
lofty sky before? And how happy I am to have found it at last! Yes! All is 
vanity, all is falsehood, except that infinite sky' 111). The sky can also be said 
to symbolise our social practices and languages, which also illuminate the 
earth, in the light of which we live, and which are also, ultimately, as 
transient as suns and stars. The divinities are those forces or energies which 
make life worth living, which lend it meaning, and which shine with a 
radiance that requires no justification or explanation. They can be poems, 
works of philosophy, religions, political movements. It is important to 
realise that for a world to be a genuine world, in Heidegger's sense, it must 
be holy, it must have this dimension of the gods. Lastly, we are mortals, we 
are all living lives that are going to stop, lives that are lived out in time. 
Thus we are capable of dying rather than perishing, of being aware of 
ourselves as on the way to absence, as 'beings-towards-death' (BT: 296). 
111 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace (Ware: Wordsworth editions, 1993), p.217. 
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Thus, the 'good life' for Heidegger, the non-nihilistic life, is a life 
that is lived in acknowledgement of these four dimensions, an 
acknowledgement which can take all sorts of forms. He is concerned with 
fostering a certain sensibility or awareness, a reverence and care for the 
world around us. As Edwards puts it, the question 'Why is there something 
rather than nothing?' is not so much a question as something, 'embodied in a 
particular kind of comportment towards things (the lover's touch, the poet's 
breath on a word, the farmer's care of her land)' . 112 
Heidegger writes about building things that gather the fourfold, and 
gives as examples bridges and jugs: 
[The bridge] does not just connect banks that are already there. The 
banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream .... The 
bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream .... the bridge 
is ready for the sky's weather and its fickle nature. 
The bridge ... grants mortals their way, so that they may come 
and go from shore to shore. Bridges initiate in many different ways .... 
Always and ever differently the bridge initiates the lingering and 
hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may get to the other 
banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other side .... The bridge 
gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities - whether we 
explicitly think of, and visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in 
the figure of the saint on the bridge, or whether that divine presence is 
obstructed or even pushed wholly aside. 
The bridge gathers to itself 111 its own way earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals (BW: 354-5). 
This is an extraordinarily poetic passage, some of the force of which is lost 
by abridging it. In it Heidegger is gesturing towards a transformation in the 
way that we see the world. This passage, about a humble bridge, is no less 
than an account of how meaning comes to pass. The crucial word is 
'gathering'. Meaning is made possible through the construction of things 
which gather the Jour fold. We, as mortals, 'gather' meaning in this way. 
112 Edwards ( I 997), p. 192. 
165 
Crucially, we do not create meaning. However, neither is meaning there 
already, waiting for us to read it off. Thus, once again, we are sailing 
between the extremes of Nietzschean will to power and Platonic Forms. Both 
accounts of the 'birth of meaning' are right and wrong - the former 
overlooks reality's capacity to yield meaning to us, the latter over looks the 
role that we play in bringing meaning about, a role that unfolds in time. 
Meaning emerges through the establishment of nfeaningful connections, 
which is what the bridge does, in Heidegger's example. Thus, 'the banks 
emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream'. Of course, this does 
not mean that the banks did not exist before the bridge was built. Rather, 
they are rendered mean ingfu I, intelligible as banks, by the construction of 
the bridge. Heidegger is focusing our attention on the importance of the 
relationships. These relationships give rise to things, which then create 
further relationships, and so the unfolding of meaning goes on. A helpful 
analogy can be drawn with words, which arise in response to relationships 
between things, and then create further relationships in their turn. 
Our role in dwelling in the fourfold is to construct things that gather 
the fourfold. It would be to somewhat misunderstand Heidegger if we 
thought this meant that we must go and build a bridge or two. Rather, 
Heidegger's example of the bridge is his poetic and idiosyncratic way of 
pointing to what it might mean to be 'open to the mystery' and 'released 
towards things', to practice his path of thinking and dwelling. There is an 
important passage at the start of 'The Question Concerning Technology' 
which helps to make this point clearer. Heidegger is writing about 
Aristotle's four causes, and the way in which our understanding of being, 
and therewith of causality, has narrowed down these four causes to just one, 
the 'efficient cause'. He points out that the Greek word for cause is 'aition', 
and claims that this means 'that to which something else is indebted' or 'to 
occasion' (BW: 314, 316). He then clarifies the nature of the four causes 
through the example of a silver chalice: 
Silver is that out of which the silver chalice is made. As this matter 
(hyle), it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, 
i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that which it consists .... The sacred 
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vessel IS at the same time indebted to the aspect (eidos) of 
chalice ness .... 
But there remains yet a third something that is above all 
responsible for the sacrificial vessel. It is that which in advance 
confines the chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal. ... 
That which gives bounds, that which completes, in this sense is called 
in Greek telos ... 
Finally, there 1s a fourth participant in the responsibility for 
the finished vessel's lying before us ready for use, i.e., the silversmith 
(BW: 315). 
Here is another good example of Heidegger's ability to make our most 
commonplace ideas and assumptions seem problematic. His point here is to 
emphasize that what 'occasions' a silver chalice is not just a silversmith, but 
rather the silversmith's participation in and indebtedness to a process that 
constitutes the material out of which it is to be made, the template of a 
chalice, which he will be working to, and, most importantly (and therefore 
easiest to overlook), the place that a chalice occupies within the 'world', the 
social practices, of a particular people. Thus the silversmith is part of 
something much wider than him, which we are inclined to overlook. 
In the companion piece to 'Building Dwelling Thinking', 'The Thing', 
Heidegger writes: 
When and in what way do things appear as things? They do not appear 
by means of human making. But neither do they appear without the 
vigilance of mortals. The first step toward such vigilance is the step 
back from the thinking that merely represents - that is, explains - to 
the thinking that responds and recalls (PL T: 179). 
On the one hand, of course things like jugs and bridges appear because we 
make them. And yet, to think only in this manner is to forget Being and fall 
into nihilism, to forget that meaningful connections, whilst they might be 
establ.ished through 9ur vigilance, .are not establ.ished through _our will or 
creation. We respond to the appeal of Being, we are part of something much 
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wider than we might habitually tend to think. Our task is to become more 
conscious of this, to attend to it, to respond and recall rather than merely 
explain, and, through so doing, to build things that exemplify such thinking. 
As Dreyfus puts it, certain things 'can focus practices and collect people 
around them. Such things focus like local, temporary works of art in giving 
meaning to human activities ... they produce a moment of stillness and 
harmony' 11 J. A thing, in Heidegger's sense, becomes a kind of sacrament. 
Encountering the gathering force of the thing allows us to take stock, to 
recollect who we are (in a manner analogous to the great work of art), to 
remember the light within which we live our lives, and to give thanks for it. 
As Edwards puts it: 
... attention to the clearing restores to us something of the religious 
person's sense of being sheltered by the fully present and perfect 
realm of the 'true world' .... Attention to the clearing ... returns one ... 
to a sense of one's smallness before the ultimate conditions of one's 
own self~appearance. 114 
Later Heidegger suggests how even the humblest things can help us pay 
attention to the clearing, and thereby guard us against the nihilistic 
tendency, proclaimed by Nietzsche and manifested in 'technology', to 
instantiate the will as the ultimate condition of whatever there is, and to 
think that we can control Being. 
5. 6. Heidegger 's Response to Nihilism: a summary 
We have considered in these three chapters the way in which 
Heidegger responds to Nietzsche and to nihilism. I began by explaining 
Heidegger's opposition to the very terms within which Nietzsche the frames 
the issue of nihilism: those of values. This is linked, in Heidegger's view, to 
the neglect of the 'question of Being', a neglect that has been becoming 
more and more entrenched in Western culture since the time of Plato and his 
theory of Forms, in which Heidegger detects an implicit instrumental 
mIn Guignon (ed.) (1993), p.316. 
114 Edwards ( 1997), p.192. 
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conception of thinking, that becomes explicit in Nietzsche's doctrine of the 
will to power and the age of 'technology'. Thus our technological society is 
a manifestation of nihilism, of the forgetfulness of Being. 
Heidegger's attempts to respond (though not 'overcome') nihilism 
underlies much of his thinking. In chapter four l showed how Being and 
Time, with its critique of Cartesianism, the subject-object distinction and the 
search of grounds, forms an essential- albeit inexplicit- part of Heidegger's 
response to nihilism, for the features of Nietzsche's thought that he attacks 
can be seen to have their roots in Descartes. Central also is the realisation 
that nihilism is not something that we humans have brought down upon 
ourselves: that it has been 'sent' us by Being as our 'destiny', and thus 
cannot be overcome through Promethean acts of vigorous willing. His 
writings on authenticity, art, language, the nature of thinking and the 
fourfold all address the necessity of becoming aware of our responsiveness 
to Being, to a measure beyond all human making and doing. This entails 
becoming more aware of the understanding of being within which we move, 
becoming aware that our understanding being is just one particular 
understanding of being, and therewith becoming more attuned to Being, the 
source of all particular understandings of being, and the object of quasi-
religious reverence which constitutes the heart of Heidegger's mature 
philosophy. 
Of course, Heidegger's 'critique' of Nietzsche is not, as it were, a 
'knock out blow'! The question, 'Well, who is right, Nietzsche or 
Heidegger?' belongs only in the mouth of somebody who does not 
understand the nature of philosophy. As Heidegger himself puts it: 
Plato's thinking is no more perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's 
philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy 
has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a 
philosophy is the way that it is. It is not for us to prefer one to the 
other (B W: 433). 
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Nevertheless, Heidegger's philosophy constitutes an illuminating response to 
Nietzsche and nihilism, which has been th_e contention of the last three 
chapters. Heidegger writes, at the start of 'The End of Philosophy and The 
Task of Thinking', 'If the answer could be given it would consist in a 
transformation of thinking, not in a propositional statement about a matter at 
stake' (BW: 431 ). This is what his response to Nietzsche essentially is: 'a 
transformation of thinking'. It is not primarily a criticism of certain 
arguments in Nietzsche's philosophy so much as a refusal to think in that 
way and an attempt to exhibit a new kind of thinking, begun in Being and 
Time and continuing through to the later essays on art, language, building, 
dwelling, thinking and the fourfold. 
5. 7. Criticisms of Heidegger 
So, is that it? Can we all live happily ever after now, safe in the 
knowledge that Heidegger has 'saved' us from the terrifying abysses of 
Nietzsche's nihilism? Again, to pose the question in this way is to 
misunderstand the nature of philosophy. To put it in Heideggerian terms, we 
might say that we have begun to make a pathway towards a field the 
cultivation of which may move us out of the vicinity of nihilism and the 
'forgetfulness of Being', if Being itself so decrees! And yet, there is much to 
cause us disquiet in Heidegger's pathways, even if we leave aside his 
escapade of 1933. It is to these disquieting aspects of his philosophy that I 
now turn, and which raise the question of the adequacy of Heidegger's 
response to the threat that Nietzsche's nihilism presents to ethics and 
politics as we know them, a threat which became frighteningly real in 
Heidegger's country in his own lifetime. 
5. 7.1. Passive Subjection to the History of Being 
When discussing his views on language, I pointed out that, what is so 
crucial about 'dif-ference', the transcendental condition for language, is that 
it is not something 'all too human', something we 'create' or 'posit'. Thus 
the very thing that grants us the possibil.ity_of being who we are, being 
human, is not itself something human. Rather, it is something that we 
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respond to. that grants us particular ways of conceiving ourselves and the 
world. It is our passivity in relation to 'dif-ference' that makes it so crucial 
in counteracting Nietzschean nihilism and value-thinking. And yet, it is this 
very passivity which must give us cause for alarm. Edwards makes this point 
well in The Authority of Language, when he writes: 
Heidegger's attack on the Enlightenment picture of the self, an attack 
founded in the radical experience of language as the primordially 
speaking Logos, threatens the moral and political heritage of the 
Western democracies. If language is made luminous and sovereign 111 
this way, there seems to be nothing to protect us from the power of 
those who speak with its voice. We and our institutions are delivered 
over to what Heidegger portentuously calls our Destiny. Such quasi-
religious rhetoric is disturbing, since it encourages in us both 
passivity and a yearning for eschatological transformation, the classic 
conditions for the rise of totalitarian moral and political structures. 
The threat of philosophical nihilism has been replaced by the threat of 
a kind of linguistic fascism, which elevates the Logos to the status of 
agod.IIS 
Later Heidegger replaces the Enlightenment ideal of self-direction and self-
autonomy - an ideal central to Kant, Nietzsche and early Heidegger - with 
submission to the historical sendings of Being. How can we guarantee that 
the contents of these sendings are going to be something it is right to submit 
to? Heidegger does not tackle this question, but this is because, I presume, 
he would reject it, insisting that 'rightness' is itself something sent by, and 
henct: subordinate to, Being, a point which, as we shall see, Emmanuel 
Levinas takes issue with him. 
Here 1s another way of putting the same thing. By aiming to think 
outside the subject-object distinction, and by arguing that it is our social 
practices, especially language, that make it possible for there to be a world 
in the first place, Heidegger has taken away the possibility of justifying any 
particular understanding of being, for justification can only take place 
115 Edwards ( 1990), p.2-3. 
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within a particular understanding of being. He was well aware of this when 
writing Being and Time, and the notion of authenticity is partly an attempt to 
offer some way of making a normative distinction between different 
understandings of being. However, the notion of authenticity advanced in 
Being and Time is so formal that it is very difficult to apply it illuminatingly 
to 'ontic' affairs, to make real life moral distinctions. In the later writings, 
111 which explicit talk of authenticity drops away, the ungroundedness of any 
understanding of being is now affirmed as the essential feature of the 'play' 
of the history of being. Heidegger writes: 
The destiny of Being: that is a child playing, playing a board 
game ... The destiny of Being: a child which plays .... 
The play is without 'why.' It plays for the while it plays. There 
remains only the play: the highest and deepest .... 
Nothing is without ground. Being and ground: the same. Being 
as grounding has no ground, but plays as the abyss that game which as 
destiny plays up to us Being and ground. 
The question remains, whether and how, hearing the movements 
of this play, we play along with and join in the play (PR: 188). 
It becomes man's task to attune himself to the unconcealing and concealing 
of Being as it plays itself out through the epochs. Not to do so is to lapse 
into the hubristic, wilful nihilism that Nietzsche epitomises. But doesn't this 
open us up to potentially disastrous consequences, if Being sends us fascism, 
say, or global capitalism? How are we to judge whether something is sent by 
Being or not? By seeking Heidegger's advice? But he is no longer around, 
and does not seem to have been especially good at making such judgements 
anyway ( 1933). He gives us no criteria by which to discern - by which he 
claims to have discerned - what constitutes the fundamental attunement and 
understanding of being of an epoch. Iris Murdoch writes of Heidegger's 
history of Being that it represents a new form of 'determinism', which 
satisfies 'a deep human wish: to give up, to get rid of freedom, 
responsibility, remorse, all sorts of personal individual unease, and 
surrender to fate and the relief of 'it coul.d not have been otherwise' ' 116 
116 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin, 1992), p.l90. 
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am inclined to agree. There is something frightening about this surrender to 
Being, especially since Heideggerian Being seems to be 'beyond good and 
evil'. 
Before leaving this point, l want simply to quote two other critics of 
Heidegger who have made the same point, in slightly different ways. Richard 
Cohen, in his introduction to one of Levinas's books, writes: 
If humanity is trapped in the history of being, then history, not 
universal standards of truth or morality, rules human destiny. Does not 
Heidegger's ontology not reduce to yet another pompous philosophy -
like Hegel's, Marx's, or Spencer's - groveling at the feet of success, 
beholden to history's victors at the expense of the vanquished, now 
couched in the mysterious name of the 'truth of being'? ... Because he 
rejects verifiable epistemological standards as mere metaphysics, mere 
wilful occlusion of being, Heidegger necessarily ends up with a 
mystified and oracular presentation of the 'voice of being.' ... 
Humanity's freedom is sacrificed on the altar of historical being (HO: 
xxii-i ii). 
And Ernst Cassirer, neo-Kantian and famous opponent of Heidegger at Davos 
in 1929, writes: 
A theory that sees in the 'geworfenheit' (thrown ness) of man one of 
his principal characters [has] given up all hope of an active share in 
the construction and reconstruction of man's cultural life. Such a 
philosophy renounces its own fundamental theoretical and ethical 
ideals. It can be used, then, as a pliable instrument in the hands of 
political leaders (HO: xxi i). 
And so it was. 
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5. 7. 2. Injustice in the Primordial 'Ethos' 
A second reason for disquiet concerns the endorsement in Heidegger's 
philosophy of a primordial 'ethos', which he finds in the ancient Greek city 
states, an 'ethos' which has gradually been destroyed by the forgetfulness of 
Being, the onset of objectifying modes of thought, culminating in the 
Enlightenment project and the search for rational groundings. But what 
about those in the lower echelons of such societies? Wh i 1st everyone knew 
their place in such stratified, teleological societies, and was bound together 
by an unspoken 'ethos' that nobody felt the need to justify or provide with 
rational foundations, can such societies be held up as ideals which we should 
want to return to? (This is a criticism that can be levelled at Macintyre's 
After Virtue, as well). As John Caputo puts it: 
If there is something to object to in the notion of autonomous reason, 
there is at least as much to object to 111 hierarchizing human worth in 
terms of gold, silver, and brass, or of occurrences along a divided 
line, or of freeman and slave, believer and infidel, and the rest of that 
intolerant, intolerable world. 
The lesson that we Jearn from the ancient city and its 
metaphysics is that deep solidarity can only be achieved on a limited 
scale, and that, wherever it is found, it has drawn a line around itself 
and become exclusionary. 117 
It might be pointed out that Heidegget· does write, from time to time, about 
justice (see, for instance, EGT, p.40), but when doing so he removes justice 
from the social and political arena and treats it as a matter of letting things 
be what they are, of giving them their due. I do not, therefore, consider this 
an adequate reposte to this charge. 
5. 7. 3. The Great Divide: On tic and Ontological 
Thirdly, there is the question of the extent to which Heidegger's 
upholding. of an ontic-ontological. schism isolates his philosophy from the 
117 John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p.255. 
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messy contingencies of everyday, from ethics, and from politics. This 
distinction is made in Being and Time (see, e.g., p.31 ), which is concerned 
with elucidating formal structures of possibility rather than providing 
criteria for making normative distinctions between the contents of such 
structures. Thus Being and Time is explicitly 'extramoral' in its intentions. 
Despite the attempts of people like Julian Young to find within it 'a morality 
of respect for all, together with active benevolence where possible and 
appropriate' 118, it is quite clear that Heidegger's intentions are 'ontological' 
rather than 'on tic'. Thus the book includes sections on gu i It and 
authenticity, but Heidegger firmly distinguishes his ontological analyses 
from ontic discussions of guilt and authenticity- what one should feel guilty 
about, whether one should be authentic - and insists that he is concerned 
with the formal structures of possibility, not the messy actualities of 
everyday life. Leave them to the novelist (like Tolstoy, from whose The 
Death of Ivan 11/yich one can learn a lot more about death than from chapter 
one of division two of Being and Time). But I think we have here, in the iron 
barriet· that Heidegger drives between the ontic and the ontological, the roots 
of the lack of genuine ethical concern in Heidegger's thinking. 
It is sometimes said that in Heidegger's later writings he abandons the 
formalism of the ontic-ontological structure. Whilst he no longer uses this 
particula1· vocabulary, a similar kind of distinction becomes, in some ways, 
even more pronounced. Consider the following two remarks from his later 
writings: 
On all sides we hear talk about the housing shortage, and with 
good reason. Nor is there just talk; there is action too. We try to fill 
the need by providing houses, by promoting the building of houses, 
planning the whole architectural enterprise. However hard and bitter, 
however hampering and threatening the lack of houses remains, the 
proper plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The 
proper plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with 
their destruction, older than the increase of the earth's population and 
118 Julian Young, Heidegger. Philosophy, Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p.I06. 
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the condition of the industrial workers. The proper dwelling pI ight I ies 
in this, that mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that 
they must ever learn to dwell. What if man's homelessness consisted 
in this, that man still does not even think of the proper plight of 
dwelling as the plight? (BW: 363). 
Compared to [a critical encounter with being], world wars rematn 
superficial (Pa: 321 ). 
The first passage is a powerful piece of writing, and one could, of course, 
excuse Heidegger's disparagement of the housing crisis that occurred after 
World War II (the above passage was delivered in a lecture in 1951) as 
trivial compared to the more important task of learning to dwell, on the 
grounds of it being simply a powerful and provocative piece of rhetoric 
designed to incite discussion, and to indicate the nature of the role that 
philosophy can play in such issues, i.e. not a practical one. Perhaps 
Heidegger is simply implying that refined common sense can solve the 
housing shortage - what you need philosophy for is to reflect on the nature 
of what it means to dwell. Similarly, his dismissal of world wars as 
'superficial' compared to a critical encounter with Being can be seen as an 
instance of hyperbole designed to shock readers into considering the role 
that the (largely unnoticed) ways in which things are disclosed to us plays in 
determining how we act, whether we fight and who we fight, and so on. And 
yet, one cannot help but feel uneasy about the strength of the distinction that 
Heidegger draws between the housing crisis and the nature of dwelling, 
world wars and a critical encounter with Being, as though the two issues 
were completely unconnected, permitting Heidegger, the philosopher, to 
reflect upon the more 'primordial' of the two issues- the nature of dwelling 
or an encounter with Being - while the government, say, gets on with 
building more houses and training its troops. We see here the antithesis of 
Heidegger's earlier, Platonic style ambition to play the philosopher-king at 
the court of Hitler. There seems to be a strengthening of Heidegger's earlier 
'ontic-ontological split' in this stark distinction between these issues, a 
distinction more and more pronounced in the later Heidegger as the 
philosopher of Being becomes more and more 'Being oriented', less and less 
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'Dasein' oriented. This comes across 111 the Spiegel interview he gave in 
1966, published after his death: 
Spiegel: ... We politicians, semi-politicians, journalists, etc., we 
constantly have to make decisions of one kind or another. We must try 
to adapt to the system we live in, we must attempt to change it, must 
look for the small opportunity of reform and the still smaller one of 
revolution. We expect help from the philosopher, if only indirect help, 
help in a roundabout way. And now we hear: l cannot help you. 
H: And I cannot. ... 
Philosophy wi II not be able to effect an immediate 
transformation of the present condition of the world. This is not only 
true of philosophy but of all merely human thought and endeavour. 
Only a god can save us. 119 
Caputo, commenting on this, writes: 
Heidegger leaves the thinker mute in the face of the ethicopolitical. 
He cuts short the reach of the deconstruction of metaphysics; he never 
exploits its ethicopolitical cutting edge. He has isolated thinking from 
the agora and driven it up into the mountains .... He does not point out 
that the sociological equivalent of the destruction of the history of 
ontology is the critique of political systems. That is what his own 
notion of ethos commits him to, but he never delivers, whereas it 
never entered the head of Parmenides or Eckhart that their lofty work 
of thought was in the slightest way incongruous with their 
situatedness in the polis. 120 
Caputo makes an excellent point here. Heidegger's later thinking lacks a 
social and political dimension, a lack which can be traced to the antic-
ontological distinction operating throughout his thought. Moreover, this 
thinking lacks an ethical dimension. Heidegger's overriding concern, early 
and late, with structures of possibility, allows his philosophy to soar loftily 
119 Quoted in Caputo ( 1987), p.195, 248. 
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above the grubby antic history of human beings, living, loving, fighting and 
dying to consider the more ideal history of Being, the background 
disclosures through which we live, love, fight and die. Again, this is a point 
Caputo makes: 
[The world of Heidegger's thinking] is a world in which a wholly 
other kind of responsiveness and responsibility have been silenced, a 
responsibility to those who live and die, to those who are embodied, 
who suffer or are in pain, who grow old and infirm, above all, to 
innocent victims. The thinker leaves no room at all for the victim in 
the history of Being's self-showing. 121 
Rorty, in a similar vein, detects in the later Heidegger a retreat from the 
messiness and riskiness of ordinary life so insisted upon in Being and Time, 
into his own version of metaphysics, his own escape from contingency and 
insecurity: 
On my reading, Heidegger is still doing the same sort of thing which 
Plato tried to do when he created a supersensible world from which to 
look down on Athens, or Augustine when he imagined a City of God 
from which to look down on the Dark Ages. He is opting out of the 
struggles of his fellow humans by making his mind its own place, his 
own story the only one that counts, making himself the redeemer of 
his time precisely through his abstention from action. The 
Heideggerian counterpart of Plato's world of appearance seen from 
above is the West seen beyond metaphysics. Whereas Plato looks 
down, Heidegger looks back. But both are hoping to distance 
themselves from, cleanse themselves of, what they are looking at. 122 
There is a sense here in which later Heidegger, with his own version of the 
decline of the West, and the 'technologization' of Being, is betraying the 
121 Quoted in Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press, 
1992), p.J34. 
122 Rorty ( 1991 ), p. 70. 
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very thing that gave his philosophy so much power in the first place: its 
close attention to the 'things themselves', without reference to grand 
theories or metanarratives that might encourage us to attend to certain 
phenomena inappropriately because we are armed 111 advance with 
preconceived notions about the way in which they must show up - as 
'standing reserve', for instance. 
How damaging are these charges of neglect of the political and ethical 
111 relation to Nietzsche's nihilism? To what extent is Nietzsche's nihilism a 
political and social threat? To a large extent, as I have shown in chapter two, 
an extent that calls, in my view, for a more explicitly ethical response than 
the one provided by Heidegger. If, as R.G.Collingwood claimed, 'The chief 
business of twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century 
history' 123, there are substantial grounds upon which to question the 
adequacy of the response to nihilism of the one time Nazi who maintained a 
resolute public silence after World War II. Can the 'deep history' of nihilism 
be severed from the two world wars of the twentieth century? 
We find in Nietzsche no such severence. He was very clear about the 
potential reverberations of nihilism in the ethical and political spheres. In 
'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life' he expresses the 
following fear: 
If ... the doctrines of sovereign becoming, of the fluidity of all 
concepts, types and species, of the lack of any cardinal distinction 
between man and animal- doctrines which I consider true but deadly-
are thrust upon the people for another generation with the rage for 
instruction that has now become normal, no one should be surprised if 
the people perishes of petty egoism, ossification and greed, falls apart 
and ceases to be a people; in its place systems of individualist egoism, 
brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation of non-brothers, and 
similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity may perhaps appear in the 
arena of the future (UM 2 9 I p.ll3). 
123 Glover (200 I), p. I. 
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In a similar, though far more apocalyptic, not to say manic, vein, Nietzsche 
wrote in his last book, Ecce Homo: 'For when truth steps into battle with the 
lie of millennia we shall have convulsions, an earthquake spasm, a 
transposition of valley and mountain such as has never been dreamed of. 
there will be wars such as there have never yet been on earth' (EH 15 I I 
p.97). What Nietzsche has in mind in both of these quotations is that, as 
faith in God wanes, and faith in the old ascetic/Platonic way in which 
Western man has secured meaning for himself in the face of suffering, a 
vacuum will open up within which great conflict and change, on a moral and 
political level, will take place. From first to last, what concerned Nietzsche 
were the implications for morality of a collective loss of faith in God. He 
writes, in The Gay Science: ' ... how much must collapse now that [the 
Christian] faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, 
propped up by it, grown into it; for example, the whole of Christian 
morality'. He anticipates a, ' ... long plenitude and sequences of breakdown, 
destruction, ruin and cataclysm' (GS: 343 I p.279). There is throughout his 
writings a sense of imminent collapse and impending disaster on a moral and 
political level. 
Reading Nietzsche at the start of the twenty first century, we can bear 
witness to his prophecies. The 'brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation 
of non-brothers' has come to pass, in Nietzsche's and Heidegger's own 
country as well as elsewhere. There have been 'wars such as there have 
never yet been on earth'. And yet, there is nothing within Nietzsche that 
offers the potential for countering such events. On the contrary, elements of 
his philosophy can be seen to be complicit in them. By describing life as 
'essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, 
suppression, severity, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and, at 
the least and mildest, exploitation', in his doctrine of the will to power, and 
by placing so much emphasis on creating one's own values in accord with 
this doctrine, it can be seen how easily Nietzsche's ideas lent themselves to 
brotherhoods intent on rapaciously exploiting non-brothers. As J.P.Stern 
puts it, in A Study of Nietzsche: 
180 
He seems unaware that he is giving us nothing to distinguish the 
fanaticism that goes with bad faith from his own belief in the 
unconditioned value of self-realization and self-becoming - that is, 
from his own belief in the Superman .... We can hardly forget that the 
solemn avowal of this reduplicated self - the pathos of personal 
authenticity - was the chief tenet of fascism and national socialism. 
No man came closer to the full realization of self-created 'values' 
than A.Hitler. it cannot be denied that the intellectual 
superstructure of [Italian and French fascists and German national 
socialists] is as inconceivable without Nietzsche as these movements 
are without their superstructur·e. 124 
Similarly, Simon May, in a passage quoted in chapter two, points out that, 
'the supreme value he places on individual life-enhancement and self-
legislation leaves room for, and in some cases explicitly justifies, unfettered 
brutality'. Moreover, as we have seen, central to Nietzsche's philosophy is 
the view that, 'The goal of humanity cannot lie in the end but only in its 
highest specimens', a view which leads Nietzsche to advocate a form of 
society in which the interests of the majority can be suppressed for the sake 
of producing such 'highest specimens'. 
In the I ight of all of this, I would argue that there is the need for a 
more urgent ethical response than the one Heidegger provides to N ietzschean 
nihilism. Heidegger's response to Nietzsche, for all of its insight, fails to 
attend directly enough to the urgently ethical nature of Nietzsche's threat. 
We need something more than the fourfold, and meditations on jugs and 
bridges, to respond to this. In the last chapter of the thesis I turn, then, to 
somebody whose philosophy might help provide a more urgently ethical 
response to Nietzschean nihilism than Heidegger's does, somebody, 
moreover, who experienced first hand the 'brotherhoods for the rapacious 
exploitation of non-brothers' that Nietzsche prophesied, having had most of 
his family murdered in the Holocaust. He was also a deep admirer of 
I-leidegger's early philosophy- Emmanuel Levinas. 
124 J.P.Stern, A Study ofNietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.ll7, 122. 
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Chapter Six: Levinas and a Way of Thinking of Ethics after 
Nietzsche 
Introduction 
Let me begin by explaining what I am not doing in this last chapter. I 
am not, as it were, bringing Levinas 'out of the hat' as the solution to the 
great mess that Nietzsche and Heidegger have got us into. Firstly, I consider 
Heidegger's response to Nietzsche to be of considerable depth and 
importance in its evocation of a measure for human life - 'Being' - that is 
beyond mere human creation, that is not a 'value' posited to secure power, 
and in its portrayal of the good human life as one I ived out in response to 
this measure. Secondly, do not consider Heidegger's philosophy to be 
entirely devoid of an ethical dimension. Rather, in my view it is 
underdeveloped, as he presents it, in these respects. Thirdly, Levinas rarely 
uses the term 'nihilism' in his philosophy, and is not directly concemed with 
nihilism per se, in the way that Nietzsche and Heidegger are. Fourthly, 
Levinas's philosophy would not have been possible without the new opening 
in philosophy created by Husser! and Heidegger- something Levinas himself 
acknowledged. 
What I intend to demonstrate is that Levinas's philosophy contains 
within it a phenomenological approach to ethics and a critique of Western 
philosophy that offers a new way of thinking about ethics in the face of the 
decline of the Platonic-Christian tradition, and the assertion, by Nietzsche, 
of a very different set of values, which leaves little room for fellow-feeling 
and selflessness, and advocates political arrangements in which the majority 
are regarded as means rather than ends. I suggest that this new way of 
thinking about ethics is needed more than ever given the tremendously 
enhanced capacities that we now possess for both evil and good, provided by 
technology, and the erosion of personal responsibility which occurs in an 
increasingly beaurocratized world. This new way of thinking which Levinas 
offers does not, crucially, fall foul of the critique of moralities based on 
'true worlds' or God that Nietzsche so successfully attacks, for his approach 
to ethics is 'anarchical', without grounding principles, as we shall see. 
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Levinas's phenomenology of 'ethical structures' argues for the priority of 
the other person in thinking about language, truth and objectivity, and the 
priority of a passive, almost visceral subjection to the presence of others and 
the moral demands that their presence makes, over a more active, rational, 
autonomous moral subject. Levinas- in his writings tries to evoke the ethical 
rather than explain it, and, in so doing, I argue, offers a fruitful way of 
thinking about ethics after Nietzsche. 
Before looking in detail at Levinas's thought, just a couple of remarks 
to orientate us. The theologian Johann Baptist Metz says that t·eligion speaks 
ex memoria passionis, from the memory of suffering. 125 If this is so, then 
Levinas's philosophical writings are profoundly religious. They speak out of 
the memory of suffering, the memory of the Holocaust, in which Levinas lost 
most of his family. Memory is important for Heidegger, as we have seen, but 
it is a remembering of the meaningfulness we have inherited, and a time 
when Being had not been forgotten. [n Levinas's writings, it is suffering that 
is remembered, especially the suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust. He 
asks, 'Did not Nietzsche's saying about the death of God take on, in the 
extermination camps, the meaning of a quasi-empirical fact?'. Thus he links, 
as I have done and as Glover does, the 'death of God' to the Nazi horrors. 
He also writes, 'The essential problem is: can we speak of an absolute 
commandment after Auschwitz? Can we speak of morality after the failure of 
morality?' (PL: 176). This is the underlying question of his philosophy, 
which is an attempt to answer 'yes' to this question, and to hold up, in the 
depths of the night through which Levinas lived, an affirming flame. 
Levinas's philosophy speaks out of the memory of suffering, then. 
Suffering in the age of technology, in which man's capacity to inflict 
suffering has increased a mi II ion fold. We no longer fight face to face with 
spears and bows and arrows, but with bombs which kill people we have never 
faced. Surely this is one of the most significant features of technology to 
consider, one of its most thought-provoking features, in a century that, as 
Levinas points out, ' in thirty years has known two world wars, the 
totalitarianisms _of right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the 
125 Quoted in Caputo ( 1987), p.281. 
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Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia.' (EN: 97). The age of 
'technology' has made the question of morality more and more pressing, as 
our capacity to inflict evil has increased so incredibly. Moreover, our age is 
one in which it is increasingly difficult to apportion moral responsibility to 
particular individuals. However, Heidegger fails to adequately consider this, 
and its startling implications when combined with the technology to inflict 
untold suffering on countless people. Thus, for example, no one thought of 
themselves as causing the horrors of Hiroshima - it just happened. The 
scientists were simply making a weapon, not necessarily using it. The pi lots 
in the 'Enola Gay' were simply obeying orders. None of the politicians 
engaged in the decision-making process were willing to stand up and take 
responsibility, and could hide behind it being a 'committee decision'. 
Jonathan Glover, in Humanity, analyses this corrosion of responsibility 
leading up to and after the dropping of the bomb 126• In the face of such 
events, what is needed alongside a critique of 'technology' for turning Being 
into so much standing order on tap for human use is a consideration of the 
moral responsibility that possessing such technologies as the atomic bomb 
places on us. We find this in Levinas's philosophy. 
6.1. Levinas '.'> Philosophical Method 
Before proceeding any further, it is worth trying to do a brief sketch 
of Levinas's philosophical method. To put it in Husserlian terms, Levinas is 
trying to make us more conscious of the ethical 'horizons' of our lives. 
However, this raises an immediate problem, a problr.m that, as we shall come 
to see, is central to the nature of Levinas's thought. He argues that the 
'phenomena' that he is concerned to articulate are not 'phenomena' in the 
sense that they do not appear! They do not manifest in the Heideggerian 'lit 
clearing of being', in the light, so to speak. As he writes, in the introduction 
to Totality and Infinity: 
The welcoming of the face and the work of justice - which condition 
the birth of truth itself- are not interpretable in terms of disclosure. 
Phenomenology is a method for philosophy, but phenomenology - the 
126 Glover (200 I), p.89-113. 
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comprehension effected through a bringing to light - does not 
constitute the ultimate event of being itself (TI: 28). 
Consequently, the way of attending to phenomena qua what appear must be 
markedly different to the way that we must attend to the 'phenomena' 
Levinas is concerned with. Indeed, the 'phenomena' which he articulates are 
precisely what disturb and break through the phenomena of more traditional 
phenomenologists, like Husser! and Heidegger. In a late essay, he uses the 
term 'enigma' to contrast the 'phenomena' he is concerned with, which 
appear in the manner of not appearing, with the phenomena of more 
traditional phenomenology. The nature and significance of this contrast wi II 
become apparent as we proceed. What I want to emphasize for now is the 
problem that this raises in assessing Levinas's philosophy: how are we to 
assess the validity of claims about something that does not show itself, that 
is not a 'phenomenon' in the conventional sense? This leads one Levinas 
commentator to astutely remark, 'To succeed as a philosophy of the Other, it 
must fail adequately to thematize its subject' . 127 This paradox potentially 
makes Levinas into one of those 'irrefutable' philosophers who one either 
gets completed carried away with and infected by, or else dismisses from the 
outset as a crank. 
Levinas argues that what he calls 'the astonishing alterity of the 
other' gets 'banalized or dimmed down to a simple exchange of courtesies 
that has become established as an 'impersonal commerce' of customs.' (PL: 
I 0 I). He claims to be uncovering the essentially ethical structure of human 
relations, a structure which can be discerned in common customs and 
courtesies, but only in dimmed down, palimpsest, form. Thus he says, in an 
interview, '[The face] is the presupposed in all human relationships. If it 
were not that, we would not even say, before an open door, 'After you, sir!' 
It is an original 'After you, sir!' that I have tded to describe' (EI: 89). 
Through close attention to human relations, one can discern the essentially 
ethical dimension underlying it, a dimension Levinas refers to as 'the face', 
but which, crucially, is not a phenomenon, is not something one can 
indubitably point to or seize upon as 'evidence', by its very nature. 
127 Colin David, Levinas: an introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.62. 
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6. 2. Levinas 's Grand Narrative: the Philosophy of the Same 
Just as Nietzsche and Heidegger both present grand narratives 
concerning the history of Western philosophy, so does Levinas. As we have 
seen, for Nietzsche the essence of the philosophical tradition is its 
asceticism, its hostility to life in favour of 'Reason' and 'true worlds'; and 
for Heidegger its essence is the 'forgetfulness of Being', forgetfulness of the 
process by which beings emerge as beings, and forgetfulness of the 'source' 
that grants them. For Levinas, the Western philosophical tradition has been 
characterised by a 'forgetfulness of the Other', by total ising forms of 
discourse rather than discourse which is open to what he calls 'infinity'. 
What does this mean? Answering this question is a necessary first step in 
accessing Levinas's thought, for this grand narrative underlies much of it. 
His most succinct elucidation of it occurs in his essay 'Philosophy and the 
Idea of the Infinite'. 
He begins this essay by making a distinction between different 
approaches to truth, a distinction that is fundamental to his thought. He 
distinguishes a heteronomous from an autonomous approach to truth. This 
dichotomy is so central to Levinas's thought that it can be seen running 
through the titles of his books and essays: Totality and Infinity, 'Meaning 
and Sense', 'Enigma and Phenomenon', 'Truth of disclosure and Truth of 
testimony', 'Transcendence and Intelligibility'. In a heteronomous approach 
to truth, 
a thinker maintains a relationship with a reality distinct from him, 
other than him ... Truth would thus designate the outcome of a 
movement that leaves a world that is intimate and familiar ... and goes 
toward another •·egion, towards a beyond, as Plato puts it. 128 
An autonomous approach to truth, on the other hand, involves not the 
exposure of the truth seeker to unexpected realities, but rather the reduction 
128 Quoted in Adriaan Perperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1993), p.88-9. Perperzak includes the whole article (in the 
original French and in English translation) as part of his book. 
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of reality to that which the truth seeker can understand. It involves, ' ... the 
preserving of his [the truth seeker's] nature, his identity, the feat of 
remaining the same despite the unknown lands into which thought seems to 
lead' . 129 Levinas argues that, of these two approaches, the autonomous 
approach has dominated Western philosophy. 
He thinks that this domination has occurred for a good reason. He 
argues that an autonomous ('autonomous' meaning, I itera lly, 'the being ruled 
by the law of oneself') approach to truth allowed Western man to take a leap 
out of the tyranny of custom, to become individuals rather than simply 
members of a particular tribe. He writes, 'Against the turbid and disturbing 
participation opinion presupposes, philosophy willed souls that are separate 
and in a sense impenetrable. The idea of the Same, the idea of freedom 
seemed to offer the most firm guarantee of such a separation.' 130 He regards 
this as an immense, epoch defining achievement which assures the 
'philosophy of the Same' of 'immortal merit'. We can see what he means 
here by considering Socrates and the questions that he put to his fellow 
Athenians concerning the nature of piety, friendship, justice as such, not as 
defined by a particular group of people. As Macintyre points out in After 
Virtue, prior to this questions of moral worth were identical with questions 
of social fact: ' ... morality and social structure are in fact one and the same 
in heroic society .... Morality as something distinct does not yet exist. 
Evaluative questions are questions of social fact.' 131 The philosophy of the 
Same's defining achievement was to separate morality and social structure, a 
revo I utionary achievement, but one which created its own bias, which 
Levinas sees himself as trying to counteract. 
In Totality and Infinity Levinas mentions various moments in the 
Western philosophical tradition that particularly exemplify the tendency he 
defines as 'the philosophy of the Same'. He detects it in Plato, and in the 
Platonic doctrine of recollection, whereby obtaining knowledge involves 
recollecting Forms which already resided in one, but which one had 
129 Perperzak ( 1993), p.91. 
130 Perperzak ( 1993), p.93. 
131 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981), p.l23. 
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forgotten. Hegel's philosophy 1s another instance of the 'philosophy of the 
Same', for Levinas, insofar as it reduces history to the gradual unfolding of 
'Spirit', and the subject's overcoming of all forms of alienation. There are 
two features which Levinas singles out as symptomatic of the 'philosophy of 
the Same'. Firstly, it is 'atheistic', by which he means it is opposed to truth 
as revelation, truth coming from to us from without: 
The essence of truth will then not be in the heteronomous relationship 
to an unknown God, but in the already-known which has to be 
uncovered or freely invented in oneself, and in which everything 
unknown is comprised. It is fundamentally opposed to a God that 
reveals. Philosophy is atheism, or rather, unreligion, the negation of a 
God that reveals himself and puts truths into us. 132 
The second feature characteristic of the 'philosophy of the Same' lies in its 
mode of access to beings, which is not direct, but is mediated by 
abstractions, such as 'Forms'. 
What Levinas proceeds to do in this essay is to outline a relationship 
that cannot be characterised in these terms, a relationship that is a 
'revelation', that involves truth being put into me, and which is direct, not 
mediated by abstractions. This is my relationship with the face of another 
person. His whole philosophy turns on the claim that this relationship is 
prior to the relationship which the 'philosophy of the Same' adopts towards 
the world, prior in the sense of a transcendental condition for it. To put it in 
slogan form: goodness is prior to truth. 
However, there is a lot more to Levinas's thesis in this essay than the 
abstract philosophical concerns I have mentioned so far. Like Heidegger, 
Levinas has the ability to combine abstract philosophical argumentation with 
cultural critique, and this essay is a good example of this. The cultural point 
underlying his philosophical point about the emphasis that the 'philosophy 
of the Same' has placed on autonomy is that, as a culture, we have 
prioritised freedom at the expense of justice. David Loy points out to how 
132 Perperzak (1993), p.96. 
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great an extent the idea of freedom has animated Western culture since the 
Greeks, in the first chapter of his fascinating book A Buddhist History of the 
West. Philosophy began, so the story goes, with the liberation of reason from 
myth. The Reformation brought us greater religious freedom, the American 
and French revolutions brought greater political freedom. The lists of 
freedoms we have become party to over the last few centuries could go on 
and on: economic freedom, colonial freedom, racial freedom, psychological 
freedom, sexual freedom. Loy's chapter makes some insightful criticisms of 
this drive towards freedom, from a Buddhist perspective. Levinas, 1n 
'Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite', also criticizes it, from the 
perspective of a concern with justice. 
These introductory remarks are necessarily vague and sketchy. What 
they might mean more concretely we shall consider when looking in more 
detail at Levinas's philosophy. For now, let us consider how Nietzsche might 
fit into this narrative. 
6.2.1. Is Nietzsche a 'Philosopher of the Same'? 
Levinas writes very little directly about Nietzsche, which 1s 
surprising given that they were both deeply concerned with the nature of 
ethics, and that Nietzsche's philosophy was associated with the political 
party that murdered most of Levinas's family. Nietzsche's philosophy 
exemplifies the characteristics of the 'philosophy of the Same' very well. As 
we have seen, central to the 'philosophy of the Same' is its emphasis on 
freedom over and above justice. Nietzsche's philosophy very much exhibits 
this emphasis. The superman is defined by his autonomy, his self-direction, 
his freedom from the constraining influence of the 'flies of the market 
place', the slavish 'herd', and the follies of pity. He writes of the superman, 
'We ... want to become those who we really are- human beings who are new, 
unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.' 
(GS: 335 I p.266). Where necessary, as we have seen, the welfare of other 
people can be legitimately sacrificed, in Nietzsche's view. for the sake of 
the life-enhancement and creativity of members of this elite, for, recall, 'A 
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people 1s a detour of nature to get to s1x or seven great men' (BG: 126 I 
p.99). 
Moreover, Nietzsche's whole epistemology is based around the idea 
that what we call 'truth' is simply a successful way of schematizing chaos in 
order to exert power over it, the subsuming of the river of becoming under 
concepts, the reduction of otherness to sameness, all the better to exercise 
one's will. For Nietzsche, thought has its source in our limbs and stomach, it 
is essentially predatory. A third -and perhaps the most telling- instance of 
the characteristics of the 'philosophy of the Same' operating in Nietzsche's 
thought occurs in his analyses of all human behaviour, especially the ethical, 
in terms of power and subjectivity. Here are two examples: 
Our love of our neighbour - is it not lust for new possessions? ... 
Gradually we become tired of what we safely possess, and we stretch 
out our hands again .... When we see somebody suffer, we like to 
exploit this opportunity to take possession of him; those who become 
his benefactors and pity him, for example, do this and call the lust for 
new possessions that he awakens in them 'love'; and the pleasure they 
feel is comparable to that aroused by the prospect of a new conquest 
(GS: 14 I p.88). 
Morality as the self-division of man . ... A girl 111 love wishes the 
faithfulness and devotion of her love could be tested by the 
faithlessness of the man she loves .... A mother gives to her child that 
of which she deprives herself, sleep, the best food, if need be her 
health, her strength. - But are these all unegoistic states? ... Is it not 
clear that in all these instances man loves something of himself, an 
idea, a desire, an offspring, more than something else of himself, that 
he thus divides his nature and sacrifices one part of it to the other? 
(HA 57 I p.53-4). 
What we have here is the theory of 'psychological egoism', the view that all 
human behaviour can ultimately be accurately accounted for in terms of 
egoism, in terms of, in Nietzsche's case, the desire of the agent to increase 
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his power. Such a theory attempts to construct what Levinas calls a 
'totality', to subsume our encounters with genuine otherness under a 
total ising theory which banishes the otherness of such experiences, their 
direct and revelatory quality. 
So much for the applicability of Levinas's grand narrative to 
Nietzsche. I shall return to the relationship between these two philosophers 
later, when comparing their views on the origins of consciousness, and when 
I consider the extent to which Levinas's account of ethics does not fall prey 
to Nietzsche's critique. Now, however, we must consider Levinas's critique 
of Heidegger as also a 'philosopher of the Same', and how potent it is. 
6. 3. Levinas 's Critique of Heidegger 
In 'Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite' Levinas argues that 
Heidegger, far from destroying, as he would have us believe, 'a whole 
current of Western philosophy', actually sums it up, affirms 'a tradition in 
which the Same dominates the Other, in which freedom ... precedes 
justice'. 133 Thus Levinas's critique of Heidegger is not just a critique of 
Heidegger, but of Heidegger as the latest representative of the 'philosophy 
of the Same'. However, there is a far more personal element to Levinas's 
critique of Heidegger, and it is necessary to draw attention to this first, in 
order the better to understand his critique. 
Levinas began his philosophical life as an ardent admirer and astute 
interpreter of Husserlian phenomenology, helping to introduce, along with 
Raymond Aron, this movement to France and to Jean-Paul Sartre, via his 
book on Husser!. However, he soon came to feel that Heidegger's approach 
to phenomenology was more fruitful than Husserl's, prompting him to attend 
several series of lectures given by Heidegger at Freiburg university in the 
late 1920s. Asked in an interview in the 1980s which works of philosophy he 
considered to be the most important, Being and Time was in the list of five 
books he mentioned (EI: 37-8). In another interview he said, 'For me, 
Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of the century, perhaps one of the very 
m Perperzak ( 1993), p.IO I, I 05. 
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great philosophers of the millennium' (EN: 116). Thus his debt to, and 
admiration of, Heidegger was immense. It is hard to imagine, therefore, what 
the twenty eight year old Levinas felt when his philosophical master joined 
the Nazi party, in 1933. In a sense, however, this event gave birth to Levinas 
as a philosopher in his own right. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say, as 
Simon Critchley does, that Levinas's 'philosophical life was animated by the 
question of how a philosopher as undeniably brilliant as Heidegger could 
become a Nazi, for however a short time.' 134 This apparent contradiction 
impelled him to undertake a critique of Heidegger in order to address the 
question of what it is about Heidegger 's philosophy that could lead its 
author to make such a terrible moral and political mistake. This question 
leads him to undertake a critique of the whole tradition of Western 
philosophy and politics, which he comes to regard Heidegger as summing up. 
Levinas 1s quite clear about the nature of his relationship to 
Heidegger: he both acknowledges the deep influence of Heideggerian 
phenomenology on his thought, and his own desire to think in a decisively 
different manner to Heidegger. As he puts it in his first book, Existence and 
Existents, written during his imprisonment in World War II, 'If, at the 
beginning our reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology and of the 
relationship which man sustains with Being, they are also governed by a 
profound need to leave the climate of that philosophy'(EE: 4). What Levinas 
means by the 'climate' of Heidegger's philosophy will concern me shortly. 
For now, it is important to note that Levinas's 'critique' of Heidegger is not 
so much a refutation as a refusal of certain fundamental Heideggerian 
assumptions. Richard Rorty argues that a 'talent for speaking differently, 
rather than for arguing well, is the chief instrument of cultural change', 135 
and it is a 'talent for speaking differently' which Lt:vinas's engagement with 
Heidegger exhibits (which isn't to imply that the argumentation is shoddy!). 
D4 Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.S. 
135 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1989), 
p.7. 
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6.3.1. Levinas and Heidegger on Death 
Before considering the heart of Levinas's critique of Heidegger, I 
want first to focus on a particular issue that Levinas criticizes Heidegger on: 
his treatment of death. This wi II allow us to see in what kind of ways 
Levinas attacks Heidegger, and allow me to point out the unsatisfactoriness 
of this particular part of his critique. Heidegger offers a famous analysis of 
death in Being and Time. Levinas takes issue with this analysis. Specifically, 
he takes issue with Heidegger's insistence on the 'mineness' of one's own 
death. 'The Being of any such entity [as ourselves] is in each case mine', 
begins the main body of Being and Time (BT: 67). This is something that we 
are generally unaware of, according to Heidegger, lost as we are in the sway 
of 'the They'. However, in moments of lucidity with regard to one's 
mortality, one is no longer able to absorb oneself in 'the They', no longer 
able to dim down an awareness of one's mortality through the comforting 
feeling that one is just doing what one does, and that death is something that 
happens to other people. The recognition that one is living a life which will 
stop brings with it, according to Heidegger, a heightened sense of the 
uniqt•eness of one's life, of the particular course it has taken, and one's 
responsibility for it. These are the thoughts behind the claim he makes, 'no 
one can take the Other's dying away from him' (BT: 284). By 'dying' here 
Heidegger is not referring to the act of literally passing away, but rather the 
sense of living in anticipation of death, as a 'being-unto-death'. Nobody can 
take away from me my power to estimate the worth of my I ife, a power that 
we become increasingly aware of as we become increasingly aware of our 
mortality. 
What is it that Levinas objects to in Heidegger's 'phenomenology of 
death', which is, after all, a pretty good formal, structural descl'iption of 
what goes on in many great works of I iterature, such as The Death of Ivan 
ll/yich, by Tolstoy (which Heidegger in fact refers to in the footnotes to his 
chapter on death (BT: 495))? Heidegger is arguing that the anticipation of 
one's death gives one a freedom and mastery over oneself that makes 
authentic existence possible. Levinas demurs: 
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Death becomes the limit of the subject's virility ... What is important 
about the approach of death is that at a certain moment we are no 
longer able to be able. It is exactly thus that the subject loses its very 
mastery as a subject. 
This end of mastery indicates that we have assumed existing in 
such a way that an event can happen to us that we no longer assume . 
.. . The approach of death indicates that we are in relation with 
something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a 
provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as 
something whose very existence is made of alterity. My solitude is 
thus not confirmed by death but broken by it (TO: 74). 
What Levinas detects in Heidegger's analysis of death is a distorted 
description of the phenomena, due to Heidegger' s insistence on the freedom 
and self-sufficiency of the individual, thereby betraying his adherence to 
what he later terms the 'philosophy of the Same' (Levinas's critique of 
Heidegger on death was written before he had coined this term). For 
Levinas. death is the kind of phenomenon that can only be distorted by such 
an analysis, because it attests to what exceeds the powers of the subject to 
incorporate something into itself as part of its history, to 'totalise' it. Death 
is an event that 'we no longer assume'. It attests to our radical vulnerability 
and passivity, a passivity prior to choice, prior to our freedom. Heidegger, in 
Levinas's eyes, wants to incorporate even something as alien and other to us 
as death into the subject, into an ontological framework, into our 
understanding of being. 
What is particularly important about their respective analyses of death 
is that they indicate where the essential discrepancy between the two 
thinkers lies. Certain features of our experience are not assimilable within a 
philosophical framework which makes ontology fundamental, in Levinas's 
view, and he is concerned with tracing such experiences, and drawing out 
their true implications, undistorted by the 'philosophy of the s~_me'. 
He also disagrees with the emphasis Heidegger places on the 
solitariness of death. Commenting on an expression from the Bible which 
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describes how 'Jonathan and Saul were not divided in death', Levinas 
suggests that this expression, far from designating an after-life in which the 
two meet, and far from being a merely 'metaphorical' expression, gestures 
towards, 
... a surpassing in the human of the animal effort of life, purely life- a 
surpassing of the conatus essendi of life - an opening of the human 
through the living being: of the human, the newness of which could 
not be reduced to a more intense effort in its 'preserving in being'; 
the human, in which worry over the death of the other comes before 
care for self .... 
Does not the relationship to the other in sacrifice, in which the 
death of the other preoccupies the human being-there before his own 
death, indicate precisely a beyond ontology - or a before ontology . 
... Beyond the humanity that still defines itself as life and as conatus 
essendi and concern for being- a dis-interested humanity (EN: 215-7). 
Levinas detects in Heidegger's insistence that 'being is in each case mine', 
an insistence most strongly felt in his analysis of death, an attachment to 
self constitutive of the 'philosophy of the Same'. He opposes to Heidegger's 
analysis of death an account whereby we are willing to die for another 
person, a willingness that indicates 'a rationality of the Good higher than all 
essence' (EN: 228), which constitutes our humanity. This is our ability to 
act for a present that will never be ours. Contrasting his own analysis of 
death with Heidegger's, he writes, in 'Diachrony and Representation': 
In the finitude of time the 'being-toward-death' of Being and Time 
sketches out ... the meaningful remains enclosed within the immanence 
of the Jemeinigkeit of the Dasein that has to be that thus - in spite of 
the denunciation of being as presence- still belongs to a philosophy of 
presence. Does not responsibility for the Other's death - the fear for 
the Other that no longer enters into the Heideggerian phenomenology 
of emotion, Befind/ichkeit - consist in understanding, in the finite 
being of the mortal ego starting from the Other's face, the meaning of 
a future beyond what happens to me, beyond what, for an ego, is to 
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come? One would thus not have gone to the end of thought and 
meaningfulness in dying. The meaningful continues beyond my death 
(EN: I 14 ). 
It is our ability to perform such acts of disinterest, to be concerned for a 
future which we will never see, that constitutes the rupture in being, in the 
rule of connatus essendi, which Levinas is concerned to articulate. 
Levinas makes some powerful points here, but he is misguided to 
direct them against Heidegger's analysis of death. It is not clear that 
Heidegger's insistence on the 'mineness' of 'Dasein', his analysis of the way 
in which 'looking death in the face' thrusts one back upon oneself, implies 
the egotism, the conatus essendi, which Levinas asserts it does. On the 
contrary, implicit in Heidegger's analysis of death is the idea that awareness 
of one's mortality forces one to consider more deeply than usual the nature 
of one's relations with others, and perhaps to change them. At the same time, 
there is nothing in Being and Time that suggests that Heidegger thought we 
should, on the basis of such consideration, become more concerned with the 
welfare of others, and less concerned with our own welfare. 
Also, it is not clear how Heidegger's analysis of death does not allow 
for a meaningfulness continuing beyond my death. Surely having a sense of 
one's heritage, the role that one is playing in the unfolding history of a 
people, implies exactly this. Equally, it is not clear that Heidegger distorts 
death by turning it into something by means of which we can become masters 
of ourselves and face up to our freedom, for it is often through confrontation 
with mortality that the deadening weight of habit loosens slightly its 
stranglehold on our lives and we become able to make comparatively freer 
and more creative choices than we usually do. Thus Levinas's critique of 
Heidegger here is somewhat off the mark. However, we can see in this aspect 
of his critique elements that feature in other, more telling, aspects: a claim 
that Heidegger's insistence on the fundamental nature of ontology blinds him 
to the nature and centrality of the ethical. 
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6.3.2. is Ontology Fundamental? 
Levinas's first direct clash with Heidegger occurs in the 1951 essay, 
'Is Ontology Fundamental?' This clash continues in Totality and Infinity, 
especially in the section called 'Metaphysics Precedes Ontology', in which 
he writes: 
Being and Time has argued perhaps but one sole thesis: Being is 
inseparable from the comprehension of Being (which unfolds as 
time); Being is already an appeal to subjectivity .... 
To affirm the priority of Being over existents 1s to already 
decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with 
someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with 
the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, 
the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates 
justice to freedom .... In subordinating every relation with existents to 
the relation with Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy 
of freedom over ethics .... Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy 
of power. It issues in the State (TI: 45-6). 
There are two problems with this passage. Firstly, Heidegger does not affirm 
the priority of Being over existents. Whilst Being is not to be equated with 
the totality of beings, and to neglect their difference is to fall into nihilism, 
Being cannot manifest without beings. Without beings, there would be no 
Being, so Heidegger is not affirming the priority of a relation with an 
abstraction over our relationship with concrete beings. On the contrary, 
Being and Time is a text which is concerned with grounding abstractions in 
concrete, lived experience. Given this, it is hard to see how Heidegge1· can 
be accused of subordinating ethics to freedom (in the way that Nietzsche 
can), ·why it is necessarily a philosophy of power, and issues in the state. 
Secondly - as Levinas no doubt knew - Heidegger does not argue that 
we e·ncounter other people in the same way that we encounter any other kind 
of being. Rather, he maintains that we encounter them as co-disclosers of the 
world, through a sui generis mode of access he calls 'solicitude'. 
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Admittedly, he does not have a great deal to say about our 'being-with-
others' in Being and Time: there is a short section on the difference between 
'leaping in' and 'leaping ahead' (BT: 158-9), and a more worked out section 
on how we must, in order to be authentic Dasein, resolutely choose our 
heroes in the face of our 'being-towards-death', and wrest ourselves away 
from the sway of 'the They', the pernicious effect that other people's 
influence can have on us. But he does not argue that we encounter them in 
subordination to Being. Rather, our 'being-with-others' is an 'existentiale', 
and, as such, is not subordinate to our relationship with Being, but is part of 
the enabling conditions of such a relationship. 
And yet, this is, perhaps, the very issue at stake. Heidegger is 
concerned to raise anew the question of Being, and sees such a question as 
the fundamental starting point of philosophy. It is this very assumption that 
Levinas is criticizing, and, as such, his critique of Heidegger goes right to 
the core of that project. The question, 'Is ontology fundamental?' is the 
question that Levinas poses to Heidegger. Levinas's answer to this question 
is 'no': because Heidegger prioritises consideration of our understanding of 
Being, he necessarily fails to do justice to the nature and centrality of our 
relationship with other people, with genuine otherness -and thus remains a 
'philosopher of the Same', prioritising freedom over justice. 
In what way does Heidegger fail to do justice to the nature and 
centrality of our relationship with other people? Levinas criticizes 
Heidegger's decision to consider our relationship with other people as part 
of a more general ontological project; and he criticizes Heidegger's 
characterization of our relationship with other people in terms of a 
relationship with co-participants in shared projects, a 'side by side' 
relationship rather than a 'face to face' one. Levinas makes these points 
during an interview: 
In Heidegger, the ethical relationship, the Miteinandersein, the being-
with-another-person, is only one moment of our presence in the world. 
It does not have the central place. Mit is always being next to ... it is 
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not in the first instance the Face, it is zusammensein [being-together], 
perhaps marschieren [marching-together] (EN: 116). 
Pace Heidegger, Levinas argues that our relationship with other people is 
primarily a face to face relationship, not a side by side one, and forms a 
transcendental condition of the ontological project. As he puts it, in Totality 
and Infinity: 
... the comprehension of Being in general cannot dominate the 
relationship with the Other. The latter relationship commands the 
first. cannot disentangle myself from society with the Other, even 
when consider the Being of the existent he is .... This 'saying to the 
Other' -this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation 
with an existent - precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in 
Being (Tl: 47-8, italics mine). 
And here is why he thinks that, from 'Is Ontology Fundamental?': 
A human being is the sole being which I am unable to encounter 
without expressing this very encounter to him. It is precisely in this 
that the encounter distinguishes itself from knowledge. In every 
attitude in regard to the human there is a greeting - if only in the 
refusal of greeting. Here perception is not projected toward a horizon 
- the field of my freedom, power and property - in order to grasp the 
individual upon a familiar foundation. It refers to the pure individual, 
to a being as such (BPW: 7). 
Levinas ts here suggesting that we do not encounter one another 
fundamentally as possessing meaning by belonging within a particular nexus 
of relationships, but as absolute, unique, irreplaceable. Moreover, we 
encounter people expressively, we acknowledge them before we 'know' 
them. Thus this encounter has the character of what Levinas terms 
'revelation', in the sense that it transcends our comprehension of being. We 
understand beings by reference to the 'world' within which they have their 
place. However, this is not how we encounter other people. Our relationship 
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to them is not, first and foremost, in any sense cognitive; and it is to a 
particular being, to you, possessing meaning without reference to a 'world'. 
Levinas is stressing the importance of the second person, as opposed to the 
first and third person, which have traditionally dominated in philosophy. 
Levinas describes, in this essay, our relationship with other people in 
terms of invocation rather than comprehension. Before we comprehend 
another person, we invoke them. When we encounter another person, we are 
in society with them, and this sociality cannot be formulated in terms of 
ontology. Thus, 'It is a matter of finding a place where the human no longer 
concerns us from the perspective of the horizon of being, that is to say, no 
longer offers itself to our powers' (BPW: 8). The search for such a place, the 
attempt to articulate it, fonns the heart of Levinas's philosophy. For Levinas 
it is what he calls the 'face' of another person which can breach the 
totalising horizons of being which engird Heidegger's philosophy of the 
horne. More than this, it is the face of another person which makes 
disclosure of being - truth - possible in the first place. These bold claims 
will be spelt out in more detail shortly. 
So, Levinas's critique of Heidegger is not simply an attack on a 
particular aspect of his philosophy - his omission of a sustained concern 
with the phenomenology of other people, say - but, rather, an attack on the 
very assumptions underlying it, that ontology is fundamental, and that our 
relationship with other people can be adequately considered within a more 
general consideration of our relationship to being. He argues, as we shall 
see, that the reverse is in fact the case, that our understanding of being is 
inherently ethical, that 'ethics precedes ontology'. This argument is merely 
adumbrated in 'Is Ontology Fundamental?'. It is not unti I 1961, in Levinas's 
main work Totality and Infinity, that they are more fully worked out. 
6. 4. Justice precedes Truth: the Other makes Objectivity and Selfhood 
Possible 
Levinas's disagreement with Heidegger, as the latest representative of 
the 'philosophy of the Same' (as well as a one time member of a political 
200 
party who murdered most of Levinas's family) hinges on the question of 
whether the human being is primarily present to himself, and only 
secondarily directed towards the other, or whether he is face to face with the 
other from the outset, and only secondarily a self-consciousness? To put it 
another way: is dialogue the transcendental framework for the intentional 
relationship to the world, or vice versa? As far as Levinas is concerned, 
Heidegger, because he insists that 'being is in each case mine', prioritises 
self-consciousness and intentionality: dialogue and face to face encounters 
are secondary. Levinas reverses this priority: for him, the face to face 
relationship with another person is the transcendental framework for our 
intentional relationship to the world. 
Why does he think this? He argues that we would have no objectivity 
if another person was not watching us. The revelation of the arbitrariness 
and injustice of my spontaneous activity is the origin of critical 
consciousness. Without the other person, who commits us to truth, we would 
succumb to confusion and ambiguity: 'The presence of the Other is 
equivalent to this calling into question of my joyous possession of the world . 
... Objectivity coincides with the abolition of inalienable property - which 
presupposes the epiphany of the other' (TI: 76). And: 
The presence of the Other dispels the anarchic sorcery of the facts: the 
world becomes an object. To be an object, to be a theme, is to be what 
I can speak of with someone who has broken through the screen of 
phenomena and has associated me with himself .... truth is founded on 
my relationship with the other, or justice (TI: 99). 
He is claiming that the presence of another person wrenches us out of our 
own personal way of seeing the world, what he calls 'my joyous possession 
of the world': that is to say an orientation that takes into account, which 
considers real, only that which enables me to satisfy my desires. Truth is 
based on my relationship with another person, and his calling me to be just, 
to not just see the world from my own point of view. Implicit in this 
argument are the following two corollaries: that the other person enables me 
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to be genuinely self-conscious, and enables the possibility of their being an 
objective world between us. 
6. 4.1. The Other Calls on me to Respond- Thus Language Arises 
This arises with, so to speak, the birth of language, which, for 
Levinas, is essentially an ethical event: 
A meaningful world is a world in which there is the Other through 
whom the world of my enjoyment becomes a theme having a 
signification. Things acquire a rational signification, and not only one 
associated with my usage, because an other is associated with my 
relations with them. In designating a thing I designate it to the Other . 
... Utilizing a sign ... permits me to render the things offerable, detach 
them from my own usage, alienate them, render them exterior. 
Objectivity results from language, which permits the putting into 
question of possession .... To thematize is to offer the world to the 
other in speech. 'Distance' with regard to the object thus exceeds its 
spatial signification .... This distance is more radical than every 
distance in the world. The subject must find itself 'at a distance' from 
its own being ... Consciousness of the object - thematization - rests on 
distance with regard to oneself, which can only be time; or, if one 
prefers, it rests on self-consciousness (TI: 209-1 0). 
Levinas argues, in this crucial passage, that rationality- 'things acquir[ing] 
a rational signification'- is made possible by my relation to another person, 
and by his calling me to offer up my world to him in a way that we can both 
understand. Thus rationality is inherently ethical, is born out of my ethical 
proximity to another person. The essence of language, in Levinas's view, is 
donation, generosity, insofar as, in language, one is facilitating the 
emergence of a 'common place' between oneself and others. Crucially, it is 
the other person who makes this possible, who allows one to attain self-
consciousness. The other person calling me to be just thereby invests me 
with genuine self-consciousness and freedom. This is the crucial moment in 
Levinas's phenomenology of the emergence of ethics. It can now be seen 
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why Levinas thinks that the 'philosophy of the Same' rests on assumptions 
which it cannot avow within its own conceptual framework, a justice which 
is prior to selfhood and objectivity, and comes not from the self but from 
another person, and is thus a heteronomous relationship. Heteronomy 
precedes autonomy, justice precedes freedom, as Levinas claims in 
'Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite'. 
There are two moments in the other person's .;:alling me to be just, and 
thereby to speak and be self-conscious. Firstly, the other person calls upon 
me to share my world, as discussed above. Secondly, there arises the 
question of justice when a third person comes along. I now have to make 
decisions based on thematization, generalisation: I can no longer relate to 
the other people as unique and irreplaceable. Levinas writes: 
Consciousness is born as the presence of the third party in the 
proximity of the one for the other and, consequently, it is to the extent 
that it proceeds from this that it can become dis-inter-estedness. The 
foundation of consciousness is justice and not the reverse. To the 
extravagant generosity of the for-the-other is superimposed a 
reasonable order, ancillary or angelic, of justice through knowledge, 
and philosophy here is a measure brought to the infinity of the being-
for-the-other of peace and proximity, and is like the wisdom of Jove 
(BPW: 169). 
Consciousness, thematization, knowing, are born from out of ethics, from out 
of 'the extravagant generosity of the for-the-other', and thus to try to derive 
ethics from knowledge is to put the proverbial cart before the horse! 
It is worth contrasting Levinas's views on language with Heidegger's, 
here. 'Language is the house of Being' for Heidegger, it is that wherein 
Being manifests itself. There is the constant danger that language might fall 
into 'idle talk' and lose its revelatory quality, its essentially poetic nature. 
This happens when words are used by people without their having had the 
kin~d of 'originary experiences' which gave rise to the words in the first 
place. Thus it is important that language be so to speak 'refreshed' by 
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genuine encounters with Being, which is the task of the 'poet' (not to be 
understood literally, simply as somebody who writes poems). Levinas wants 
to focus our attention on a different aspect of language, and to claim that 
this aspect is more fundamental than the one Heidegger privileges. Levinas 
emphasises the way in which language allows us to touch and connect with 
on another, to acknowledge one another, to share the world - what we might 
call language's 'in-this-togetherness'. Underlying the disclosure of Being is 
the fact that we disclose Being to somebody else. 'Before any participation 
in a common content by comprehension, [expression] consists in the 
intuition of sociality by a relation that is consequently irreducible to 
comprehension'(BPW: 7). This sharing of one's world constitutes the birth 
of ethics, for Levinas, and he locates it in language. The commonplaces that 
language creates are not first and foremost failings away from the primordial 
experience of perhaps solitary poets, whereby genuine encounters with Being 
are degraded into hackneyed cliches. Rather, such commonplaces involve the 
generosity of a speaker in society with another person donating his world to 
the other person, who is calling him to be just. 
6.4.2. Affinities with Husser/ and Nietzsche 
There is an obvious similarity here with Husser! and his fifth 
'Cartesian Meditation' (which Levinas refers to), where he writes: 
... the only transcendence which is really worthy its name, and 
anything else that is called transcendent, such as the objective world, 
depends upon the transcendence of foreign subjectivity. 
All Objectivity, in this sense, is related back constitutionally 
to what does not belong to Ego proper, to the other-than-my-Ego's-
own in the form, 'someone else' - that is to say: the non-Ego in the 
form, 'another Ego'. 136 
Husserl's point, like Levinas's, is that only insofar as 1 experience that 
others experience the same objects as myself, do 1 really experience these 
136 Quoted in Evan Thompson (ed.), Between Ourselves: second person issues in the study of 
consciousness (Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 2001 ), p.I59. 
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objects as objective and real. My perceptual experience is experience of 
intersubjectively accessible being- being which does not exist for me alone. 
There is also a useful comparison to be made with Nietzsche. In The 
Gay Science, he advances a similar thesis concerning consciousness. He 
argues that consciousness and language emerged together, due to a need to 
communicate (in order to escape from predators, find food, etc .. ): 
consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need 
for communication; ... As the most distressed animal, [man] ... had to 
learn to express his distress and make himself understood; and for all 
of this he needed 'consciousness' first of all, he needed to 'know' 
himself what distressed him, he needed to 'know' how he felt, he 
needed to 'know' what he thought (GS: 354: p.298). 
Nietzsche uses this argument as a way of downplaying the role that 
consciousness plays, or should play, in our lives, and to point out that we 
can never become conscious of what makes us truly individual. Levinas 
argues in the opposite direction, pointing out the ethical significance of 
creating a world of common places between two people, the ethical 
significance of offering the privacy of one's world up to the other person. 
6. 4.3. Conversation as the Locus of Ethics 
Offering one's own world up to another person constitutes an 
essential part of conversation, which is why Levinas focuses on conversation 
as a prime locus of ethics: 
The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, IS 
primordially enacted as conversation, where the same, gathered up 111 
its ipseity as an '1,' as a particular existent unique and autochthonous, 
leaves itself .... the very fact of being in a conversation consists in 
recognising in the Other a right over [my] egoism, and hence in 
justifying oneself. Apology ... belongs to the essence of conversation 
(TI: 39-40). 
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Levinas is, as it were, arguing for how conversation is possible. Granted we 
have conversations, what must be in place in order for them to happen? In 
conversation, I offer my world up in word, and this is an act of generosity, 
not an act based on reciprocity. All conversation presupposes this prior act 
of generosity, this exposing of my world to the potential criticism of 
another, this apology or accounting for oneself. This is what Levinas, 111 
Otherwise than Being, refers to as 'Saying': 
Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all 
communication, as exposure .... It is the risky uncovering of oneself, 
in sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all 
shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability (08: 48). 
6. 4. 4. The Asymmetry of My Relationship with Another Person 
Underlying these claims about self-consciousness, rationality, 
language, and conversation, and separating them from Nietzsche's and 
Husserl's similar claims, is the distinctively ethical twist that Levinas gives 
to them. Fundamental to this ethical dimension is an assumption about the 
nature of our relationship with other people: namely, that it is a is a vertical 
relationship, one of height, it is 'asymmetrical', it is, as he puts it, a 
relationship with 'the Master' (TI: I 0 I). In order to offer up my world in 
words to the other person, I must encounter the other person as, in some 
sense, above me: 'The Other - the absolutely other - paralyzes possession, 
which he contests by the epiphany of the face. He can contest my possession 
only because he approaches me not from the outside but from above' (TI: 
171, italics mine). This seems like a peculiar claim, and has caused a number 
of Levinas commentators to demur. For example, Sonia Sikka, in 
'Questioning the Sacred: Heidegger and Levinas on the Locus of Divinity', 
asks: 
In what manner are these claims [about the asymmetry of the 
relationship with . another person] asserted? If they are 
phenomenological claims, do they mean to locate structures of 
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experience which everyone, upon reflection, could recognize as their 
own? But this simply is not so .... Many are likely to respond that 
these [Levinas's characterisation of our relationship to other people as 
asymmetric] are religious relics, that there is no guilt prior to the 
conception of freedom, that the ethical relation is a symmetrical one 
in which I may demand as well as give. 137 
The asymmetry of the ethical relationship is a phenomenological claim -
Levinas insists that he is being descriptive rather than prescriptive, locating 
structures that we can alI, on reflection, recognize as our own. What kind of 
reflections might induce us to accept that the ethical relationship is 
asymmetrical? Firstly, Levinas is emphasising that we experience other 
people first and foremost 'head on' -we are directly in relationship to them. 
We do not, so to speak, experience people from sideways on primarily - to 
do so is to abstract from our concrete relationship with particular people. 
Performing such an abstraction is completely necessary in order to create 
just social arrangements, but it comes after and is made possible by this 
prior, face to face, relationship. 
However, this only establishes that the symmetrical relationship 
between people is an abstraction from our direct relationships with other 
people. It does not establish that the latter relationship is one of 'height', is 
one in which we are below the other person. Levinas describes as 'a concrete 
moral experience' that, 
... what I permit myself to demand of myself is not comparable with 
what I have the right to demand of the Other. This moral experience, 
so commonplace, indicates a metaphysical asymmetry: the radical 
impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside and of speaking in the 
same sense of oneself and of the others, and consequently the 
impossibility of totalization - and, on the plane of social experience, 
the impossibility of forgetting the intersubjective experience that 
leads to the social experience and endows it with meaning (TI: 53). 
137 Sonia Sikka. 'Questioning the Sacred: Heidegger and Levinas on the Locus of Divinity', Modem 
Theology 14 (3) (1998), p.314. 
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He is suggesting that we do experience people in this way, that the essence 
of human relations is not reciprocity, a 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch 
yours' kind of contractual ism of the kind that underlies the political 
philosophies of Hobbes and Locke (and therewith modern capitalist society), 
but a pure giving, without expectation of recompence. He suggests that such 
experiences are commonplace. In 'Diachrony and Representation', for 
example, he claims that, in simple greetings, in 'Hello' and 'Goodbye', there 
'already lies dormant ... the gratuitousness of the for-the-other' (TO: 106). 
This is why he is fond of quoting Dostoyevsky's remark, 'All of us are guilty 
of everything and responsible for everyone in the face of everything and I 
more than the others.' (e.g. El: 105, italics mine). My moral responsibility is 
not something that I can, as it wet·e, distance myself from and relate to in the 
same way that I might relate to the moral responsibility of others. My moral 
responsibility cannot be thus 'totalized', and to that extent cannot be spoken 
of as primarily symmetrical. There is a substantial affinity here between 
Levinas and Kierkegaard, and the latter's insistence that the individual - like 
Abraham - might be called upon to perform an act of 'purely personal 
virtue', that cannnot be universalized, or subsumed under a 'System'. 138 
An examination of the key Levinasian notion of 'the face' may help us 
to become clearer about why Levinas views our relationship to others as an 
asymmetrical one whereby we are called to put the other before or above 
ourselves. 
6. 5. The Nakedness of the Face 
When discussing 'Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite' I pointed 
out that Levinas distinguishes between two kinds of approaches to truth: an 
autonomous and heteronomous one. This is the crucial distinction in his 
thought. Another way of describing it is as a distinction between different 
types of givenness: givenness as disclosure, within a horizon or 'world'- the 
givenness that Heidegger and the 'philosophy of the Same' focuses upon, 
and givenness as what Levinas terms 'revelation', or absolute given ness (the 
,,, parallel with Suber's '1-thou' and 'l-it' distinction is obvious here). As J 
138 See Soren Kierkegaard, Fear And Trembling tr.Aiastair Hannay, (London: Penguin, 1985), e.g. p.88, 
where Kierkegaard writes, 'Abraham is great through an act of purely personal virtue.' 
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have mentioned above, his claim is that other people are not given to us 
within a horizon, they are given absolutely, without reference to anything 
else, 'revealed'. He makes this contrast in the following passage: 
To disclose a thing is to clarify it by forms: to find for it a 
place in the whole by apperceiving its function or its beauty. 
The work of language is entirely different: it consists in 
entering into relationship with a nudity disengaged from every form, 
but having meaning by itself, signifying before we have projected 
light upon it .... Such a nudity is the face. The nakedness of the face is 
not what is presented to me because I disclose it, what would therefore 
be presented to me, to my powers, to my eyes, to my perception, in 
I ight exterior to it. ... It is by itself and not by reference to a system 
(TI: 74). 
The face is an 'irreducible means of access' (PL: 169), like Heidegger's 
'ready-to-hand' category, for instance. It cannot be reduced to something 
more basic: it is a way in which the world is given to us. When we encounter 
another person as 'the face', we are encountering them as unique, 
irreplaceable, and of value in themselves. In using the term 'face', Levinas 
is trying to focus our attention on what it is actually like to encounter other 
people, to face them, to look them in the eyes and listen to their voice, to be 
in their presence and fall under their influence. Approaching another person 
is like approaching a field of energy, and Levinas is trying to convey what 
this is like, speaking of it as an irreducible means of access, and pointing 
out its essentially moral character. In 'Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite' he writes: 
But [the Other] can also- and here is where he presents me his face-
oppose himself to me beyond all measure, with the total uncoveredness 
and nakedness of his defenceless eyes, the straightforwardness, the 
absolute frankness of his gaze .... Not that conquest is beyond my too 
weak powers, but I am no longer able to have power ... Here is 
established a relationship not with a very great resistance but with the 
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absolute Other, with the resistance of what has no resistance, with 
ethical resistance. 139 
Much of the time, we do not encounter the face. Rather, we encounter 
masks. Levinas writes, 'To be sure, most of the time the who is a what. We 
ask, 'Who is Mr.X?' and we answer: 'He is the President of the State 
council,' or 'He is Mr.So-and-so.' The answer presents itself as a quiddity; 
it refers to a system of relations' (TI: 177). But sometimes, we encounter the 
face. This encounter can occur in erotic love, which is why Levinas writes 
quite extensively about it (see, e.g., TO: 84-90). It can also occur when we 
share with somebody our miseries, the miseries we all bear, and yet which 
rarely see the light of day in the public sphere - indeed, are promptly frog-
marched out when they do disturb the social world, in which everybody is 
assuring everybody else that they are doing fine, and that they are a suitable 
object for other people's envy. An encounter with the face might occur when 
somebody shares with you a song or poem they have written. It occurs when 
the other is exposed to us, as just this person, in all their vulnerability, an 
exposure which contains a moral demand that we not remain indifferent to 
this person's vulnerability, and, ultimately, to their death. When we 
encounter the face we are, as it were, hearing the other silently whisper to 
us, 'Remember me'. 
Crucially, this encounter cannot be represented or recalled. Levinas's 
thinking here is analogous to the Buddhist idea that 'Enlightenment' cannot 
be spoken of as an experience or state because to do so turns it into an 
object, which is precisely what it is not. If it were, it could be appropriated 
by a subject, by the ego, which is the very relationship that 'Enlightenment' 
denotes the absence of. Similarly, Levinas writes that the face is not 
something we experience, or rather, it is an experience of' infinity'. It is an 
experience which cannot be spoken about in the kind of terms in which 
philosophy has tended to speak of the world, because to thematize such an 
experience, to incorporate it into a more general movement or 'totality', is 
to no longer to encounter 'the face', the unique, the irreplaceable. Our 
relationship to 'the face' is not one of comprehension or knowledge, for such 
139 Perperzak (1993), p.I09-JO. 
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relationships totalize whatever they are in •·elation to. Rather, our 
relationship to the face is what Levinas calls in Totality and Infinity 
'Desire'. In 'Peace and Proximity' he writes of it thus: 
The thought that is awake to the face of the other human is not a 
thought of ... , a representation, but straightaway a thought for ... , a 
nonindifference for the other, upsetting the equilibrium of the steady 
and impassive soul of pure knowledge, a watching over the other 
human in his or her unicity which is indiscernible to knowledge 
(BPW: 166). 
Interestingly, the 'face' does not literally have to be the face! It can 
also be 'a bare arm sculpted by Rodin' or the nape of the neck of people 
queu1ng up to see relatives imprisoned in Lubyanka prison in Moscow. 
Levinas says, 'The face, then, is not the colour of the eyes, the shape of the 
nose, the ruddiness of the cheeks, etc .. ' (EN: 232). Rather, it is, 'This 
possibility for the human of signifying in its uniqueness, in the humility of 
its nakedness and mortality' (EN: 231 ), ' ... the pure denuding of exposure 
without defence. Exposure as such, extreme exposure to death, to mortality 
itself. Extreme precariousness of the unique, precariousness of the stranger' 
(BPW: 167). 'The face is a hand in search of a recompense, an open hand. 
That is, it needs something. It is going to ask you for something' (PL: 169). 
6.5.1. Summary 
To briefly summarise this morass of thinking, which Levinas 
relatively chaotically splurges out in Totality and Infinity (it has none of the 
precision of structure of Heidegger's Being and Time), here is one of his 
own concise summaries of these thoughts: 
The transitivity of teaching, and not the interiority of 
reminiscence, manifests being; the locus of truth is society. The moral 
relation with the Master who judges me subtends the freedom of my 
adherence to the true. Thus language commences. He who spea:ks to 
me and across the words proposes himself to me retains the 
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fundamental foreignness of the Other who judges me; our relations are 
never reversible. This supremacy posits him in himself, outside of my 
knowing, and it is by relation to this absolute that the given takes on 
meaning (TI: 101). 
'Teaching' is the evocative term that Levinas sometimes uses to convey the 
asymmetry of our relationship with others, the fact that the other comes from 
on high, his uniqueness cannot be reduced to my understanding and 
capacities. The ultimate outcome of this argumentation is the thesis that 
meaning is possible due to ethics, due to the face of the other person, beyond 
phenomena I outside of being, calling me to justice. This has the radical 
imp I ication that my I ife - my home, work, and labour (all of which Levinas 
offers analyses of in Totality and Infinity) - gains its meaning from without, 
has it bestowed upon it by another person. As the Levinas commentator 
Perpezak puts it: 'I must feed my body and arrange my house in order to 
receive the foreigner knocking at my door ... The justification of my nestling 
in the world ... does not lie in the necessity of my satisfactions but in the 
dedication to others that thereby becomes possible .... the sense of my 
selfhood is my being-for-the-Other." 4° For Levinas, prior to any acts of 
Nietzschean self-creation or Heideggerian resolutely choosing of one's 
heroes or letting beings be, prior to our freedom and capacity to initiate 
action, our lives have already been given a potential meaning from without, 
from the other person, an ethical meaning or calling - a calling which, of 
course, we are then free to evade. 
As we saw when discussing Being and Time, one of the crucial points 
of the book is that our understanding of being is not grounded in reasons, 
that, as Wittgenstein puts it, at a certain point explanation gives way and we 
simply have to say 'This is how we go on'. Being and Time attempts to 
describe our non-cognitive attunement to being, our 'forms of life'. 
Crucially, then, the conditions of knowing are non-cognitive. Equally 
crucially, this non-cognitive attunement to being is communal, it is not 
primarily the private affair of a lone subject. Levinas's thinking depends to 
a certain"extent ~on these insights, because they open up a way of thinking 
140 Perperzak ( 1993), p.25. 
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about ethics as prior to cognition. We need no longer think that what gets us 
into the moral universe must be rational or cognitive. Thus to ask for reasons 
to be ethical is to mistake the nature of ethics. Ethics is not an object of 
knowledge, and certainly cannot be made into a science. 
From the above we can see how Levinas's philosophy, in criticizing 
Heidegger and the whole Western philosophical tradition as a 'philosophy of 
the Same', provides us with a phenomenologically inspired moral dimension 
largely lacking in Heidegger. Moreover, Levinas provides us with another 
way of responding to Nietzsche's nihilism than Heidegger's, a way that more 
directly addresses Nietzsche's devastating critique of morality. 
6. 6. Our Anarchical Allegiance to the Good: Levin as's Response to 
Nietzsche's 'Immoralism' 
Thus far my exegesis of Levinas has focused on the earlier of his two 
main works, Totality and Infinity. What remains for me to say shall focus on 
his later work, including his second main work, Otherwise than Being. Very 
roughly speaking, these two books differ in approach in so far as Totality 
and Infinity focuses on our encounter with the face, whereas Otherwise than 
Being focuses on the nature of a subject who is capable of encountering the 
face. 
Underlying Levinas's work is the thesis that conscience 1s prior to 
consciousness - as we have seen. This priority is not the priority of an 
unconscious lurking under a surface of conscious and really ruling the roost, 
the kind that Nietzsche invokes in his writings time and again. Rather, it is 
prior in the sense of a transcendental condition. Levinas never dealt with 
Nietzsche's philosophy at any great length - which, as I have mentioned, is 
both surprising and a shame, given that ethics is so central to the 
philosophies of both men, and given Nietzsche's alleged ideological 
association with a political party who murdered most of Levinas's family. If 
he had dealt with Nietzsche's critique of Judea-Christian morality, this is 
what, I suggest, he would argue: that Nietzsche has overlooked the ethical 
origins of consciousness in conscience. He would probably have said that, 
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yes, if the 'philosophy of the Same' and the freedom of the subject had the 
priority that the Western philosophical tradition has given to them, then 
Nietzsche is right to insist that the essence of life is 'appropriation, injury, 
overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of 
one's own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation', 
'will to power'. But this is to overlook our prior exposedness to the Other, 
which is not an experience, and which cannot be incorporated with in the 
history of a subject as an allegiance which he freely undertook at a 
particular point in time. It is the evocation of this prior exposedness that 
constitutes the heart of Levinas's second major work, Otherwise than Being, 
to which I now tum. 
In this strange book he is, to use a phrase Wittgenstein used, 'making 
propaganda' for a certain type of thinking that unearths this prior 
exposedness, the priority of conscience to consciousness. Otherwise than 
Being is a frustrating and opaque book, that possesses an almost incantatory 
quality, as Levinas insists over and over again on the same essential point. 
His clearest exposition of this point, to my mind, occurs not in the book 
itself, but in an essay called 'Non intentional Consciousness'. To be clear 
about the nature of 'nonintentional consciousness', it helps to have in mind 
which aspects of consciousness has in mind: 
Consciousness is a mode of being such that beginning is its essential. 
To begin - to ignore or suspend the undefined density of the past - is 
the wonder of the present. All contents of consciousness were 
received, were present and consequently are present or represented, 
memorable. Consciousness is the very impossibility of a past that had 
never been present, that is closed to memory and history (EN: 49). 
It is on the basis of the freedom and autonomy of consciousness that 
philosophers - including Nietzsche - have reasoned, according to Levinas, 
which i1s why they have all propagated 'philosophies of the Same'. He draws 
an illuminating parallel between philosophy and the fate of Job: 
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We still reason as though the ego had been present at the creation of 
the world and as though the world, henceforth in its charge, had issued 
from an act of free wi II. Such are the presumptions of philosophers, 
the presumptions of idealists. Indeed, it is for this that Scripture 
reproaches Job. No doubt he could have understood his misfortunes 
had they been the result of his faults .... in an orderly world one is 
responsible only for one's own actions. Ergo, Job must have been 
guilty of an oversight. But the meaning of the world is not inscribed in 
being as a theme that exhibits itself in this world .... 
Entering too late into a world created without him, he is 
responsible over and above what he experiences. And yet, in the same 
way, he is better for not being a mere effect of this world (BPW: 93 ). 
Levinas will argue that consciousness in the sense defined above, and the 
freedom associated with it, rests on a prior 'non-intentional consciousness'. 
This non-intentional consciousness is something Heidegger devotes a lot of 
attention to, in his insistence on the 'thrownness' of 'Dasein ', its 'always 
already' being situated in a particular relation to being. It is that feeling 
which Kierkegaard, p1·ior to both Heidegger and Levinas, so well articulates 
when he writes, 'Why was I not asked about [coming into this world], why 
was I not informed of the rules and regulations but just thrust into the ranks 
as if I had been bought from a peddling shanghaier of human beings?'. 141 
What Levinas objects to about Heideggerian thrownness is its lack of ethical 
content, which is the dimension of it that Levinas is concerned to make so 
much of. He refers, in the essay mentioned above, to our thrownness as 'bad 
conscience', of which he writes we are, 
... without intentions, without aims, without the protective mask of the 
character contemplating himself in the mirror of the world, self-
assured and affirming himself. Without name, position, or titles. A 
presence that fears presence, stripped of all attributes. 
Bad conscience or timidity: accused without cu lpabi I ity and 
responsible for its very presence. Reserve of the non-invested. the 
non-justified, the 'stranger in the earth,' in the words of the Psalmist 
141 Quoted in Caputo (1987), p.25. 
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the stateless or homeless person, who dares not enter. The interiority 
of the mental is perhaps originally this. Not in the world, but in 
question (EN: 129, italics mine). 
Levinas, in this passage, is trying to invoke a sense of self that is prior to 
our sense of 'self-possession', a sense of our 'selves' prior to having been 
invested with 'the protective mask of the character contemplating himself in 
the mirror of the world', prior to our name, positions and titles. As such, 
these passages can be compared with Heidegger's passages on angst, in so 
far as both are trying to describe a rupture in our ordinary understanding of 
ourselves that reveals something more fundamental or 'originary' about us. 
The big difference is that Levinas insists, unlike Heidegger, on the 
ineluctably ethical character of this rupture, this mood of dispossession and 
vulnerability prior to and underlying one's self-possession. For Levinas, 
prior to intentionality, freedom and consciousness, we are accused, and 
responsible for our very presence - this is the locus of ethics, and it is what 
his whole philosophy points towards. This bad conscience is not, as it is for 
Nietzsche, 'some childhood of the mind to be outgrown, or the momentary 
weakening of an otherwise impassive psyche': 
In the passivity of the non-intentional ... the very justice of position in 
being which is affirmed in intentional thought, knowledge and control 
of the now is questioned: being as bad conscience; being put in 
question, but also put to the question, having to answer - the birth of 
language; having to speak, having to say 'I,' being in the first person, 
being precisely myself; but henceforth, in the assertion of its being as 
myself, having to answer for its right to be ... Having to answer for 
one's right to be, not by appealing to the abstraction of some 
anonymous law, some juridical entity, but in the fear for the other 
person. My 'being in the world' or my 'place in the sun,' my home-
are they not a usurpation of places that belong to the other man who 
has already been oppressed or starved by me? Fear for all the 
violence and murder of my existing, despite its intentional and 
conscious innocence, can bring about .... A fear that comes to me from 
the face of the other person (EN: 130). 
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Louis Macniece, in his 'Prayer Before Birth', voic~s a similar sentiment in 
the lines, 'I am not yet born; forgive me I For the sins that in me the world 
shall commit' . 142 What Levinas is trying to do in this passage is to emphasise 
our passivity in the face of other people and the necessity of justifying 
ourselves to them, a necessity that arises not from an autonomous but from a 
heteronomous moral subject who fears for the harm that his simply existing, 
being there, 'under the sun', may unintentionally cause other people. 
Levinas is arguing, pace Nietzsche, that there is no 'innocence of becoming'. 
We are hurled into a world that was here before we were, and in occupying a 
place in it we are occupying a place that could be occupied by somebody 
else if we were not here. When we come into the world we all do so as 
strangers, homeless and stateless, nameless, without identity, and this is 
something that 'always already' constitutes us, prior to our becoming 
conscious of, taking over, particular responsibilities and identities. As 
Levinas poetically puts it in 'Without Identity': 
Echo of the permanent saying of the Bible: the condition - or 
incondition - of strangers and slaves in the land of Egypt brings man 
closer to his fellow man. Men seek one another in their incondition of 
strangers. No one is at home. The memory of that servitude assembles 
humanity (HO: 66). 
Perhaps this is why making a genuine apology to somebody can be so 
difficult and terrifying- because it reminds us of our primordial condition of 
stranger. There is an analogy here with the Buddhist notion of 'going forth'. 
In traditional Buddhist societies one ordained as a Buddhist monk would be 
spoken of as 'going forth' from civic life, and would be referred to as an 
'anagarika', literally 'a cityless one'. In Levinasian terms, we could say that 
such a person is exposing himself to our primordial condition as strangers, 
to the very fact that our simply being in the world is violent, and needs to be 
justified. 
142 In Francis Turner (ed.), Palgrave 's Golden Treasury (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
p.518. 
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Levinas's whole philosophy is an appeal to this 'bad conscience' 
which precedes freedom, our capacity to fear for the other and the harm that 
our simply 'being there', existing, may, unintenlionally, cause him. To be 
human is 'to prefer that which justifies being over that which assures it' 
(EN: I 33), which is perhaps the pithiest way of expressing Levinas's 
objection to Nietzsche and the will to power, to the assurance of ever greater 
degrees of power over various forms of I ife. 
We do not choose to be good ('No one is good voluntarily', Levinas 
writes (OB: II)). Rather, prior to the conscious decision to be good or bad, 
prior to the decision to exercise one's will to power in one way rather than 
another, prior to giving oneself laws or deciding to embody particular 
values, we have 'always already' been delivered over to the Other, we 
'always already' have responsibilities which we did not contract, which 
arose prior to us, but nevertheless obligate (but not compel) us: 
Interiority is the fact that in being the beginning is preceded but that 
which precedes is not presented to the free gaze that would assume it, 
does not make itself present or representation; something already 
happened 'over the head' of the present, did not pass through the cord 
of consciousness and does not Jet itself be recuperated; something 
that precedes the beginning and the principle, something that is, an-
archically, despite being, reverses or precedes being (HO: 51). 
And, 'Prior to consciousness and choice, before the creature collects himself 
in present and representation to make himself essence, man approaches man. 
He is stitched of responsibilities. Through them, he lacerates essence' (HO: 
67). This being 'stitched of responsibilities' is not something that can be 
proved or demonstrated, because it precedes all such proofs and 
demonstrations, for reasons we have seen earlier concerning the priority of 
justice over truth. In this manner Levinas presents an alternative way of 
accounting for ethics to the one Nietzsche attacks. That account - Platonic, 
Christian, or Kantian - grounds morality in a 'true world' which grants to 
morality its value, grounds it in knowledge. Nietzsche's attack on Judea-
Christian morality is based on his attacking the idea of a 'true world' in 
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which it is grounded, an attack that, as we saw in chapter one, was 
facilitated by Kant's critical philosophy. This leads Nietzsche to argue that 
moralities grounded in 'true worlds' are hostile to life in this world, and as 
such, should be replaced with a morality that does not denigrate this world. 
He finds, as we have seen, the will to power to be the adeq.uate expression 
for such a morality. He argues that the drive for power underlies all human 
actions, even the most ostensibly power-free actions, such as generosity or 
patience. Levinas, crucially, does not seek to ground morality in a 'true 
world', in knowledge. On the contrary, he regards attempts to do so as 
symptomatic of the 'philosophy of the Same', and its attempts to reduce 
goodness to truth, to situate morality within the wider, more fundamental 
context of knowing or understanding. Instead Levinas situates morality in a 
phenomenology of the face of another person. More importantly with 
reference to Nietzsche, he argues that language and self-consciousness are 
only made possible by our relationship with another person, and his calling 
me to be just. This leads him, in his later work, which is more concerned 
with the nature of moral subjectivity, to argue that, prior to consciousness, 
to the autonomous subject and his free decision to respond to particular 
obligations, there is a prior obligatedness that originates out of our fear for 
the other person, and the potential violence that my simply being here in the 
world, occupying a 'place under the sun', causes him. 
What I am suggesting is that Levinas's philosophy offers a new way 
of thinking about ethics that can and must be used to supplement 
Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's philosophy. 'Every thinker is dependent 
- upon the address of Being', wrote Heidegger (EGT: 55). The way in which 
Being addressed Levinas was very different to the way in which it addressed 
Heidegger and Nietzsche. He was a man haunted by the memory of the 
Holocaust. He experienced first hand the horrors of the Nazi reg1me, the 
practical consequences of thoughts that can be found in Nietzsche's 
portrayal of nihilism. He was also much more aware than Heidegger of the 
moral implications of our technological age. His philosophy attempts a 
response to both of these things, a voice in the wilderness, speaking out of 
the memory of suffering, and of the Old Testament prophets. Whilst it lacks 
the substance and detail of Nietzsche and Heidegger (Levinas only wrote 
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four matn works, all of which are relatively short), it nevertheless, in a 
beleaguered time, holds out an affirming flame. 
6. 7. Assessing Levinas 's Philosophy 
As I have said earlier, Levinas's philosophy is difficult to access, 
because its central topic is not something that we can produce evidence for, 
as it were set up in front of us and discuss and reach agreement about. To 
quote again one of Levinas's commentators, 'To succeed as a philosophy of 
the Other, it must fail as a philosophical text, fail to thematize adequately 
its subject'. Thus, in one interview Levinas says, 
There is no evidence with regards to the face; there is, rather, an order 
in the sense that the face is commanded value. Consequently, you 
could call it generosity; in other terms, it is the moment of faith. Faith 
is not a question of the existence or non-existence of God. It is 
believing that love without reward is valuable (PL: I 76-7). 
The problem is that Levinas is trying to point out what cannot be 
pointed out by philosophy- by doing philosophy! In this respect his work is 
analogous to Kierkegaard's. Levinas argues that philosophy is a particular 
way of speaking that arose in Greece at a certain time. He says, 
The Greeks have taught us how to speak .... Greek philosophy is a 
special language which can say everything to everyone because it 
never presupposes anything in particular. Greek philosophy is the way 
that people speak in the modern university the world over .... It is a 
certain way of presenting things. It is a way of using language that 
everyone can enter (PL: 179). 
'It is a way of using language that everyone can enter.' But what Levinas is 
trying to articulate cannot be universalized in this way. The encounter with 
the face is my encounter with the face. As soon as I try to universalize this 
encounter. I, as it were, begin to speak Greek, and, in so doing, repress the 
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very thing that I am trying to express, by thematizing it, placing it within a 
context, totalizing it. 
Moreover, as we have seen, Levinas argues that the impulse to speak 
Greek, to universalize, depends on a prior encounter with the face. On the 
basis of this encounter, in the face of more than one person making demands 
upon one, there is the necessity to generalize. As he puts it in one interview: 
Now, when there are two unique beings, the genre appears. From this 
moment on, I think of the other in the genre. I am Greek, it is Greek 
thought. The thought of comparison, of judgement, the attributes of 
the subject, in short, the entire terminology of Greek logic and Greek 
politics appear .... But, what I say, quite simply, is that [Greek 
thought and the desire for justice] is, ultimately, based on the 
relationship to the other, on the ethics without which I would not have 
sought justice (PL: 174). 
This does all raise serious questions about to what extent Levinas can 
still claim to be doing philosophy, or, more specifically, phenomenology. He 
is insistent that what he is concerned to articulate - the 'face' - is not a 
phenomenon, does not show itself. In one essay he refers to it as an 'enigma' 
(BPW: p. 70) and, as we have seen, he points out in Totality and Infinity that, 
'The welcoming of the face and the work of justice ... are not interpretable 
in terms of disclosure' (TI: 28). This leads me to think that perhaps the best 
way of reading Levinas's often emotive and incantatory prose is as a kind of 
performance that attempts to break open the accretions of the ego in order to 
foster a greater recognition of the 'otherness' of other people, their 
resistance to all of our attempt to reduce them to something more general 
than their own uniqueness. He is not trying to 'ground' or to 'found' ethics. 
Rather, he is trying to show why all such attempts to do this come too late, 
and that ethics requires evocation rathe•· than explanation, that being ethical 
is a response to a call, not the call of' Being', but of the other person, in his 
vulnerability, his susceptibility to suffering, and his 'being-towards-death'. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I have attempted to articulate a satisfactory response to 
the issue of nihilism and to the philosophy of Nietzsche, based on the 
writings of the phenomenologists Heidegger and Levinas. I began, in chapter 
one, by explaining the nature of nihilism as Nietzsche saw it. He regards 
modern European nihilism and the death of God as the result chiefly of 
Kant's arguments against us having knowledge of 'things-in-themselves'. 
This puts paid to the 'true world' hypotheses of Plato and Christianity 
whereby this world has been invested with meaning insofar as it is related to 
another, higher, better world. In chapter two 1 examined Nietzsche's 
proposed solutions to nihilism: chiefly, the overman and the will to power. 
The overman is able to create his own values in the face of the collapse of 
Judeo-Christian values, whilst recognising that his values are not part of a 
'true world'. These values will be based on the will to power, a view of life 
as the constant striving for ever greater degrees of power and distinction. 
Thus nihilism is overcome through the emergence of great men who are able 
to endure the demise of 'true worlds' without lapsing into despair or 
mediocrity. I then pointed out what kind of social arrangemellts Nietzsche 
viewed as necessary for the production of such men, and the Jack of any 
limits placed on who or what might be sacrificed in order for such men to 
thrive. 1 tried to show that Nietzsche's philosophy contains elements that we 
must find deeply disturbing, elements that may have been overlooked by 
commentators in attempts to redress Nazi distortions of his work, and 
champion him as a forerunner of existentialism and postmodernism. As 
Nietzsche himself insisted, he is 'dynamite' (EC: 15 I I p.96)! Let us not 
domesticate him, like an outspoken guest at a dinner party who we fear 
might embarrass us. 
In chapter three I consider Heidegger's response to Nietzsche and 
nihilism. Heidegger reframes the issue of nihilism, portraying Nietzsche as 
thoroughly bound up with nihilism rather than moving beyond it. For him, 
nihilism is symptomatic of a forgetfulness of Being, a forgetfulness that 
began around the time of Plato, and the switch from truth as unconcealment 
to truth as correspondence. This set Western philosophy and culture on a 
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course of increasing subjectivization of Being, culminating in Nietzsche's 
conception of nihilism in terms of values, and the age of 'technology'. 
Crucially, for Heidegger, nihilism is an event of Being itself. It has been 
sent us by Being. To think that we ourselves have brought it about, as 
Nietzsche does, is itself a form of nihilism, a version of the humanistic 
hubris that nihilism manifests as. 
In chapter four I considered Heidegger's attack on Cartesianism, and 
the subject-object distinction, as mounted in Being and Time, in terms of its 
implications as a critique of Nietzsche and his conception of nihilism. In 
chapter five I considered other aspects of Heidegger's writing as responses 
to nihilism: those on authenticity, art, language, thinking, and the 'fourfold'. 
I concluded that, for Heidegger, responding to nihilism involves becoming 
more aware of ourselves as disclosers of Being, becoming more aware of the 
particular, technological, understanding of being within which we move, and 
becoming attuned to Being, to the 'source' of all particular disclosures of 
being. This source is, crucially, not dependent on us. Rather, we are 
dependent on it, for our language, for our lives, and, as such, it is an 
appropriate object of reverence and gratitude. 
At the end of this chapter I considered three aspects of Heidegger's 
thought that might cause us unease: the sense of submission to the destiny of 
Being, his harkening back to a primordial 'ethos', and the ontic-ontological 
distinction that runs through his work. I suggested that this latter distinction 
diminishes Heidegger's philosophy's effectiveness as a response to 
Nietzsche because it subsumes the ethical dimension of Nietzsche's threat 
under a supposedly all-encompassing question of Being, and thus does not 
specifically address the most disturbing feature of Nietzsche's response to 
nihilism. 
To redress this lack I turn to Levinas in the last chapter. Here I 
outline and assess Levinas's critique of Heidegger for his subsuming of 
ethics to ontology, and his 'anarchical' ethics of the face as a way of 
philosophically upholding an ethics of fellow feeling that does not fall prey 
to Nietzsche's corrosive critique of morality. 
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I thereby hope to have shown that Heidegger's and Levinas's 
philosophies provide us with means for responding to Nietzsche's nihilism, 
without adopting the unpalatable solutions that he proposes, solutions which 
would render democracy and fellow feeling weaknesses to be overcome 
rather than strengths to be cherished. 
William Barrett, 111 the concluding pages of his excellent The Illusion 
of Technique, writes: 
As soon as we are born we breathe the air of religion: We are alive, 
and so we must die. Amid all the definitions proposed for man the 
most truthful is that he is the religious animal. He created religions 
long before the Greeks created reason. And now that he lives at last in 
the world of science and the computer, new religions sprout all over 
the map. It would be folly to think that this part of him was an 
accidental excrescence terminated by the French revolution. The 
fanaticism of subsequent history has shown that mankind has simply 
displaced its religious passions into the world; and the results have 
been more terrifying than any religious inquisition. 143 
We are, as Nietzsche points out, sensitive, delicate creatures, in need of 
balms to soothe our aching wounds. And now the traditional remedies are 
banned us. Nihilism is upon us. But we are fools, as Barrett suggests, if we 
think we have done with religion, or the need for religion. We are often told 
that we are now living in a secular age. To think this is naive. It is rather 
that our gods have taken different forms now. As Heidegger insists, we 
'always already' live under the gods, even if they have abandoned us. It 
could be feasibly argued - as David Loy does in chapter nine of A Buddhist 
History of the West - that capital ism, far from being some value-neutral 
economic system, is essentially a religion. Like all religions, it offers its 
own forms of salvation, of transcendence - they just do not happen to be 
very satisfactory ones. Nietzsche's 'last man' walks the shopping malls, 
blinking at the dazzling array of products now on offer. In the writings of 
Heidegger and Levinas we find new ways~of thinking about being 'religious' 
143 William Barrett, The Jllusion ofTechnique (London: William Kimber, 1979), p.343. 
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(in the broadest sense of the term)- in 'Being' and the 'face' - without 
falling back into the ascetic nihilism Nietzsche castigates. 
In addressing the issue of nihilism, I have been forced to consider the 
whole history of Western philosophy, via the writings of Nietzsche, 
l-leidegger and Levinas. Two thousand five hundred years ago Plato sought to 
locate meaning and morality outside the cave of culture. Over a hundred 
years ago Nietzsche proclaimed the end of such an attempt, castigating it as 
nihilistic, life-denying. Meaning and morality are firmly culture-bound, and 
this is something we must learn to live with, he insists. l-leidegger negotiates 
a 'middle way' between the two. Language and culture are not obstacles 
separating us from a 'true world', and neither are they a prison within which 
we are condemned to be trapped. Rather, they are the means whereby Being 
manifests itself to us, its shepherds. This 'middle way' offers us a way 
beyond nihilism. 
I hope to have shown that, if nihilism really is a threat, there are 
other ways of framing the issue and responding to it than those provided by 
Nietzsche. We do not need to create new values based on the will to power. 
It is not an elite of higher men whose excellence is going to justify the 
mediocrity of the majority and make life meaningful again in the wake of the 
death of God. Rather, we must heed the rally call of phenomenology and 
attend to the 'things themselves', the threads of care by which we are, in the 
world, and to the face of the other person, calling me to be just. Moreover, 
we must attend to the hold that technology has on our lives. We must give 
thanks for the threads of meaningfulness that we have inherited from 
previous generations, and attend to those aspects of our lives which resist 
the objectifying tendencies of technology: we must learn to dwell and build. 
We must attend to the ways in which we are 'always already' ethical, 
'always already' beholden to the other man. No big global blue-print of 
reform can take us out of nihilism in one fell swoop - thinking in this 
manner would be to forget Being, to practice totalizing thought, to remain 
nihilistic. We do not need philosopher kings imposing their will from above. 
Small steps, wandering and slow, are what is needed, for, as a humble 
English novelist from Nuneaton pointed out, ' ... the growing good of the 
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world is partly dependent on unhistorical acts; and that things are not so ill 
with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who 
lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs' 144 • These faithful, 
hidden, unrecorded lives, lived 'far from the madding crowd', are 
disregarded by Nietzsche, in his constant search for grandeur and greatness. 
As such, he remains as metaphysical as the metaphysicians that he 
castigates. Heidegger and Levinas return us to the 'plain sense of things'. 
This is why they may help us to move beyond nihilism into something else ... 
144 George Eliot, Middlemarch (London: Penguin, I 965), p.896. 
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